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This thesis examines British perceptions of Anglo-German colonialism in Southern Africa 
before and after the First World War. During the peace negotiations at Versailles, the British 
Foreign Office published the Blue Book which exposed Germany’s brutal suppression of 
the 1904-8 Herero and Nama uprising in German Southwest Africa (GSWA) as an abuse of 
the responsibilities of a colonial power. This was part of a move to allow Britain and her 
allies to confiscate German colonies all over the globe through showing how Germany was 
unfit as a trustee of ‘backward’ nations. The German delegation responded by publishing a 
White Book which claimed Britain had committed similar atrocities in its colonies – 
particularly in Southern Rhodesia in the 1890s. 
 
This dissertation examines the entangled histories of British and German colonial violence 
in the cases of Southern Rhodesia and GSWA. It juxtaposes how the British viewed, and in 
part collaborated with, German counterinsurgency at the zenith of ‘High Imperialism’ vs. 
their position at Versailles.  It explores the interests and agendas of British officials.  These 
included the internal security of Southern Rhodesia and the extent of governmental 
influence, the problem of the Boer diehards who had taken up residence in GSWA, and 
rivalry with Germany for command of south-central Africa. Situated in this myriad of stakes 
was the African resistance of the Ndebele and the Herero and Nama which posed both 
challenges and opportunities for British officials. 
 
Central to the thesis is an exploration of the values and ideas which underpinned British 
attitudes to colonial violence. It seeks in particular to understand the role of humanitarianism, 
central to the justification for European rule in Africa since its partition at the Berlin 
Conference. It examines equally how ideas of race and civilisation shaped how British 
officials understood both their strategic interests and the legitimate uses of colonial violence 
in the aftermath of the partition of Africa. 
 
Overall, the dissertation is a contribution to a new history of European imperialism in Africa 
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The [British South Africa] Company has become absolute proprietor of Matabeleland and Mashonaland: 
the colonists will now cultivate their land without danger, the miners will dig out their gold without 
hindrance, the shareholders at home will touch large dividend and the influence of Great Britain will 
become supreme in South Africa. If to attain this object it has been necessary to confiscate the lands of 
several thousand blacks, to cut down and massacre the native soldiery, these are mere incidents of British 
Christian Colonial life. There will be a cry in Exeter Hall, there will be a few newspaper articles, and a few 
pamphlets, and then no more will be thought of it. The wheels of the Juggernaut car of British Christian 





The great aim of German policy in German South West Africa, as regards to the native, is to reduce him 
to a state of serfdom, and, where he resists, destroy him altogether. The native, to the German, is a baboon 
and nothing more. The war against the Herero conducted by General Trotha, was one of extermination; 
hundreds – men, women and children – were driven into desert country, where death from thirst was their 
end; those left over are now in great locations near Windhuk, where they eke out a miserable existence. 
With the Hottentots – their treatment is still more barbarous, as the Germans are fully determined to root 




Before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Southern Africa saw several violent 
revolts against colonial rule. The Ndebele (anglicised as Matabele) rebellion in the British 
South African Company’s (BSAC) territory of Southern Rhodesia in 1896 and the Herero-
Nama rebellion and subsequent genocide in German South West Africa (GSWA) in 1904-8 
remain two compelling examples of this and form the two case studies around which this 
thesis is situated. These cases were both important parts of the British and German 
diplomatic efforts pertaining to the colonial question during the negotiations at Versailles 
after the First World War. Invited by this connection of the two cases after the war, this 
thesis investigates how we may, from a British perspective, characterise and understand the 
nature of the changing perceptions and responses to colonial (mis)rule and violence in Anglo-
German Southern Africa around the First World War.  
In 1918, the British published a Blue Book report which disclosed the horrors 
suffered by the Herero and Nama peoples of GSWA at the hands of a cruel German colonial 
administration. In their unsuccessful attempt to counter this, the Germans published the 
fittingly named White Book, which suggested that Britain too was guilty of colonial crimes – 
most evidently in Southern Rhodesia. The focus of the thesis is emphasising British officials’ 
perceptions of these incidents and tracks their development from the advent of colonial 
expansion into Africa to the end-game of German colonialism at the Versailles treaty in 1919 
and the creation of the League of Nations the following year, when GSWA became a 
                                                 
 
1 BL: 8154.dd.20.(10.), [Unknown Author], The Matabele Scandal and its Consequences, etc. (Cambridge, 1894), 17. 
2 TNA: FO 367/136: Intelligence Report by Captain H.S.P Simon, 6 March 1909, enclosed in Walter-Hely 
Hutchinson to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Crewe, [undated], 1. 
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mandate of the Union of South Africa. As Susan Pedersen has observed, one of the core 
premises of the new mandates system was that these territories were to be held ‘in sacred 
trust’.3 This resembled the international law concerning colonial rule from the pre-war years, 
where the Berlin Treaty (1885) in particular laid out the ostensible responsibilities of the 
colonial powers in governing Africans.4 In its Article 6, it stated: 
 
All the Powers exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories [African continent] bind 
themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the 
conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help in suppressing slavery, and especially the 
slave trade. They shall, without distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific or 
charitable institutions and undertakings created and organised for the above ends, or which aim at 




The Berlin Treaty serves as a backdrop against which colonial rule could be judged both 
morally and in terms of international law. At Versailles, it presented a viable opportunity to 
represent German misrule in GSWA as being in violation hereof and at the same time to 
promote British imperialism as being morally superior.6 Colonial misrule and violence was 
therefore directly engaged with the British diplomatic agenda after the war. With the two 
cases serving as reference points at Versailles, it is worth asking first how British officials 
responded to the 1896 rebellion in Southern Rhodesia and the Herero-Nama war in GSWA 
when they were unfolding contra their views after the First World War? Second, how may 
we understand the changing relations between British officials in Whitehall and the two 
secondary actors – the BSAC and Germany – in the face of colonial wars and cases of 
maladministration? From these perspectives, the thesis will seek to bring the two cases 
together to understand not only the ways in which British officials viewed and responded to 
these incidents, but also how they intersected with other arenas such as diplomatic agendas 
and imperial policies. Indeed, it will examine how these officials managed reports of violence 
and misrule in the colonies at different times and in different contexts with varying interests 
and agendas. 
 
A crucial element of this thesis is the developing field within imperial history concerning 
colonial violence. This topic has received increasing attention, particularly from scholars 
concerned with India’s colonial history where it has been demonstrated that violence was an 
                                                 
 
3 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford, 2015), 1-2. 
4 Wm. Roger Louis, Germany’s Lost Colonies, 1914–1919 (Oxford, 1967), 29. 
5 TNA: FO 881/5181: General Act of the West African Conference, 26 February 1885, Article 6. 





intrinsic part of everyday life.7 Naturally, colonial violence differentiated according to 
context, setting and time, but in colonial Africa, as will be shown, violence was a prevalent 
feature of colonial rule. Furthermore, although violence in this thesis is mainly seen as 
physical, it could also be, for instance, psychological or social. As Philip Dwyer and Amanda 
Nettelbeck have recently argued, colonial violence was not a singular entity or an outcome 
of a particular event, but rather ‘a historical contingent.’ One crucial factor was the aim of 
the coloniser in committing violence. For instance, exploitative colonialism, intended to 
extract resources, sought to subjugate the colonised as a source of labour, whereas settler 
colonialism sought the expropriation of lands, and potentially extermination of the colonised, 
to make way for settlers.8 In the two cases here, however, these categorisations of colonialism 
as determinants of the nature of violence are somewhat distorted. Where the aim in Southern 
Rhodesia in 1896 was to extract the mineral wealth of the colony, the expropriation of 
Ndebele lands was also evident. Similarly, GSWA was earmarked as a German settler colony, 
but there were also, as will be discussed, clear indications and voiced ambitions to subjugate 
the Herero and Nama as forced labourers. These categories should therefore not be 
considered monolithic: colonial violence was not exclusively part of a specific strategy for 
the colony in question, but also emerged haphazardly and took forms that did not necessarily 
reflect a broader strategy or ambition.  
Colonial violence, as Mark Condos has observed, was often permitted as exceptional 
conditions could be created, as it was committed against foes considered to be ‘fanatics’.9 In 
Africa, insurgents could also be seen also as fanatics, but perhaps more commonly as 
barbarians, which, for the coloniser, rendered a harsh response necessary. In his momentous 
Wretched of the Earth (1961), Frantz Fanon disclosed the nature of colonialism, where violence 
and the subjugation of the colonised were the norm. According to Fanon, a dehumanisation 
of ‘the natives’ saw violence as an integral part of maintaining colonial rule, and for the 
colonised, violence was the only way to challenge the colonial state and its oppression. 
Consequently, the colonised perceived the coloniser as the embodiment of ‘absolute evil’ and 
vice versa.10 Fanon’s views are still fundamental to the developing attention to colonial 
violence, as it was an integral part of how colonial rule sustained itself and constantly sought 
hegemony by imposing violent measures. Indeed, the weakness of the colonial state resulted 
                                                 
 
7 See, for instance Jonathan Saha, ‘Histories of Everyday violence in British India’, History Compass, 9, 11 
(2011). 
8 Philip Dwyer and Amanda Nettelbeck (eds.), Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World 
(Forthcoming, London, 2018), 2-4. 
9 See Mark Condos, ‘Licence to Kill: The Murderous Outrage Act and the Rule of Law in Colonial India, 
1867-1925’, Modern Asians Studies, 50, 2 (2016). 
10 Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth [org. 1961] (London, 2001), 29-33 & 73. 
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in the imposition of violent measures to remain in control over the much larger African 
populations.11 Both Southern Rhodesia and GSWA, as will be discussed, were characteristic 
of weak colonial states. The constant search for hegemony was paired with the 
dehumanisation of the colonised, where racial views of Africans as inferior constructed a 
conviction that the coloniser had ‘the right to kill’ if necessary.12 But as Dominik Schaller has 
noted in his study of the conduct of German soldiers in GSWA and East Africa, racism alone 
cannot explain colonial violence. The constant fear of ambush, rumours of mutilations and 
group dynamics created a psychological framework where the soldiers readily committed 
atrocious acts of violence.13 This was also the case for Southern Rhodesia where the Ndebele 
rebels struck fear among the British troops, resulting in, as will be shown, in the shooting of 
chiefs and alleged spies despite this being against established procedures. 
This thesis will also explore transcolonial aspects of colonial violence such as 
collaboration in counter-insurgency and the transfer of practices of colonial violence such as 
concentration camps. More importantly, by examining how reports of violence were acted 
on and managed by British officials in changing circumstances, the thesis will examine how 
colonial violence impacted both diplomatic and imperial agendas and policies. The two cases, 
as we shall see, both remain examples of the oppressive nature of colonial rule and the 
violence that came with European expansion in Africa, despite often being seen as minor 
incidents in ‘the scramble for Africa’.14 From the perspective of Whitehall, both cases were 
nothing but ‘small wars’ or ‘uprisings’ fought against rebels and not governments nor 
resistance groups. The targeting of the civilian population was part of the overall strategy of 
both Britain and Germany, often intended to remove the substance of the rebels and hinder 
any future rebellions.15 Colonial violence was therefore in the context of a war seeking to end 
an insurgency. Officials did not see these rebellions as great moments of resistance or early 
beginnings of anticolonial movements or national consciousness, but rather as small 
incidents of insurgency that should be quelled through excessive violence if necessary. 
Reinforced by racist dehumanisation, this meant, as Jan-Bart Gewald has observed, that ‘total 
                                                 
 
11 Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria 
(Philadelphia, 2013), 92-4. 
12 Klaas van Walraven and Jon Abbink, ‘Rethinking Resistance in African History: An Introduction’ in Jon 
Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn, Klaus van Walraven (eds.), Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African 
History (Leiden, 2003), 25. 
13 Dominik Schaller, ‘From Conquest to Genocide: Colonial Rule in German Southwest Africa and German 
East Africa’ in Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World 
History (New York, 2008), 311. 
14 See, for instance, Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (London, 1992). 
15 Dirk Moses, ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide. Keywords and the Philosophy of History’ in Moses (ed.), Empire, 
Colony, Genocide, 27. 
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subjugation, humiliation, destruction and death was often decided upon by the people in 
offices 8,000 km away.’16  
With only a few exceptions, Southern Rhodesia and GSWA have seldom been 
compared or studied together. For instance, John Wellington and Benjamin Madley included 
Southern Rhodesia to contextualise the genocide in GSWA, but it remained a marginal theme 
in both works.17 Mark Levene, for instance, brought the 1896 rebellion and the Herero-Nama 
war together and claimed that the Ndebele (and Shona) war was ‘a significant precursor’ to 
the war in GSWA. For Levene, the violence committed by the British in Southern Rhodesia 
was similar to that of the Germans in GSWA, as they both sought the extermination of 
Africans.18 In Southern Rhodesia, the British scrupulously used dynamite to blow up caves 
in which resistance fighters were hiding, but also where women and children had taken refuge 
from the war. In GSWA, the Germans waged a brutal war in the field and established 
concentration camps to exploit and arguably exterminate prisoners. It remains important at 
this stage, however, to note that there is a clear asymmetry in terms of the scale of violence 
in the two cases. Levene is wrong to consider both as wars of extermination on the same 
level. For instance, the road to peace was widely different in the two cases. In Southern 
Rhodesia, peace came after a remarkable deal struck between the Ndebele Indunas and 
Rhodes, after which the fighting generally ceased. Conversely, in GSWA, the concentration 
camp policy continued long after the main fighting had ended. Indeed, the rhetoric and 
practices of extermination, as will be shown, were far more widespread in GSWA than in 
Southern Rhodesia. 
These dissimilarities are important to keep in mind when making broader 
observations about colonial violence in the two cases. Nevertheless, the response by British 
officials in both cases shows similar patterns in how potentially harmful and problematic 
information about violence and misrule was managed, which is at the crux of this thesis. As 
mentioned, it was colonial violence that was promoted by the Blue Book to advocate the 
confiscation of Germany’s colonies. Similarly, in the White Book, British colonial violence 
was the centrepiece in its propagation of ‘the crimson trail of Britain across the world.’19 This 
thesis can therefore add to the emerging history of colonial violence by examining the 
                                                 
 
16 Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘German Governance in Namibia’, Review of Jürgen Zimmerer, Deutsche Herrschaft 
über Afrikaner. Staatslicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia (Münster, 2004), 
Journal of African History, 46 (2005), 175. 
17 See John Wellington, South-West Africa and its Human Issues (Oxford, 1967) and Benjamin Madley, ‘From 
Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and 
Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe’, European History Quarterly, 35, 3 (2005). 
18 Mark Levene, The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide (London, 2005), 253. 
19 TNA: CO 323/807: Correspondence pertaining to Germany’s White Book, 11 April 1919. 
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reactions to it from the perspective of British officials in a transnational context as well as in 
different chronological settings where the diplomatic circumstances were imperative to how 
such violence and misrule were portrayed.  
 
Although the historiographies of each case will be discussed in depth in designated chapters 
in each case study, it is worth highlighting the tendencies in the historiography of Southern 
Rhodesia and GSWA respectively, and examining how these differentiate and converge. 
Terence Ranger has in many ways been the pioneer of African and in particular Zimbabwean 
history and his momentous Revolt in Southern Rhodesia (1967) has been the benchmark for 
future publications on the 1896 rebellion and arguably for African history in general.20 Ranger 
contended, first of all, that the 1896 rebellion came as a unified African response to 
colonialism and was orchestrated through a spiritual leader, the Molimo, formulating an early 
formation of national consciousness.21 This was later refuted by, amongst others, Julian 
Cobbing, who saw the 1896 rebellion not as a proto-nationalist uprising, but as the last-ditch 
attempt by the Ndebele state to regain power.22 Nevertheless, what Ranger termed ‘primary 
resistance’ – the initial response to colonialism – has in many ways created a connectivity to 
the later liberation struggles (‘secondary resistance’).23 Indeed, although Ranger himself 
rejected the idea that the 1960s and 1970s bush war – the ‘second Chimurenga’ – in 
Zimbabwe was ‘a return to the values of the society engaged in the 1896 risings’, he did 
suggest that the African will to control one’s own destiny was fundamental to both 
occurrences and therefore that the ‘first Chimurenga’ of 1896 was a historic precursor to the 
second.24 
Similarly, in Namibia, the genocide became ‘one of the pillars of anti-colonial 
propaganda.’ Although they were mainly concerned with the nature of German colonialism 
in GSWA, Helmut Bley’s Namibia under German Rule (1971) and in particular Horst 
Drechsler’s Let us Die Fighting (1980) both became central to the formation of Namibian 
                                                 
 
20 One historian who was inspired by Ranger and has been one of the most notable scholars of African 
history is John Iliffe who, for instance, argued for Africans to be considered actors rather than ‘passive 
objects of colonial rule’. See, for instance, John Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule, 1905-1912 (Cambridge, 
1969), 5. 
21 Terence Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97: A Study in African Resistance (London, 1967), 377-78. 
22 Julian Cobbing, ‘The Absent Priesthood: Another Look at the Rhodesian Risings of 1896-1897’, The Journal 
of African History, 18, 1 (1977), 62-3. 
23 See Terence Ranger, ‘Connexions between “Primary Resistance” Movements and Modern Mass 
Nationalism in East and Central Africa’, Part I & II in The Journal of African History, 9, 3 & 4 (1968). 
24 Terence Ranger, Writing Revolt: An Engagement with African Nationalists 1957-67 (Harare, 2013), xi-xiii.  
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national identity during the struggle for independence from South Africa.25 As observed by 
Reinhart Kössler, there are therefore ‘commonalities’ in how the histories of primary 
resistance constructed images of nationalism in both Namibia and Zimbabwe.26 The histories 
of resistance to the BSAC and Germany respectively, created powerful images of a nation 
which translated into a rallying call for anticolonial movements such as SWAPO in Namibia 
and ZANU (and ZAPU) in Zimbabwe.27 As Ian Phimister has noted, patriotic history, 
characterised by the articulation of loyalty to the liberation movements and governing parties, 
means that the historical roots of ZANU–PF are the ‘alpha and omega’ in Zimbabwean 
historiography.28 Therefore, the national identities and political legitimacy of the wars of 
independence are grounded in images of a past of primary resistance against colonialism and 
this, Henning Melber observes, is the same pattern in both Zimbabwe and Namibia.29 
However, the historiography of GSWA has seen the development of a different 
tendency, in which a supposed continuity between the Herero-Nama genocide and the 
Holocaust has become the overshadowing focus. This has seen the revival of a new ‘colonial’ 
Sonderweg, suggesting that German colonialism was uniquely brutal and the genocidal horrors 
in GSWA were, some argue, nothing short of a precursor to the Holocaust.30 Jeremy Sarkin, 
for instance, claims that the practices used by the Nazis in the Holocaust were not only 
inspired by, but were outright developed in GSWA.31 This colonial Sonderweg represents a 
return to the history of the German nation state in the colonial world, as continuities of 
German, not Namibian, history, are observed here. Furthermore, it has meant that the search 
                                                 
 
25 Jan Bart Gewald, ‘Herero genocide in the twentieth century: Politics and Memory’ in Abbink et al. 
Rethinking Resistance, 294. See also Horst Drechsler, Let us Die Fighting: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama 
against German Imperialism, 1884-1915 (London, 1980) and Helmut Bley Namibia under German Rule (London, 
1971). Both were initially published in German with the titles Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft and 
Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika, 1894-1914 in 1966 and 1968 respectively.  
26 Reinhart Kössler, ‘Images of History and the Nation: Namibia and Zimbabwe Compared’, South African 
Historical Journal, 62, 1 (2010), 31-3. 
27 Ibid., 40-2. 
28 Ian Phimister, ‘Narratives of progress: Zimbabwean historiography and the end of history’, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, 30, 1 (2012), 28. See also Terence Ranger, ‘Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic 
History and the History of the Nation: the Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 30, 2 (2004). 
29 Henning Melber, ‘“Namibia, land of the brave”: Selective memories on war and violence within nation 
building’ in Abbink et al. Rethinking Resistance, 308. Also, Terence Ranger, Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn 
McGregor, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matabeleland (Oxford, 2000), 254-5. 
30 Matt Fitzpatrick, ‘The Pre-History of the Holocaust? The Sonderweg and Historikerstreit Debates and the 
Abject Colonial Past’, Central European History, 41, 3 (2008), 486. There are numerous publications indicative 
of a new colonial Sonderweg. See, for instance, Jürgen Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beitrage zum 
Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust (Münster, 2011) and David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen, The 
Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism (London, 2010).  
31 Jeremy Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero- Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers (Cape 
Town, 2010), 20-22. 
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for the colonial roots of the Holocaust have become the alpha and omega in the 
historiography of the Herero and Nama rebellion and genocide. 
The historiographies of Zimbabwe and Namibia, therefore, show both similarities 
and dissimilarities, but in both cases colonial violence remains a key theme that is connected 
to later issues. In Zimbabwe, the 1896 rebellion is connected to the bush war in the 1960s 
and 1970s and remains central to national identity and the ZANU–PF. In Namibia, the 
Herero-Nama genocide is similarly connected to the struggle for independence and national 
identity, but it is also connected to the Holocaust. Incidentally, the colonial pasts of both 
Namibia and Zimbabwe have recently re-emerged. In January 2017, the Herero and Nama 
decided to sue the German state and various companies such as Deutsche Bank for their 
complicity in the genocide.32 At the same time, debates and protests surrounding Cecil 
Rhodes’ legacy in both South Africa and Britain, prompted by the Rhodes Must Fall 
Campaign, has created a public debate about the memory of Rhodes (and by extension the 
BSAC) and the British empire. The history and memory of the 1896 Ndebele rebellion and 
the 1904-8 Herero-Nama genocide, therefore, have seen relatively parallel afterlives both in 
terms of similar historiographical patterns and the resurfacing of these histories in current 
political debates on the memories of colonialism. 
Instead of making parallels, continuities or causalities – whether to anticolonial 
liberation movements or to the Holocaust – this thesis draws the cases into a common 
history of European expansion and colonialism. Through British officials as the central actor, 
the thesis will bring these cases together through an asymmetrical entangled history. This will 
be further elaborated upon below, but it means that it does not seek to investigate the 
entanglements between two states or entities, but rather how two events of disproportionate 
scales, when approached from a common outset, are connected at different moments and in 
different contexts. There is therefore not merely entanglement in terms of space, but also 
time. Indeed, the two cases not only have similar afterlives, but were both crucial 
components at Versailles where these histories converged and were promoted as exemplary 
of German and British colonialism. 
This thesis is intended as a thorough study of two cases of resistance and colonial 
wars that deserve the attention of scholars instead of being reduced to marginal incidents in 
the ‘scramble for Africa’, or as mere reference points for the anticolonial risings of the 1960s 
and 1970s or the terrors of the Third Reich. However, the novelty of this thesis lies not only 
in its original inquiry into these two cases as a contrast to these historiographies of continuity, 
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but also in its addressing of the interplay between diplomatic, realpolitik concerns and 
humanitarian ideologies challenged by reports of misrule and violence. It brings together 
different approaches to imperial history that have traditionally been separate, and can 
therefore disclose how a central actor – British officials – engaged in both moral and realist 
convictions and interests. As will be shown, potential scandals and critique of colonial 
practices, characterised by violence and excessive racism, were directly engaged with 
diplomatic action, either posing a threat to realpolitik and foreign policy interests or lending 
it considerable moral substance. Therefore, managing knowledge and reports on misrule and 
violence in the colonial world was crucial for British officials. Moreover, by deploying this in 
a shifting context before and after the First World War, we can furthermore infer what the 
outbreak of the hostilities in 1914 and the conventional history of Anglo-German rivalry 




The cases represent two different stories of how British officials responded to and perceived 
colonial rule and violence. Southern Rhodesia represents an ‘inward’ case, situated within the 
British imperial sphere, while GSWA is an ‘outward’ case which includes another colonising 
power – Germany – as a crucial actor. This may reveal how responses to and perceptions of 
colonial rule and violence interplayed with internal empire-building and control and external 
foreign relations and dynamics respectively. Consequently, this thesis touches upon many 
aspects such as comparative approaches, Anglo-German relations and colonial violence; 
however, it remains clear that this thesis does not fall neatly into an existing historiography 
concerned with a particular field within imperial history. 
 Given that the thesis is built around two case studies, it is first important to ascertain 
the comparative elements that are relevant. Comparative history demands certain carefully 
selected aspects to be in common between the entities that are being compared.33  
Furthermore, it necessitates the selection of a transferable ‘object’ that is present in both 
entities – in other words, what is being compared.34 Roughly based on this, in this thesis the 
two entities are therefore company and German colonial rule and violence in Southern 
Rhodesia and GSWA respectively, and the ‘object’ being compared is the perception and 
response of British officials in Whitehall. According to Reo Matsuzaki, colonies can be 
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‘systematically compared, if comparisons are structured around common sets of mechanisms 
that similarly regulate the behaviour of actors across cases.’35 However, this thesis does not 
strictly follow a conventional comparative approach where the similarities and dissimilarities 
between German and British colonialism are elucidated. Rather, it analyses the perceptions 
and responses of a selected, yet common actor on two separate cases that represent 
comparative historical circumstances of ‘native rebellions’. Naturally, comparative history 
has its shortcomings. Not only is there the problem concerning the significant quantities of 
sources, but there is also the reliance on specialised literature on the selected entities. In this 
thesis, the specialist literature is especially on German and British colonialism, which are two 
separated historiographies that need to be conjoined. 
There are, as has already been mentioned, clear dissimilarities between the two cases. 
First and foremost, the rising in GSWA lasted longer and was of a much larger scale than 
the Ndebele rebellion. Censuses and estimations of the Ndebele and Shona populations from 
the time are extremely unreliable. Julian Cobbing notes that one estimate from 1895 listed 
the Ndebele population to be approximately 46,000 and a census from 1897-98 estimated it 
to be around 120,000. The latter remains most trustworthy, but does not give any estimation 
as to how many perished in the 1896 rebellion.36 Furthermore, any estimation may be unclear, 
as it would undoubtedly be problematized by recurring famines in the 1890s.37 Although also 
unreliable, the Herero and Nama, according to the Blue Book, had populations of 
approximately 80,000 and 20,000 respectively prior to 1904.38 The conflicts in Southern 
Rhodesia and GSWA, however, were remarkably different when it came to their magnitude. 
In Southern Rhodesia a rather questionable estimate suggests that more than 9,000 Ndebele 
and Shona were killed between 1896 and 1897.39 In GSWA, estimations of how many were 
killed are also unreliable and vary immensely, but are substantially higher, as it is believed 
that the Herero and Nama populations were decimated by approximately 80% and 50% 
respectively.40  
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The two cases are also separated by the practices employed by the Europeans. 
Although the practices of violence employed by the British were indeed brutal, they were 
very different from the conduct of the Germans in GSWA where concentration camps were 
established and outright orders of extermination were issued. Where the war in Southern 
Rhodesia was perhaps more a war of brutal subjugation, the war in GSWA is generally 
claimed to have been one of extermination.  Additionally, GSWA was intended to be built 
around agriculture and earmarked as Germany’s ‘white dominion’, equivalent to Australia or 
Canada.41 Southern Rhodesia, however, was colonised by the BSAC with the purpose of 
extracting its supposed mineral wealth.42 This meant a different type of colonisation and 
subjugation of the indigenous communities. As mentioned, the violence that came with each 
type should not be seen as monolithic, but ostensibly, in GSWA the Africans were an 
‘obstacle’ to the creation of a settler colony, whereas in Southern Rhodesia they were a source 
of labour for the mines. Despite these clear dissimilarities, however, certain parallels do exist 
on a more structural level. For instance, both cases reveal the inherent weakness of the 
colonial state in its continuous attempt to establish hegemony, as has already been 
mentioned.43 More importantly, the way in which British officials in London managed 
reports of colonial maladministration and violence that was in clear violation of established 
principles and international law also saw a similar pattern. In both cases, information about 
excesses and atrocities was frequently sent back to Whitehall but was always managed in 
accordance with official interests, depending on which policy was being pursued towards the 
BSAC or Germany. However, with the dissimilarities outweighing the similarities, why – or 
rather how – can these two cases be brought together? Although the inclusion of two case 
studies necessitates some level of comparison, this cannot be the main approach, since these 
cases are simply too different and are of such disproportionate scales. Yet, the comparative 
element will enable the thesis to contextualise the practices and perceptions of colonial rule 
and violence. What we can infer from these cases, however, is what this thesis is concerned 
with: a study of how a central actor reacted to these events in different circumstances.  
 
The approach of this thesis is in many ways shaped by transnational and especially entangled 
history. Transnational history questions the defined borders and limitations that have been 
put onto the historical past from present-day national borders by focusing on a range of 
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connections and entanglements that transcend politically bounded territories.44 It has been 
particularly useful as a tool to understand colonial and imperial history, as empires and 
colonies were themselves transnational by nature.45 The subjugation of indigenous 
populations and the colonial borders drawn in Europe meant that the colonies were home 
to many different ‘nations’, whether local or European. This is particularly important in 
Southern Africa, as the region consisted of many different European groups besides its many 
African communities. Furthermore, in this thesis, transnational history is important, since 
the colonial world has mostly been considered separate and disconnected, where rivalry has 
obscured the more hidden patterns of inter-colonial collaboration. Indeed, the years prior to 
the First World War are generally conceived as being steeped in Anglo-German antagonism, 
with incidents such as the Kruger Telegram in 1896 or the naval race being indicative of an 
increasing estrangement.46 Consequently, imperial history has seen the invocation of 
nationally deduced colonial borders of German, British or French spheres as relatively 
autonomous extensions of European nation states.47 In fact, the traditional approach to the 
European empires, including studies examining two or more, tends to reflect national 
empires.48 
 In their series on The Rulers of Africa (1977 & 1979), Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan 
approached both British and German colonialism in Africa through what they termed 
‘parallel’ studies.49 One of their central arguments is that factors such as a desire for more 
geopolitical security, a search for glory, the civilising mission and especially nationalism were 
equal in importance to economic factors in instigating actors to effectuate imperialism.50  
However, Gann and Duignan’s rigid division of the British and German spheres obscures 
the entanglements and connections across the colonial border. Instead, the colonies of the 
region were intensely entangled, as the colonial border drawn up between them merely 
reflected the formal rule of empire, but not necessarily the colonial reality, where settlers, 
Africans, trade and communication crossed relatively freely. Furthermore, the search for 
geopolitical security in Southern Africa was a transnational concern, where Britain had to 
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intimately interact with other actors such as the BSAC and Germany in order to pacify risings 
and maintain stability on the borderlands. 
 The interactions and collaborations between Britain and Germany in Africa have 
been explored by, among others, Ulrike Lindner, who in Koloniale Begegnungen (2011) displayed 
the connectedness between British and German colonial spheres in Southern and East 
Africa, arguing that there was a ‘shared colonial project’ in existence.51 This issue of 
collaboration is also relevant in Southern Rhodesia, although it was of a different nature, as 
this was ‘internal’ to the British Empire where the government and the BSAC saw changing 
relations develop around the 1896 rebellion. However, as will be evident throughout this 
thesis, co-operation did not necessarily replace an antagonistic sentiment between the 
colonial powers and between the government and a sub-imperial actor like the BSAC. 
Indeed, co-operation coexisted alongside rivalry. This will be particularly evident in the case 
of GSWA where British actors remained suspicious of German intentions and at times 
hesitated or even refused to co-operate against the Herero and Nama. Nevertheless, it is 
appropriate to consider Anglo-German colonialism in Southern Africa within a transnational 
framework to understand the premises and contexts in which colonial rule was effectuated 
and violence against the colonised in the face of resistance was perpetrated. Another crucial 
aspect of entanglement was that colonial powers learned from each other. Practices proven 
to be useful and new norms of violence in colonial warfare soon set new standards and 
caused inspiration that could easily move across the colonial border.52  
According to Michel Werner and Benédicte Zimmermann, entangled history allows 
us ‘to reconsider the interactions between different societies or cultures.’53 It renders possible 
the merger of comparative and transfer studies which have traditionally been seen as 
opposites, since comparative analysis requires the acknowledgement of defined entities, 
                                                 
 
51 Ulrike Lindner, Koloniale Begegnungen. Deutschland und Großbritannien als Imperialmächte in Afrika 1880-1914 
(Frankfurt am Main, 2011), 458. For further sturdies concerning the entanglement of Anglo-German 
colonialism, see also Lindner, ‘Encounters Over the Border: The Shaping of Colonial Identities in 
Neighbouring British and German Colonies in Southern Africa’ in Lindner et al., Hybrid Cultures- Nervous 
States: Britain and Germany in a (Post)Colonial World (Amsterdam, 2010). Also, Ronald Dreyer, The Mind of 
Official Imperialism. British and Cape Government Perception of German rule in Namibia from the Heligoland-Zanzibar 
Treaty to the Kruger Telegram, 1890-1896 (Essen, 1987). 
52 Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski (eds.), Imperial Co-Operation and Transfer, 1870-1930 (London, 2015), 7-
9. 
53 Michael Werner and Benédicte Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of 
Reflexivity’, History and Theory, 45 (2006), 30. 
19 
 
often nations.54 Furthermore, according to Werner and Zimmermann, entangled history can 
showcase how the interconnectedness in history also creates meaning in different contexts.55 
This thesis does not seek to make outright comparisons of colonial rule; nor does it seek to 
investigate how German and British colonialism were entangled into one another in the same 
vein as, for instance, Lindner. Instead, the transnational method of this thesis is a revamped 
– or rather asymmetrical – entangled history. The entanglement here is one through time and 
space: these events, despite their dissimilarities, were connected through the same events at 
Versailles, and also, since the two cases occurred within the same region and timeframe, 
through regional dynamics. Indeed, this thesis is historically situated in a context where other 
central events were highly influential on the circumstances of the cases and on how colonial 
rule and violence was perceived. For instance, consistently in the background were the 
ongoing troubles between British and Boers in Southern Africa; in the first case, the growing 
antagonism leading up to the South African War (1899-1902) affected and shaped policies 
and strategies regarding Southern Rhodesia and the BSAC. Furthermore, the BSAC itself, 
with Cecil Rhodes in charge, played a crucial role in the outbreak of war in 1899, as 
exemplified by the Jameson Raid in 1895. In the case of GSWA, Anglo-Boer relations and 
the war had a profound impact on the colony and on Anglo-German relations in Southern 
Africa. As will be shown, British officials were concerned by the possible ramifications that 
the war in GSWA could have on their own territory and how this would, in one way or 
another, influence the Boer population to possibly take up arms. The South African War 
changed the political and economic balance in the region in favour of Britain but also allowed 
for a fragile peace to exist between British and Boers. Sub-imperial forces such as the BSAC 
and rival actors such as Germany, therefore, either influenced or threatened this delicate 
situation. Thus, these two events are interwoven through time and space and are influenced 
by wider regional dynamics and events, which is particularly evident when approached from 
the standpoint of the same actor across the trajectory under scrutiny in this thesis. 
But it remains important to state that the Southern Rhodesia case is not directly 
connected to or entangled with the GSWA case. Furthermore, while Britain and South Africa 
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were deeply entangled in the affair in GSWA, Germany was not entangled in the events in 
Southern Rhodesia. In the GSWA case, more conventional traces of entangled history are 
evident, as it explores British collaboration and connectivity across the colonial border. 
However, this is exclusively from the British aspect, not the German. Similar traces of 
entangled history are not evident in the Southern Rhodesia case, as this was internal to the 
British imperial sphere. What is examined here is the government-company relations 
concerning colonial rule and violence. Hence, there is a certain asymmetry to the two cases 
in terms of entanglement. Additionally, the cases differ significantly both in scale and in the 
nature of how they developed. Here it is important to reiterate that this thesis does not seek 
to investigate these two cases comparatively, nor to examine how they were connected in 
themselves. They happened at different times and in different places and had profound 
dissimilarities. Yet, as shown, both these events were connected by the portrayals at Versailles 
and through the perceptions of a single author: British officials. When approached from the 
angle of British officials with the colonial question at Versailles in mind, they may reveal 
certain ways in which colonial violence and evidence of misrule were managed and tailored 
to suit the specific diplomatic and political situation. Asymmetric entangled history in this 
thesis, therefore, should be understood as an approach that gauges the interconnectedness 
and entanglements of these two rather different cases in different contexts and at different 
times, but approached from a common historical actor. 
 
The Official Mind, Actors and Source Material 
 
The sources used in this thesis are mainly official documents retrieved from the National 
Archives (Kew, UK) and the German Bundesarchiv, Lichterfelde. The thesis therefore does 
not attempt to scrutinise the perspectives of Africans and their subjugation, and 
consequently, the experience of colonial rule and violence remains a marginal theme. It will be 
studied as a sub-theme throughout, but it will not be at the forefront of this inquiry. 
However, as will be shown, African agency was important, as the reactions and perceptions 
of British officials often came as a response to situations brought about by Africans. Specific 
cases such as that of Nama resistance leader Jakob Marengo remain instructive and will 
accordingly be emphasised, but only as a way to further the inquiry of the thesis, rather than 
as a study of colonial resistance and African agency in itself. 
The focus on the officials investigates the view from Whitehall and especially the 
Colonial Office and the Foreign Office (henceforth CO and FO respectively). Reports, 
telegrams etc. are therefore the most frequently featured array of sources used in this thesis. 
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Sources from, for instance, parliamentary debates remain at the fringes of this inquiry. These 
sources may certainly pose interesting angles and perspectives, but they do not address the 
core premises of decision-making and colonial policies. Such policies and the whole scope 
of foreign relations were primarily in the hands of the executive power – the government. 
Parliament was without much influence concerning foreign relations and the government 
even held the right to refuse information to parliament ‘on the ground that the release of 
such information would be prejudicial to the public interest.’56 In Thomas Otte’s The Foreign 
Office Mind (2011), the underlying ideas and principles that existed in the halls of the FO are 
observed as creating a particular mindset on an institutional basis. Although this was not 
monolithic, it nonetheless suggests that the institutions of the British government can indeed 
be studied as entities.57 Thus, this thesis will focus on the executive power as a collective 
body where decision-making and perceptions of colonial rule and violence were constructed. 
The CO and WO mainly dealt with affairs regarding the 1896 Ndebele rising, while for the 
Herero-Nama war in GSWA, the FO remained a key institution. Although the CO was 
mostly included in the affairs on GSWA too, this differentiation nonetheless showcases 
discrepancies in how each case was perceived. For instance, Southern Rhodesia was 
ostensibly embedded in imperial policies, whereas GSWA was more interwoven into British 
foreign policy toward Germany. But in both cases it is evident that broader imperial policies 
and interests of the British government were crucial. What is therefore key here is that despite 
these differentiations, the official mind in this thesis should be understood as a conversation 
spanning the CO, FO, WO, BSAC and even Germany. 
On the ground, several colonial actors were at play and provided Whitehall with 
numerous reports, telegrams and information about the two cases as well as being imperative 
in effectuating British colonial policies and the relations with GSWA and the BSAC 
respectively. It is important to note here that while Southern Rhodesia and GSWA were 
administered by the BSAC and Germany respectively, the surrounding territories, particularly 
the Cape Colony and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, were under the administration of the 
CO, the Cape Government and the FO.58 Through the nineteenth century, a colonial 
administration was built up in the Cape and in 1853 it was granted responsible government 
and thus a degree of self-determination.59 Later, after the South African War, the Transvaal 
also saw a gradual move towards self-governance in 1907. The links between British officials 
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in the metropole and in the colonial ‘periphery’, therefore, were part of a rather complex set 
of different actors depending on where and when. Matsuzaki contends that there are three 
arenas in which the colonial state acts: First, the international scene, where diplomacy 
between European colonial powers influenced colonial policy and interests; second, the 
home arena, where the ‘colonial state’ coordinated with the metropole, which could be a 
point of disagreement, but also one of common policy or diplomatic effort; and third, the 
domestic arena, which can be reduced to the conventional encounter between colonised and 
coloniser.60 Thus, the colonial state and its men-on-the-spot acted within a wider framework 
that entailed international relations on a broader scale, as well as interacting in relation to the 
metropolitan institutions as well as the more immediate local interests.  
This transnational framework of administrative and executive power meant that the 
men-on-the-spot often acted in accordance with policies and regulations as decided from 
Whitehall. Often, they interpreted these liberally, but they followed them nonetheless, 
perhaps because senior appointments in the colonial service were still made by the CO.61 At 
the same time, these colonial actors displayed different interests than those in the metropole. 
The High Commissioner, the Governor and the Cape government were all important actors 
that drove British colonialism on the ground for different purposes and with different 
visions, both amongst themselves and also different from the ambitions of Whitehall. As will 
be shown, High Commissioner Alfred Milner had a very different view to the CO in London 
of forced labour and ‘public works’ in Southern Rhodesia. Similarly, the Cape Government 
were somewhat reluctant to aid Germany in her counter-insurgency efforts, whereas the FO 
were keen not to harm relations with Germany and thereby insisted on South African 
assistance in the borderlands. The ways in which each case was perceived and responded to 
by British officials were always communicated through these different actors and channels, 
and therefore, were subjected to differing views and agendas. All of these actors were, of 
course, responding to the background pressure of local African, Afrikaner and English 
opinion, but it is beyond the scope of this thesis to map these currents of sentiment.  
In this thesis there are furthermore two ‘secondary’ actors: the BSAC and Germany 
(both as a nation and in the form of its colonial administration). With regard to the first case 
on Southern Rhodesia, the BSAC itself, with Cecil Rhodes in charge, remains a crucial actor 
with whom both colonial and metropolitan officials engaged. The BSAC drove colonialism 
on the ground in Southern Rhodesia and it was company rule that was scrutinised by British 
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officials in 1896. For the BSAC, the colonial project here was based on profits and a desire 
to generate profits from the supposed mineral wealth, and this was therefore the premise 
upon which British officials acted and sought to control the BSAC in order to safeguard their 
own imperial and political interests. The other secondary actor(s), Germany and the German 
colonial administration in GSWA, were also central actors with whom these British officials 
engaged. Similar to how the BSAC was to be controlled, so too was the British response to 
German colonialism embedded in a similar pattern in terms of how potential scandals and 
cases of misrule were to be managed. However, German colonialism had its own aims and 
purposes: therefore, this has also been examined in the case study where, for instance, the 
desire to create a German state and ‘white man’s land’ was imperative to the policies and 
practices applied by the German colonial administration. Important to mention here is that 
one aspect that complicates a direct comparison of official perceptions from British and 
German officials, and is part of the reason why this thesis does not seek to compare Anglo-
German colonialism per se, is the fact that in Britain, imperial policy was a much larger issue. 
Indeed, the CO was prestigious and occupied a whole building and office in Whitehall, 
whereas the German equivalent, the Reichskolonialamt, was until 1907 a department confined 
to a corner in the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office).62 
 
Ever since Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny published their 
monumental Africa and the Victorians: the official mind of imperialism (1961), the ‘official mind’ 
has been a crucial element in understanding British imperialism. The official mind was the 
policy-makers, the officials, the clerks and the secretaries working at the ministries and 
governmental offices in Whitehall, London. While these were not the only perpetrators 
behind the British Empire, in terms of both expansion and rule, all traces lead, in one way 
or another, to Whitehall. This is not to say that Whitehall decided everything, but rather that 
it was involved in many aspects of empire.63 The main thesis in Africa and the Victorians, 
however, was that these officials in the metropole sought to manage threats and crises in the 
colonial periphery rather than driving imperial expansion for its own sake.64 At the top of 
their agenda during the ‘scramble for Africa’, British officials were mainly concerned with 
securing India and the trade routes, particularly the Suez Canal, and thus Robinson and 
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Gallagher suggested that the main cause of imperial expansion was to be found in the colonial 
sphere. Whitehall as a historical actor, however, has been revisited by several scholars: 
perhaps most notably Peter Cain and A.G. Hopkins, who emphasised the role of the City of 
London and the ‘Gentlemanly capitalists’ as influencing officials and being a prime mover of 
imperial expansion.65 The debate over these various motivations and causations of imperial 
expansion cannot be explored fully in depth here, but remains central to the historiography 
of the British Empire.66  
 The official mind and the colonial officers in the field have been examined in a few 
studies, which have mainly focused on the background of these officials, their education and 
their concerns.67 However, broader interest in the actors in imperial history took a turn with 
the publication of Edward Said’s monumental Orientalism (1978). Said argued that Western 
officials had a prejudiced perception of the colonised as shaped by what he termed 
‘orientalism’.68 On the basis of this, there has been a body of work, especially in African 
history, which has turned away from official actors and instead showcased the experiences 
of the colonised.69 However, as Dane Kennedy has convincingly argued, post-colonial theory 
has reinvigorated imperial history and asked important questions, but in many instances, the 
historical circumstances have been lost.70 A recurrent problem with postcolonial studies is its 
preoccupation with a critique of colonialism and ‘modernity’ rather than actual historical 
research and its continuous ‘occlusion’ of European history as part of colonial history in 
general.71 Thus, it is plausible to move beyond the paradigm of postcolonial theory and study 
the coloniser without diminishing the importance of understanding the colonised. It is no 
longer a direct matter of choosing to write from either position, and in doing so, 
automatically repudiating the other. In this thesis, attention is directed at officials in London, 
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thus the coloniser, and admittedly this means that the perspective from the colonised has 
been obscured. However, both represent different aspects of a given historical trajectory and 
each should be appreciated and understood as such.  
 The reality of these officials and the sources they have left behind were naturally very 
different from the colonial reality as it was shaped by actors on the ground, whether 
indigenous, settler or other. However, with the increasing attention to colonial officials, it 
has been established, almost as a foregone conclusion, that Whitehall did not hold any local 
sway in the colonies and that decision-making, and hence imperialism, was very much left to 
the ‘man-on-the-spot’.72 As will be shown through this thesis, there were many incidents 
where decisions taken in London directly shaped the actions of the colonial officers on the 
ground. It is true that the government did not oversee everything and that its control of 
empire was not monolithic. However, Lord Selborne, High Commissioner to South Africa, 
wrote to Lord Elgin, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1907: ‘at present, in cases of 
divergence of opinion or interest between the British South African Colonies, even in the 
respect of affairs which are strictly the internal affairs of South Africa, the ultimate authority 
is the Imperial Parliament at Westminster.’73 Furthermore, as Ronald Dreyer has argued, 
foreign policy decisions regarding the colonies were the prerogative of Whitehall and not the 
colonial administrations themselves.74  
Naturally, there was a significant difference between the colonial reality in the 
metropole and that of the colony itself. This centre-periphery dichotomy is, by now, a long-
standing and conventional observation and the multitude of different actors have already 
been alluded to. However, it would be a mistake to completely dismiss the role of Whitehall 
in the wider network of imperial rule and power when it came to decision-making and the 
unfolding of events in the colonies.75 In this study, the role of metropolitan officials remains 
crucial to ascertain the broader ideologies that might have shaped perceptions of Anglo-
German colonialism while both the case studies unfolded, but also for the perception of 
1918 as constituted in the Blue Book. 
 
Christopher Prior seeks to understand the mentality of British officials by examining ‘what 
British colonial officials thought and why.’ Prior rightly highlights the fact that there has been 
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little focus on the principles of the official mind in Africa and that if studied at all, it is usually 
in a more politically concerned study or one that focuses on what they did rather than what 
they thought.76 Nevertheless, we should approach the sources of the official mind as a piece 
of the wider imperial puzzle with caution. We must be aware that these sources do not tell 
us the entire story, as they leave out many aspects. But regardless of historiographical 
tendencies, they are a piece of the puzzle nonetheless. Indeed, the sources left behind by 
these officials do, after all, reveal myriad historical factors, including political interests, stakes, 
strategies and broader policies of imperial rule and expansion. But they also inform us about 
how humanitarianism and racism, as two crucial developments at the time, both having roots 
in a wider imperial origin (i.e. slave trade, racial hierarchies), were received and perceived, 
and what impact they had in the metropole. For instance, humanitarianism penetrated 
metropolitan ideals and hence Whitehall to a greater extent than the men-on-the-spot. Since 
the officials studied here were mainly located in London, they were subjected to a different 
reality to that of the colonies. This made for different interpretations of colonial issues and 
problematiques, but it also meant an entirely different basis upon which their decision-
making derived. Hence, the official mind responded to and acted on reports and perceptions 
of imperial rule in Whitehall more than to the reality and desires in the colonies themselves.77 
At the other end of the spectrum, officials in Southern Africa were less concerned by the 
prospect of public opinion turning against their favour than were those in London. However, 
according to Robinson and Gallagher, public opinion was a powerful force that swayed 
decision-making in Whitehall, which rendered officials reluctant to engage in imperial matters 
and expansion, as it could mean that they would be held responsible.78 
Several publications have showcased the importance of the public in colonial matters, 
both through its interest and agency in pressuring officials and through the fascination of 
imperial cultures. John Mackenzie, for instance, has revealed the propagandistic aspects of 
empire, which fused nationalism and empire into a common culture. But because of the once 
prevailing focus on official sources, ‘public sources’ received less attention, meaning that the 
idea of a metropolitan culture of empire was vague and thus seemingly unimportant.79  
Catherine Hall, among others, has shown that the British public was widely engaged with the 
culture of empire and particularly with the representation of ‘the other’.80 There are several 
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indications that late nineteenth century Britain was fascinated and engaged with empire. 
Exhibitions, publications, societies, museums and plays all bear witness to an increasing 
interest in the vastness of Britain’s imperial territories and the exoticism concerning faraway 
places, objects and cultures. But according to Bernard Porter, the British public was largely 
‘absent minded’ when it came to empire.81 It would be fallacious to construct a clear 
dichotomy between metropolitan cultures and the official mind and the sources it left behind 
as they interacted. Not only were the officials also part of the public, but they were also 
swayed by the pressure of public opinion on policy-making. Especially during the South 
African War, public opinion played a crucial role, as the so-called Khaki Election of 1900 
was crucial to how the war was to be continued.82  
Prior to Robinson and Gallagher’s thesis on the official mind, it was often surmised 
that the public opinion that influenced policy-making, particular concerning foreign relations, 
before the twentieth century was constituted by smaller groupings of governmental officials 
and small groups of ‘influential citizens who, by reading the press, attending dinners and 
belonging to the right clubs, obtained a large amount of information on foreign affairs and 
followed them closely.’83 In other words, it was only the government officials and the 
metropolitan elite that held any sway and interest in foreign affairs, which here included 
colonial matters. The impact of public opinion and pressure groups was revisited by John 
Darwin in 1999. For Darwin, British imperial expansion was driven by ‘a chaotic pluralism’ 
of, among others, commercial, strategic and humanitarian interests in which the role of the 
government was to both facilitate and regulate these interests. But at the same time, Whitehall 
also had to see to its own purposes, such as overseeing its own commitments, avoiding 
diplomatic embarrassment and securing strategic interests. Darwin, therefore, called for 
further explorations of the role of public opinion and pressure groups in the broader prism 
behind British imperial expansion.84  These groups could be financial, such as the 
gentlemanly capitalists, or as more relevant here, humanitarian lobbies such as the 
Aborigines’ Protection Society (henceforth APS) and the Congo Reform Movement 
(henceforth CRM). Public opinion, therefore, was intrinsically entangled into the interests 
and perceptions of both colonial and foreign policy. However, the official mind as a social 
group ‘did more than respond to pressures and calculate interest; their decisions were not 
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mere mechanical choices of expedients.’85 Indeed, they were also motivated by various 
factors such as duty of government, international relations and the conviction of right and 
wrong.  
Yet, what may be said to be lacking in Robinson and Gallagher’s study of the official 
mind is a more thorough examination of the attitudes and ideologies that directed them.86 
Jürgen Osterhammel has identified three core elements of colonial reasoning, which may 
have influenced the official mind. First is the notion of an irreconcilable difference in the 
construction of an inferior ‘other’ vis-à-vis racial theories and persuasions. Second, there was 
a genuine belief in empire as having the right, and even the obligation, to expand as part of 
a civilising mission. Third, and lastly, there was a ‘utopian vision’ of how pure administration 
would function. While the first two elements indicate that racism and humanitarianism were 
forceful elements that shaped the mentality of the official mind, the latter represents a more 
practical, yet imagined perception of colonial rule. Indeed, concepts such as protectorates 
and trusteeship represent a certain rhetoric of empire which sustained not only how colonial 
rule was effectuated on paper, but also how it was imagined or seen as a utopia in reference 
to, for instance, humanitarian ideals. All three elements, however, rested on the conviction 
that the Europeans had uncovered ‘chaos’ in Africa and elsewhere which made it necessary 
to civilise and implement an effective administrative framework.87 This is therefore a basis 
upon which colonial rule and violence were both carried out and perceived. The moralism 
of these ideologies was present throughout the timespan of this thesis, albeit shaped by the 
different contexts. The utopian beliefs were a way to create an ideal against which to hold 
cases of maladministration and to mobilise critique of a colonising power, and were, as will 
be shown, present both at Versailles and in the pre-war humanitarianism decreed in treaties 
such as the Berlin Treaty. The two first elements in Osterhammel’s model, however, adhere 
best to the contemporary contexts of the cases where colonial rule and the right to govern 
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Beginning at the End: The Colonial Question at Versailles 
 
The treaty of Versailles remains a crucial moment in imperial history and brings the history 
of GSWA and Southern Rhodesia together through the Blue and White Books respectively. 
In 1915, during the First World War, South African forces invaded GSWA. This invasion 
was significant in many ways and was one of the major African theatres of war. But it also 
had regional ramifications when the outbreak of war prompted a new Boer rebellion – the 
so-called Maritz rebellion – now that Britain would be unable to aid the newly established 
Union of South Africa.88 Ironically, this rebellion was eventually quelled by two of the main 
figures fighting for the Boers in the South African War of 1899-1902. Louis Botha and Jan 
Christian Smuts had both risen to prominent military and political positions in South Africa 
and in 1915 both oversaw the invasion of GSWA.89 British plans to invade GSWA existed 
long before the outbreak of war. In 1910 a War Office report made detailed observations 
and instructions.90 The report noted that while the white settlers would ‘be averse to 
incorporation into the South African Union’, the indigenous population would more easily 
be swayed, especially since their numbers had decreased and ‘the Herero tribe has almost 
been exterminated.’91 The overall aim of this invasion was both expansionist and diplomatic, 
as Whitehall contended that an invasion of GSWA, either immediately after the outbreak of 
war or at its closing stages, would be ‘undertaken chiefly in order to influence the terms of 
peace.’92 
  
Although he does not pay much attention to the Blue Book, Wm. Roger Louis in Germany’s 
Lost Colonies (1967) provides probably the best analysis of the colonial question at Versailles. 
The book tracks the changing views and diplomatic challenges of Britain and her 
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Commonwealth Allies pertaining to the conquered German colonies and studies how the 
mandate system emerged as a solution.93 Where the general sentiment in 1884 when Germany 
acquired its colonies was positive, this was no longer the case by the outbreak of the war, 
and so, in 1916 and 1917, two secret government committees decided that the conquered 
German colonies were to be annexed.94 In general, before the outbreak of the war in 1914, 
German colonialism was seen as acceptable and humanitarian groups such as the APS even 
advocated for German rule to take over Belgian and Portuguese colonies on the same token 
as the British and French, as these were ‘enlightened’ colonial powers.95 However, from a 
geopolitical standpoint, Britain had increasingly wanted to get rid of its German neighbour 
in Southern Africa since the discovery of gold in the rand in 1886. With incidents such as the 
Kruger Telegram and German sympathy and support for the Boers during the South African 
War, matters had only grown worse and there was a conviction that the German threat had 
to be dealt with.96 When the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, it sought to 
manifest its position as a sovereign dominion. This meant a gradual distancing from the 
German colony to the west, and with the outbreak of the war and the subsequent invasion, 
the question that now arose was how to integrate GSWA and its German settlers into the 
Union. These geopolitical interests of the British and South African governments were 
supported by the fact that during the war, the view of German colonialism among the British 
public had changed.97 
As Christina Twomey has observed, the excesses of German forces in Europe during 
the war meant that Germany’s colonial endeavours were also scrutinised, which resulted in 
the publication of various books, articles and pamphlets condemning German colonialism 
as a whole.98 For instance, Sir Hugh Clifford, Governor of the Gold Coast, published a book 
titled German Colonies, A Plea for the Native Races (1918), in which he argued that Germany had 
‘proved herself a singularly bad and restless neighbour’ (here in Togo) and as such the British 
dominions in the Pacific and South Africa were to face a vital yet difficult battle in preventing 
the restoration of Germany’s colonies which would be against ‘established principles of 
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justice.’99 Influential humanitarian societies such as the APS also remained in constant 
communication with the FO during the negotiations to ensure that ‘the welfare of the natives 
was safeguarded’ in the question of the future of Germany’s colonies.100 Thus, by the time 
the peace negotiations were initiated, the general perception of German colonialism was 
extremely negative in public as well as official circles in Britain, and according to Louis, this 
conviction was so popular that it was almost impossible to advocate for Germany to retain 
its colonies.101 
 
From the perspective of the British government, it was important to maintain positive 
relations with the dominions, and with the participation in the war, securing Germany’s old 
colonies as mandates was an attractive way of doing exactly that. The desire to seize 
Germany’s colonies, therefore, may have been strongest in the dominions where the security 
of their homelands was believed to be at stake.102 Jan Christian Smuts was elected to be a 
representative of the Union of South Africa at Versailles, where he remained supportive of 
American president, Woodrow Wilson’s idea of a League of Nations. According to Smuts, 
however, the league was not only considered an ideal successor to the European and 
particularly the British Empire, but was also to be modelled on the British imperial system.103  
Where Article 119 effectuated the deprivation of Germany’s colonies, Article 22 of 
the Versailles Settlement created the mandate system which decreed that those areas where 
the inhabitants were not considered able to govern themselves would be kept ‘in sacred trust’ 
by ‘advanced nations’ in order to be given independence when ready.104 This, of course, 
echoed the logic of pre-war humanitarianism vis-à-vis the civilising mission, as will be 
discussed below. In the end, three different types of mandate were defined: ‘A’ mandates, 
which were to apply to the former Ottoman territories. ‘B’ mandates, which were to be the 
former German colonies in East, West and Central Africa; and ‘C’ mandates, which were 
earmarked for GSWA and the pacific islands. ‘C’ mandates were very different, as they were 
applied to what were then considered to be backward areas.105 Their populations were seen 
as incapable of governing themselves and resided too far from ‘civilisation’, and therefore 
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they were to be administered as an integral part of the mandate power (Union of South Africa 
and Australia respectively) and subject to its laws.106 While this served as ‘booty and buffers’ 
for the Union of South Africa and Australia respectively, there may also have been concern 
over who would take the place of the German colonial administration if they did not. The 
League of Nations would be a new player and unable to purposefully fulfil that obligation, 
and therefore some feared that ‘black intellectuals’ (W.E.B. DuBois was mentioned by name) 
would swoop into these ‘vacated’ lands and establish ‘an African colony run by Negroes.’107 
This was an irrational fear, but nonetheless shows that there were concerns over the future 
of Germany’s former colonies if these were not agreed to be governed by a ‘civilised’ colonial 
power. This shows that there was a general desire to reach an agreement on a new global 
order wherein colonies still existed despite Wilson’s disdain for them.  
Smuts shared Wilson’s scepticism towards imperialism on the one hand and sought 
to extend the borders of the Union on the other.108 Plans for the de facto annexation of 
GSWA were in place from the outbreak of war as the Union extended its railways and 
allocated lands for white settlers, although the territory was not formally annexed.109 Smuts 
contended that annexation of the German colonies ‘should be pushed for to the utmost.’110 
SWA was eventually transferred to the Union of South Africa and formally remained a 
mandate until 1990, when it finally gained its independence as Namibia after decades of 
turmoil and resistance. The Versailles Treaty of Peace submitted to the South African 
Parliament clearly stated the responsibilities and the effect to which the mandate over SWA 
was to be formulated. In Part IV, Germany was to ‘renounce all her rights and privileges 
whatever in or over territory in which being there or to her allies.’111 Furthermore, ‘The native 
inhabitants of the former German overseas possessions shall be entitled to the diplomatic 
protection of the Governments exercising authority over those territories.’112 Thus, the 
Union of South Africa was to govern the territory, but while the matter might have been 
settled internationally, the intra-imperial arrangements were different. Similar to the treaty of 
Berlin in 1885 and, as we shall see, the Charter of the BSAC, the South African government 
was to prevent liquor and arms trade amongst the Africans, prevent any slave trade and make 
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sure that ‘no forced labour shall be permitted except for essential public works and 
services.’113 The Versailles treatment thus echoed the same principles and responsibilities 
given to the colonial powers pre-1914, which did not prevent widespread violence and 
oppression. Ultimately, as Louis has correctly suggested, the mandates would ‘differ only in 
name from other colonial possessions.’114 
 
In order to acquire support and the mandate to seize Germany’s colonies, however, the 
British and South Africans needed a reason. Public opinion and the spoils of war were not 
enough on their own, and with Wilson’s reluctance to support any imperialistic interests, he 
and the Americans needed convincing. Indeed, Prime Minister, Lloyd George was even 
fearful that the colonial question could place severe strain on Anglo-American relations.115 
Seizing Germany’s colonies was therefore not simple and straightforward and, as a FO 
official noted in May 1917, ‘unless justification can be proved up it will be difficult to 
convince many people that we have not at any rate continued the war for purposes of 
aggrandizement.’116  
The CO had possibly foreseen this, as they had directed the dominion governments 
to collate evidence of German colonial maladministration and excesses.117 The most 
renowned and diplomatically efficient of these reports was the Blue Book on the atrocities 
in GSWA titled Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and their treatment by Germany. To this 
day, the Blue Book remains one of the most important sources on the genocide, not only 
because of its vivid description of the horrors that unfolded, but also because it includes 
several eye-witness accounts from Herero and Nama survivors.118   The subjectivity of the 
Blue Book is obvious; however, several historians have reiterated its importance nonetheless. 
Some of the most central scholars in the field, such as Casper Erichsen and David Olusoga, 
contend that the Blue Book ‘stands almost entirely alone as a reliable and comprehensive 
exploration of the disinheritance and destruction of indigenous peoples’ throughout the 
history of colonialism in Africa.119 While this is a clear overstatement which obscures the 
clear methodological problems of this source, it may also be because, as Erichsen observes, 
many original sources on the genocide have been lost, either in the German military archives 
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during the Second World War or destroyed before the invasion in 1915.120 More negatively, 
Brigitte Lau claimed that the Blue Book was nothing but ‘a piece of war propaganda with no 
credibility’ and thus a useless source.121 Lau is often disregarded, as she ardently opposed the 
categorisation of horrors in GSWA as genocide, as had been done in the United Nations 
Whitaker Report in 1985.122 However, as Jörg Schildknecht observes, when compared to the 
actual circumstances of the genocide, the statements and sources of the Blue Book can be 
doubted.123 The Blue Book, therefore, remains an important albeit problematic source 
because of its subjectivity.124 But this very subjectivity is a crucial aspect of the purpose of its 
publication, as it constitutes a way in which colonialism was remembered selectively and 
thereafter purposefully used as a diplomatic instrument during the negotiations at 
Versailles.125 In other words, the subjectivity reveals its underlying agenda. 
The Blue Book is structured in two parts: the first sought to establish the nature and 
history of German colonial rule in order to showcase the atrocities committed and the 
incapability of Germany to govern colonies, while the second described the German law 
code which had effectively created a system of exploitation and terror in which the 
indigenous communities had been systematically marginalised and abused.126 The style and 
setup of the Blue Book suggest that the British and South African authorities were unaware 
or at least ill-informed of the atrocities that unfolded in GSWA.127  As we shall see, this was 
far from the case. Britain was aware of and at times even took part in German counter-
insurgency. This ‘selective memory’ of obscuring Britain’s awareness and involvement was 
important for the diplomatic value of the Blue Book because if the British knew nothing of 
the genocide until the 1915 invasion, they could deny any complicity and by extension 
righteously lay claim to GSWA as its benevolent protector.128 Throughout the Blue Book this 
is repeatedly proven to be the case and its intentions remain clear:  
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Enough should be found in this report to convince the most confirmed sceptic of the unsuitability of the 
Germans to control natives, and also to show him what can be expected if the unfortunate natives of this 




Such statement directly related to the Wilsonian idealism at Versailles where overt statements 
of coercion, exploitation and genocide were extremely powerful.130 The Blue Book therefore 
effectively portrayed mismanagement and violence as being intrinsic in German colonialism 
as a whole, while, as Reinhard Kössler has observed, it established a depiction of British 
colonialism as not merely being more efficient, but as being morally superior.131 Clifford’s 
aforementioned publication summarises this predisposition:  
 
The German colonial system, so young in years, ever remains the oldest system, because it is the most 
tyrannic, the most oppressive and illiberal, as opposed to the English – liberal par excellence. It represents 




Such moral argumentation may be ascribed to the Wilsonian idealism at the time. However, 
the Blue Book also reflected the idealism of previous international conferences such as those 
of the Berlin Treaty in 1884-5. Indeed, the Blue Book could forcefully refer to the obligations 
to which Germany had ostensibly agreed to colonise Africa, where the aforementioned article 
6 meant that the coloniser was to protect and secure the well-being of its colonial subjects. 
Thus, the Blue Book utilised diplomatic treaties as a way of legally justifying the takeover of 
Germany’s colonies.133 Moreover, this reveals that humanitarian ideals were influential on 
how colonialism was perceived and revisited in 1918, indicating a trajectory from Berlin to 
Versailles.134 
  According to the Blue Book, the indigenous population had been decimated by 
92,258 people during German colonial rule. It projects this exact figure by comparing a 
census from 1877 to one from 1904 and then to one from 1911.135 Such figures were used 
to showcase the degree of barbarism displayed by German colonialism. However, these 
numbers were, of course, influenced by the subjective interests of its authors. The 
estimations provided by the Blue Book (and for that matter, many other scholars giving 
figures to the overall death toll of the genocide) fail to take various aspects into account, such 
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as the rinderpest (cattle plague) epidemic which swept across Eastern and Southern Africa 
from the late 1890s and had a severe impact in both Southern Rhodesia and GSWA.136 One 
historian who has attempted to gauge the accuracy of the census is Werner Hillebrecht, who 
suggests that the estimations given in the Blue Book are exaggerated.137 It therefore seems 
plausible that the Blue Book presents such exact figures as part of a diplomatic argument 
which was intended to convince its readers of the intrinsic cruelty of German colonialism. 
This was echoed by, for instance, Foreign Secretary George Curzon, who, in a speech 
to Parliament on the future of Germany’s colonies, echoed the rationale of the Blue Book as 
he proclaimed that ‘the 13-14 million dark-skinned men could not be abandoned.’138 The 
atrocities portrayed by the Blue Book were, as Frank Bösch has shown, important in 
constructing the image of the ‘brutal German’ which has clearly ‘impacted on Germany’s 
reputation well after 1918.’139 Yet, its purpose remained rather short-sighted, as the Blue 
Book reports were destroyed in 1926 in order to accommodate German settlers in SWA so 
that they would integrate into the Union of South Africa more easily.140 As such, the purpose 
of the Blue Book becomes clear, as it was intended purely for the strategic interests at 
Versailles, and after this agenda had been achieved, the Blue Book was only an obstacle to 
Anglo-German rapprochement, both in South Africa and in Europe. Indeed, the German 
government occasionally complained when a Blue Book report was found in circulation or 
referred to in publications. The post-Versailles use and view of the Blue Book was therefore 
that it was unnecessary, problematic and even false. A group of Oxford Commonwealth 
scholars in the late 1930s found the report to be a piece of propaganda and referred to it as 
‘the colonial guilt lie.’ In fact, this group even considered whether Germany’s old colonies 
could be used by Britain in her appeasement policy towards the Third Reich, but eventually 
deemed it impractical and concluded that it ‘would do very little to hinder the potentialities 
of discord in Europe.’141 Clearly, the purpose of the Blue Book was limited to the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War and no more.  
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The German delegation at Versailles did not consider the colonial question to be as important 
as other more pressing matters. Nevertheless, they responded to the critique of the colonial 
ventures and sought to re-establish their image as a benign colonial power, as had existed 
before the war. It was argued that since the colonies were so costly and had little economic 
prospect, Germany only retained them for civilisational purposes and for ‘surplus 
population.’ Furthermore, they claimed that Germany had stood by international law by 
eradicating the slave trade, and therefore, ‘stripping Germany of its colonies is 
unjustifiable.’142 In order to attempt to restore the public image, the Germans countered the 
Blue Book by publishing the fittingly named White Book, which attempted to show that 
violence and maladministration were not unique to German colonialism, as the British 
Empire had also seen similar events occur through its long history.143 
The White Book is structured in three parts. It first shows how British and American 
opinion on German colonialism before the war was positive. In the second part, the Blue 
Book and its evidence are questioned and criticised, and finally, in the third part, the White 
Book addresses British colonial excesses in, among others, Africa, India and Australia. The 
main purpose of the White Book was not so much to refute the claims of excesses in GSWA 
as it was to point to British hypocrisy and moralism. 
 
If these English moralists be held to the postulate they have set up, the inexorable conclusion must be 
drawn, by virtue of their own arguments, that England has irretrievably lost all right to the possession of 




The argument of the White Book rests upon the rationale of British allegations in the Blue 
Book as being made in the context of the war, highlighting the circumstances of the evidence 
and finally reiterating that Britain was in no position to deem Germany an unfit colonial 
power given its own record of excesses. In Britain, the CO found that the White Book was 
cleverly put together and would be hard to disprove. In the White Book, indigenous 
resistance was represented as an intrinsic and unavoidable part of colonialism in general and 
could therefore not be differentiated according to each colonial power. Indeed, the 1896 
Ndebele rebellion was highlighted to illustrate that exact point, in that it was alleged to bear 
striking similarities to the war in GSWA: 
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The resistance of natives clashed with the penetration of the white man and all that this implies, as well as 
with the interest of colonial policy. The results were identical: secret preparations by the natives, a sudden 




Just as the Blue Book is a detailed, albeit subjective analysis of the genocide in GSWA, so is 
the White Book a contentious, yet illustrative study of British colonialism and the Ndebele 
rebellion of 1896 in Southern Rhodesia as a contemporary and similar event in which British 
warfare and systematic exploitation of the indigenous peoples is described as symptomatic 
of British colonialism. In criticising the moral superiority of the Blue Book, the authors of 
the White Book state ‘we have seen how relentlessly the Matabele were persecuted. We have 
seen how caverns into which they had fled were blown up with dynamite and smothered 
with sulphur-fumes regardless of whether there were women and children in them or not.’146 
In fact, the White Book proposes that German rule in GSWA was similar to British rule in 
Southern Rhodesia prior to the 1896 rebellion, suggesting that the nature of colonial rule in 
both places were crucial causalities behind the rebellions.147 Although the malice and degree 
of violence perpetrated in GSWA was far worse than in Southern Rhodesia, the portrayals 
in the Blue and White Books both reveal that the colonial history of Anglo-German Southern 
Africa was one steeped in violence and oppression.  
The purpose of the White Book was similar to that of the Blue Book: to gain support 
at Versailles and among the general public opinion to settle the colonial question in favour 
of Germany. However, unlike the Blue Book, the White Book was not primarily intended 
for the American delegation alone, but also for the neutral participants. In May 1919, a FO 
official was alarmed by the circulation of the White Book in Scandinavia and he feared that 
‘this very opportune statement will have a considerable effect with regard to the German 
claim to the restoration of her colonies.’ Therefore, it was requested that the CO provide a 
review – a ‘reasonable criticism of this book (the White Book) setting the true perspective of 
the British fair administration of the Colonies and the German ruthlessness with regard to 
them.’ This, it was contended, could be published in the press of the neutral countries to 
prevent the ‘loud outcry in the neutral country about poor misused Germany’ that would 
come if they did not reply.148 However, W.C Bottomley at the CO did not share such 
concerns, as the White Book was not considered to pose a threat to Britain’s policy vis-à-vis 
Germany’s colonies at Versailles.149  
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In the end, the colonial question at Versailles established a view in which British 
colonialism was deemed morally and practically superior to German. Through the 
representations in the Blue and White books, the genocide in GSWA and the war in Southern 
Rhodesia were both presented as incidents typical of German and British colonialism 
respectively. However, their intentions were different: where that of the Blue Book was to 
justify the takeover of Germany’s colonies, the White Book’s intention was to counter this 
by highlighting other colonial excesses and thus gaining support from the neutral powers 
(and possibly Wilson) as it highlighted British hypocrisy.  Considering the depictions of 
German and British colonialism in the Blue and White Books respectively, it remains clear 
that these events are intertwined through time and space and linked by that crucial moment 
in Versailles which decided the future of the colonial world. But it also shows that colonial 
rule and violence could purposefully be exhibited as part of a diplomatic manoeuvre. 
Therefore, this invites us to ascertain two things: first, to consider the premises of these 
reports as discussed here in this chapter, and second, to juxtapose and test these depictions 
of colonial rule and violence with the way in which the same actors perceived the same events 
while they were unfolding. This will allow us to gauge the connection between theory and 
practice in that such perceptions will be revealed in different lights where various sets of 
moralities and realpolitik circumstances swayed the convictions that constructed perceptions 
and responses to each case. First, however, it is important to examine the nature of these 
ideological convictions and moralities.  
 
 
Humanitarianism and the Civilising Mission 
 
Humanitarianism is an important issue to discuss here, as it formulated a core ideology of 
Empire. It was a political force that directly influenced policy-making through, for instance, 
lobby groups such as the APS, but it also constructed a utopian ideal about colonial rule and 
the purpose of imperialism. As convincingly argued by Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, one of 
the more prevalent ‘ideologies’ when it came to the moral and legal basis of colonialism was 
the humanitarianism which stemmed from the anti-slavery debates of the early nineteenth 
century, which became a widespread and powerful discourse that affected imperialism and 
colonial rule altogether.150 Humanitarianism often worked through central groups such as the 
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APS to influence policy-making.151 Where the humanitarian groups of the early part of the 
century campaigned for abolitionism, such agenda was different in the latter part of the 
century. From 1870, the ideology of ‘protection’ of indigenous peoples from not only 
indigenous slavery and slave trade but also European colonial excesses became prevalent: 
 
Between 1870 and 1914, British humanitarianism came to adopt the goals of the Aborigines’ Protection 
Society. With the slave trade and slavery both declining, abolitionists considered more the consequences of 




These new forms of slavery certainly adhere to the case studies of this thesis where 
concentration camps and forced labour were central points of concern for the British 
officials and humanitarian groups in London. There were various reasons for this. Personal 
convictions of how colonial rule should operate certainly had a strong place among the 
various officials, but as Suzanne Miers has argued, on an institutional level, ‘abolition and the 
legal status of slavery’ were ‘blessed words’ in the CO because it was so popular in the public 
opinion and thus accusations of slavery carried significant weight.153 This was because since 
the 1840s, humanitarianism and anti-slavery had become ‘a vital component of Britain’s 
national and imperial identity.’154 Not only was the British public genuinely concerned and 
interested in humanitarianism and the eradication of slavery and the slave trade, they were 
also concerned about the reputation of the British Empire.155 As Fred Cooper has argued, 
the general conviction was that any incident of slavery would be considered a stain on the 
British flag.156 Thus, it is reasonable to assume that humanitarianism was a forceful factor 
which shaped the official mind in its decision and policy-making because of the popularity 
amongst its peers and because it adhered to convictions of the officials themselves. Thereby 
humanitarianism became an ideology upon which perceptions and views of colonial rule 
were created. 
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Humanitarianism, however, also revealed the contradictory premises of empire: how 
Britain as a relatively developed democracy at the time, expressing ideals of liberty, still 
conquered and subjugated a significant proportion of the planet while imposing coercion 
and oppression. This contradiction has been exposed by, among others, Martin Wiener, who 
has shown how law, as a key component of the British Empire, on the one hand sought to 
subjugate the colonised judicially and on the other facilitated criticism of empire by putting 
it ‘on trial’. This contradiction was thus at the crux of the very self-awareness of empire itself 
and was, as shown, carried on into the creation of the mandates system where the Permanent 
Mandate Commission put the mandatory powers ‘on trial’. Empire was thus a collision 
between the spread of British ideals of liberty and humanitarianism and the authoritarian 
nature of imperial rule.157 In other words, the ideology lending legitimacy to imperialism was 
at odds with the nature of imperialism itself. 
 
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of humanitarianism and empire was the civilising mission, 
which, according to Osterhammel, can best be understood as follows: 
 
A special kind of belief with, sometimes practical consequences. It includes the self-proclaimed right and 
duty to propagate and actively introduce one’s own norms and institutions to other peoples and societies, 





Furthermore, the civilising mission transcends the boundaries of direct colonial rule and that 
‘the civiliser’ deeply believes that the imperial practices are generous and benign.159 As Alice 
Conklin has shown in the case of French West Africa, the apparent contradiction of a 
‘civilising empire’ was resolved through a transformation in which coercion and oppression 
became a civilising force.  Coercion actively ‘improved’ the colonial subjects and prevented 
them from ‘degenerating’ back into their supposedly savage state.160 The civilising mission 
was therefore an integral tool which deeply influenced and legitimised colonial 
administration, but also coercion.161 This meant that humanitarian convictions of empire as 
formulated in the ‘civilising mission’ were not merely a critic of empire, but also an agent of 
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empire. In the field, it was necessary to spread ‘civilisation’ and to subjugate the world in 
order to bring about civilised rule and save, in this case, the Africans from the alleged 
savagery. This rested upon a notion of the Africans as being savage, inferior and weak. When 
complemented by the burgeoning scientific racialism of the day, these suppositions were only 
confirmed by those sceptics who had been disappointed in the unwillingness of the ‘savages’ 
to accept the gifts of civilisation.  
 Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann have contended that the civilising mission 
was far more than a mere justification of empire: it was an ideology.162 In focus is the meaning 
of the civilising mission as the ‘moral and material progress’ and the ‘improvement’ or 
‘betterment’ of the world. This sustained a responsibility that legitimised an assumed mastery 
of the world, which shone through in colonial rule.163 Ordained suppositions of the Africans 
as being weak formulated a practical tool of colonial rule. For instance, the so-called 
repugnancy clause empowered the colonial officer in Africa to determine whether a 
customary practice of the indigenous peoples was contrary to Western morality as a means 
of social control to maintain authority.164 As Bonny Ibhawoh suggests, the traditional laws 
and customs of indigenous peoples within the British Empire were permitted as long as they 
were not ‘repugnant’ to British morality.165  This was effectuated through various 
implementations such as education, where the ideals of the civilising mission acted as an 
active promulgation of social control, as it intended to alter the identity of the Africans to 
make them more appreciative and ‘good’ subjects.166  
Instruments such as the repugnancy clause derived from a humanitarian constructed 
perception of moral responsibility for the coloniser. This arose from what Andrew Porter 
terms ‘trusteeship’, which originated with Edmund Burke’s critique of the East India 
Company in the 1780s. It merged with humanitarian critique of colonial rule and the anti-
slavery debates, and, combined with the advent of Christian missioning, it formulated a 
powerful morality of empire in which the coloniser was responsible for the welfare of the 
colonised.167 As has already been shown, this was a fundamental premise of the mandates to 
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be held in ‘sacred trust’ in the Treaty of Versailles. But more importantly, the idea of 
humanitarian responsibility was brought into effect through the many treaties in the late 
nineteenth century, where the European powers carved out the African continent amongst 
themselves. In particular, the Berlin Treaty echoed the notion of trusteeship in its rhetoric 
of humanitarianism, anti-slavery and enlightenment to be brought to the supposedly 
backward Africans. 
It therefore became both the moral and legal obligation of the European colonial 
powers at the end of the nineteenth century to save the Africans and to examine each other’s 
practices.168 The European colonial powers therefore legally obligated one another to adhere 
to humanitarian rules and norms, thus indicating a contemporary morality in which colonial 
rule was to be contained. However, while treaties such as that of Berlin and later Brussels 
echoed humanitarian values, the reality in the colonies was very different. Nonetheless, it 
serves as a framework in which colonial rule in Africa was perceived by the governments and 
officials in Europe: in other words, how they considered colonial rule ought to be. This is 
important for this thesis, as it provides a legalistic and moral platform upon which colonial 
rule in Southern Rhodesia and GSWA were understood and scrutinised both at the time and 
at Versailles. Indeed, as we shall see, this moral responsibility was brought to the fore by the 
British officials in various aspects in, among others, diplomatic and political contexts.  
In more practical terms, this moral responsibility formulated other instruments of 
imperialism such as the idea of the ‘protectorate’, which differentiated from annexation of 
the African territories. Where annexation was ‘the direct assumption of territorial rights to 
maintain the paramount authority’, a protectorate was ‘the recognition of the right of the 
aboriginal or other actual inhabitants in their own country.’169 Thus, humanitarianism found 
its way to becoming an active agent and instrument for colonial diplomacy, which was helpful 
in carving out the African continent between the European powers. Indeed, besides the 
moral humanitarianism voiced in the Berlin Treaty that laid the ground rules for the ensuing 
scramble for Africa, certain practical guidelines were also included. Although the continent 
had ostensibly been carved out in Bismarck’s Berlin villa, colonial rule was not formalised 
before said territory had seen an ‘effective occupation’.170 This could be done by sending 
expeditionary forces, granting a charter to sub-imperial entities such as the BSAC or granting 
‘protection’ to African chiefs. Through this manoeuvre, the colonial powers could, according 
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to the international laws agreed among themselves, legitimately lay claim to huge swathes of 
land, and it was an efficient means of acquiring the otherwise uncontrollable interiors. 
Indeed, both GSWA and neighbouring Bechuanaland were technically protectorates, or 
Schutzgebiet, for Germany and Britain respectively. 
 
Christopher Leslie Brown has examined how humanitarian beliefs became action at times 
under the etiquette of humanitarian intervention, by studying the anti-slavery movements of 
the early nineteenth century. Through accumulating what he calls ‘moral capital’ – a resource 
similar to economic, social or cultural capital – certain actors gained increasing influence and 
power.171 However, the inclusion of humanitarianism into policy-making and imperial 
expansion also had its costs. It rendered the powers in question responsible for those same 
moral values and a violation hereof could have significant ramifications, as displayed not only 
at Versailles but also prior to the war. One crucial event that drove the humanitarian 
conviction to its zenith was the Congo crisis. The Congo crisis is important because it is 
situated around the same time as the two case studies and had severe consequences not only 
for the Congo Free State but also for King Leopold II of Belgium and most importantly for 
the British government. The horror regime of the Congo Free State is by now well-known 
and has sparked many historical accounts.172  The concession companies that were extracting 
rubber did so through a regime of violence in order to meet financial expectations and 
demands, which resulted in cases of hands being chopped off, people being left to starve and 
whole villages being burned.173  
Upon visiting the Congo Free State, British consul Roger Casement compiled a 
report which disclosed these atrocities to the FO.174 Upon his return to Britain, Casement 
campaigned against the regime with the help of philanthropic groups such as the APS and, 
most importantly, from E.D Morel, with whom the CRM was created.175 Throughout the 
first decade of the twentieth century, Casement and Morel were incredibly successful in 
captivating and mobilising the public and pressuring the British government to action.176 At 
the same time, characters sympathetic to the cause, such as Foreign Secretary Edward Grey 
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and later Prime Minister Charles Dilke, ascended and became prominent advocates in 
parliament.177 Furthermore, the aforementioned legal obligation of international treaties were 
alluded to by, for instance, Henry Fox Bourne of the APS, who advocated for a British 
intervention in ‘the Congo crisis’ based on the Congo Free State’s violation of the Berlin 
Treaty.178 As Dean Pavlakis has argued, the CRM replenished British society’s moral capital 
in much the same vein as the anti-slavery campaigns over a century before.179 The pressure 
upon the FO was then twofold: on the one hand, popular opinion demanded action, and on 
the other, the legal obligation of the Berlin Treaty had rendered the Congo Free State 
illegitimate. However, a re-opening of the Congo question was against British interests at the 
time, as France and Germany were standing in the background ready to swoop in and claim 
the immensely valuable colony.180 Eventually, the British government managed to negotiate 
a transfer of administration from Leopold’s personal company to the Belgian government, 
thereby avoiding a geopolitical worst-case scenario.181 
The origin of public opinion in scandals and crises either derived from a top-down 
process where the masses were manipulated by elitist groups or from a bottom-up process, 
often comprising more spontaneous responses to certain events. But considering the broad 
network of which Whitehall was part, access to information on scandals and particularly 
unwanted events and reports could be screened. In other words, Whitehall was first to receive 
detailed information on various events in the colonies.182 As will be shown in this thesis, such 
information was key to how colonial scandals such as those in Southern Rhodesia and GSWA 
were perceived, managed and acted on. The intricate relationship between public opinion 
and colonial and foreign policy, where Whitehall was dependent on the former to attain the 
interests of the latter, was therefore a fundamental relationship in the actions taken by British 
officials at the time.183 When it came to colonial conflicts and crises, it was a fragile situation 
where they were caught between appeasing the public and securing realpolitik interests. 
Therefore, the use of force in the colonies needed to be excused and rationalised by officials 
so that they had a backing, not only in the government and internationally, but also in relation 
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to its public peers. The use of force, therefore, was often excused by the claim that it would 
prevent use of more excessive force in the future.184  
Certainly, the Congo crisis can be categorised as a colonial scandal, which Frank 
Bösch defines by three factors: ‘First, they violated norms; second these violations were made 
public and third they resulted in a widespread public outrage.’185 Because of the consequences 
of the Congo crisis, where public pressure was so intense that it directed British foreign and 
colonial policy, the official mind was keen to avoid a repetition. The scepticism about colonial 
rule originating from a national and imperial identity of humanitarianism, grew exponentially 
during the Congo crisis and the British government experienced the potential ramifications 
of colonial excesses upon their policies.186 The moral capital, therefore, was a force which 
could fundamentally stir and alter British imperial policy. It drew attention, facilitated and 
legitimised action and sustained the moral prestige of the actor(s) in question.187 Therefore, 
since the governments were responsible for the treatment of the indigenous people both 
morally and judicially, as determined in several treaties, there was also direct pressure in terms 
of responsibility where the moral capital could be wielded against them. Scandals of colonial 
abuse and violence could lead to ‘dismissals and suicides, to the setting up of investigative 
committees, and the introduction of reforms’ and, most importantly, ‘the scandals that drew 
international attention discredited the moral claims of the colonial leadership.’188 As a 
consequence, they could involve the European governments in serious diplomatic situations 
which disrupted the geopolitical stability (or at least perceived stability) in Europe itself. 
Therefore, the European colonial powers had little or no interest in showcasing colonial 
excesses, stories of exploitation, war and even genocide even when it was happening in a 
rival’s territory. This created a fundamental logic among the colonial powers where a shared 
omerta (the mafia vow of silence) pertaining to the colonies was established. The Congo crisis 
and the CRM’s successful campaigning and other scandals, such as the concentration camps 
in South Africa during the war in 1899-1902, only made British officials aware of, and 
concerned by, public attention to excessive violence in both British and non-British colonies. 
As Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne noted on the Congo atrocities in 1905, ‘Ghastly, but 
I am afraid the Belgians will get hold of the stories as to the way the natives have apparently 
been treated by men of our race in Australia.’189 As recently observed by Amalia Forclaz, 
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colonial governments either encouraged or suppressed the circulation of evidence of 
scandals, particularly cases of slavery, depending on their political needs.190 Therefore, 
breaking this omerta by circulating and exhibiting colonial scandals could also formulate a 
powerful instrument to attain various interests, as best illustrated by the Blue Book of 1918.  
 
 
Racial ideologies and Scientific Racialism 
 
Racism remains a fundamental aspect in the history of the European empires. Broader 
prejudices of race at the time are important for this thesis in several ways. Not only is racism 
an important explanation of the exploitation and violence that occurred, but it is also a way 
to understand how British officials perceived those upon whom colonial rule and violence 
were imposed and inflicted. In other words, racial prejudices and racism can explain the 
nature of colonial rule and what happened in Southern Africa at the time, thus providing a 
crucial context for the cases. However, while the prejudices and ideas of race remain 
important, it is more the actual practices of racism and how these were perceived that will be 
examined in this thesis. 
Racial prejudices and convictions rationalised colonialism and created a discursive 
framework in which the white colonial rulers were promoted as biologically and culturally 
superior, thereby justifying the right of the colonisers to rule. The racially deduced hierarchies 
that emerged in the colonial world were perhaps nowhere as explicit as in Southern Africa 
where the history of racism is often linked to the advent of apartheid in 1948 under which 
the indigenous peoples of both Southern Rhodesia and SWA became oppressed.191 
Apartheid had roots in both colonial Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, but also in 
GSWA, as alluded by Senator Heinrich Vedder in 1956 when he claimed that apartheid had 
in fact been invented here by the German colonial administration.192 Indeed, the apartheid 
regime has influenced historians greatly and has taken a place as a key moment in Southern 
African history.193 However, while this remains a central context, this thesis does not seek to 
address whether there were any continuities originating in either GSWA or Southern 
Rhodesia. 
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Ideas and practices of race and racism are connected, but it remains crucial to 
distinguish them, as they represent different aspects of imperial history. Race is ‘the 
systematic expression and rationalisation of the idea of superiority and innate biological 
difference amongst distinct groups of human beings.’194 Thus, race represents the ideas that 
may have influenced British officials, whereas racism was the practice and expression of these 
ideas. One of the key publications on the matter of race and racism is George Fredrickson’s 
Racism, A Short History (2002) which showcases how racism is situated in the various 
differentiations between human groups, such as religion, tribalism, culture, and particularly 
relevant here, biological determinism. But it is not until these differences are considered 
‘innate, indelible, and unchangeable that racist attitude or ideology can be said to exist.’195 
However, racism, Frederickson argues, is more than a set of beliefs: ‘it also expresses itself 
in the practices, institutions, and structures that a sense of deep difference justifies or 
validates. Racism, therefore, is more than theorising about human differences.’ More 
precisely, he contends that the purpose of racism is that it ‘sustains or proposes to establish 
a racial order, a permanent group hierarchy that is believed to reflect the laws of nature or 
the decrees of God.’196 Frederickson’s definition therefore sets a starting point in which 
racism and colonial rule can be said to combine. The violence inflicted upon the colonised, 
who were of course lamented as inferior due to their supposed racial grouping, may therefore 
be inflicted to either maintain or create this racial order. The nature and premises of racism, 
however, remain debated. For instance, Benjamin Isaacs argues that racism is ‘an attitude 
towards individuals and groups of people which posits a direct connection between physical 
and mental qualities.’197 Conversely, Francisco Bethencourt has defined racism as being racial 
prejudice (or theory) paired with discriminatory action.198 Crucial here is the aspect of action: 
an action can be physical in the shape of, for instance, violence, but it can also be policies or 
other means of oppression in which groups defined by racial presumptions are placed in a 
hierarchy which may be social, political or economic, for example. 
It is also crucial to ascertain the place of racist prejudices and practices in the official 
mind and broader public culture at the period under scrutiny here. Saul Dubow has suggested 
that the popularisation of racial thought and the scientific racism of the day remains a 
complex matter which can be traced by ‘keywords’ in wider discourse to ascertain its impact 
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and importance in society.199 But racial thought and the interest in the matter may also be 
indicated via other aspects, such as the popularity of societies and groups, even those of the 
APS whose agenda rested on a racial disposition of ‘helping’ the lesser races. Given the 
simultaneous imperialist expansion at the end of the nineteenth century and the growing 
attention to Empire in general, one may assume that this correlated to the evolving 
significance of racist ideas and the growing popularity of scholarly, especially anthropological, 
societies. But racist prejudices and actions differentiated widely in the metropole and the 
colonial sphere, as the circumstances were different. In the colonies, the practices that were 
implemented to rule and govern the supposedly lesser races were of course steeped in 
prejudice and racial assumptions. But unlike the metropole, their main causation was to 
sustain the governance of a white minority rather than the various scholarly or moral 
implications of race. Thus, the aspect of action as implied by Bethencourt is imperative if we 
are to comprehend the relation between these methods of colonial rule and the racial 
discourse of the late nineteenth century.  
 
Frederickson and Bethencourt, despite a disagreement on the origin and historical trajectory 
of race and racism, both address the emergence of ‘modern’ biological racism or racialism. 
Ever since Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859), which was followed up by his Descent 
of Man (1871), there had gradually during the nineteenth century been a prevailing tendency 
for the natural sciences to focus on race while the humanist and cultural considerations were 
increasingly set aside.200 Instead, a more rigid systematisation of nature was soon applied to 
humanity as categorised into different racial groupings, allowing humanity to be seen from a 
natural scientific rather than a humanist perspective.201 In the late nineteenth century, the 
obsession of rationalism and science led to the rise of scientific disciplines that affected the 
social compositions of society in Europe and its colonies. 
Perhaps the most renowned Darwinian term, ‘survival of the fittest’, as coined by 
Herbert Spencer, suggested a conflict between the biologically determined racial groups as 
the main premise of human evolution.202 The Social Darwinism that derived from this 
remains an extensively studied and discussed theme in which racist principles were developed 
and were channelled into actual policies, comprehensions and actions, perhaps best 
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illustrated by the growing popularity of eugenics. Eugenics was a merger between scientific 
and social approaches dedicated to the improvement of society and sought to introduce 
active policies for the ‘selective breeding’ of specific groups, races and social classes.203 
Another example that was perhaps more pertinent to the colonial world was the 
preoccupation with understanding the ‘native mind’, which remained a key aim for Social 
Darwinists to develop strategies of effective colonial rule over the alleged savages. This 
helped to rationalise and explain colonial rule and the state of colonial subjects and reinforced 
the notion of the child-like African in need of help, as inferred in the paternalism of the 
civilising mission.204  
 At the time, these various interpretations and needs for racial examination led to the 
development of what Bethencourt calls ‘scientific racialism’, where the differences between 
racial groups became increasingly seen as innate and stable. These perceptions had developed 
from the changes in both natural sciences and the political landscape of the mid-nineteenth 
century – where nationalism, in particular, had become prevalent – which created a 
development in the general study and perception of race and presented a turning point where 
scientific inquiry ‘became much more assertive, ideologically aggressive, and politically 
engaged.’205 Racial categorizations can be traced back to, for instance, Carl Linnaeus (1707-
1778), who connected racial groupings according to continents, or Georges Cuvier (1769-
1832), who identified three distinct races of mankind, mainly determined by using 
craniometric measurements. In Britain, the advent of a deterministic scientific racialism is 
perhaps best characterised by Scottish anatomist Robert Knox, who famously proclaimed 
that ‘race is everything: literature, science, art – in a word, civilisation depends on it.’206 
 
To keep the focus on the official mind of the British government, it is important to 
emphasise British strands and traditions of racialism and, for the sake of context, how they 
differentiated from German traditions. The case of GSWA has often been linked to the 
principles of scientific racism in Germany and beyond, prompting further assumptions of its 
links to the Holocaust.207 The emerging German tradition spearheaded by prominent figures 
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such as Rudolf Virchow saw a more rigid and deterministic perception of race. Here 
Darwinism was initially rejected as Affenlehre (monkey doctrine), meaning that Africans were 
often not considered part of the human species, but were regarded as being somewhere 
between human and animal.208 Accordingly, there was a clear distinction between the 
Kulturvolker and the Naturvolker: the ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ peoples. This meant that a 
humanist approach was impossible, hence paving the way for a more rigid and biologically 
determined approach to emerge wherein polygenetic principles, which suggest several 
disconnected evolutionary processes, became popular amongst anthropologists. One of the 
more vivid examples thereof was the contention that the evolutionary trajectory of the 
Polynesians derived from worms rather than from apes.209 Regarding the colonial world, the 
issue of Entmischung (racial de-mixing) captivated German racialists such as the eugenicist 
Eugen Fischer, who conducted field work among the mixed-raced Baster tribe in GSWA to 
prove Mendelian inheritance and race-mixing as the main reason for ‘racial degeneration’.210 
The perception of race in Germany, therefore, was rigid and deterministic in nature, and, as 
will be shown, translated into colonial policies and practices. 
Concerning racial policies, however, one of the most influential figures in Germany 
was British-born biologist Houston Chamberlain, who promoted the Teutonic Race as the 
fairest and noblest of all through history alongside the Anglo-Saxons. For Chamberlain , it 
was important to actively wage the racial struggle, because if it was ‘not waged with 
cannonballs, it goes silently in the heart of society’ through various interchanges between the 
races, including marriages. This, Chamberlain warned, was ‘a struggle for life and death.’211 
Important to note, however, is that the increasingly deterministic racialism in both Britain 
and Germany was also a matter of critique by many scientists and scholars. For instance, 
Franz Boas actively criticised scientific racialism, especially eugenics, as he contended that it 
was impossible to completely rationalise human life because of the existence of emotions 
and a soul.212 
In Britain, the development of race in the metropole was somewhat different because 
of the longer colonial history of the British Empire. Catherine Hall has suggested that the 
anti-slavery positivism of the first half of the nineteenth century was soon replaced by 
scepticism, and the growing influence of racist key figures such as Knox and Thomas Carlyle 
                                                 
 
208 Paul Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945 
(Cambridge 1989), 55-56. 
209 Andrew Zimmerman, Anthropology and Antihumanism in Imperial Germany (Chicago, 2001), 68. 
210 Eugen Fischer, Die Rehobother Bastards und das Bastardierungsproblem beim Menschen (Jena, 1913), 135-6. 
211 Houston Chamberlain, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, Vol. II, [org. 1899], translated by John Lees 
(New York, 1911), 578. 
212 Franz Boas, ‘Eugenics’, The Scientific Monthly, 3, 5 (1916), 475. 
52 
 
saw racist ideas becoming increasingly influential and prominent in British society. This was 
paired with the events in the empire where the resistance of Indians and Jamaicans generated 
a backlash against the civilising ideals. The violence of the rebels in the Indian rebellion 
(1857) and the Morant Bay rebellion (1865) was a sign of their racial degeneration and 
barbarism and ended the anti-slavery positivism that had hoped to civilise and ‘improve’ the 
supposedly lesser races.213 This ‘disillusionment’, exhibited at Morant Bay and elsewhere, 
paved the way for a ‘hardening’ of racial attitudes which saw the emergence of a more rigid 
and deterministic scientific racism.214 Yet, as Peter Mandler and Douglas Lorimer have 
pointed out, nineteenth-century Britain was not exclusively about race and there may be a 
tendency to inflate its role and importance, which, in Lorimer’s opinion, means that the 
Victorians are being historically generalised.215 Indeed, the radical scientific racialism as 
promoted by, for instance, Knox, was accordingly not the mainstream conviction about race. 
But more importantly, we cannot discard the continued influence of anti-slavery and 
humanitarianism in the metropolitan perception of race and colonial rule in particular. Unlike 
the German tradition, in Britain, the racial discourse in the late nineteenth century was 
entangled into the humanitarian discourse and rhetoric of anti-slavery where the African was 
considered barbaric and inferior, but still part of the human race.216 The humanitarian 
sentiment of the anti-slavery movement should therefore not be seen as an ‘interlude’ in the 
history of racism, as it sustained the imagination of Africans as being child-like, in need of 
help and civilisation. Indeed, while the growth of scientific racialism from the mid-nineteenth 
century became increasingly influential in the perception of indigenous peoples, it never 
completely displaced the humanitarian beliefs manifested in the anti-slavery debates.217  
Indicative of how these beliefs penetrated scientific racialism was one of the most 
important anthropologists of the time, Edward Tylor (1832-1917). According to Tylor, the 
various races of the world had the same fundamental principles and the same capability to 
develop in three stages: savagery, barbarism and civilisation.218 Tylor believed that ‘the white 
man’, while being intellectually superior, did not have monopoly on this progress.219 This 
enabled a possible venue for racial development in which the civilising mission could 
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effectively promote the supposedly inferior races and was thus a revival of humanitarian 
principles within the prism of racist practices and perceptions – especially those concerning 
the issue of ‘native labour’, as physical and hard work could be ‘educative’ and thus develop 
the supposedly inferior races. 
In a colonial context, Benjamin Kidd argued that the ‘race question’, which equated 
to racial struggle, was based on the process of natural selection where ‘less developed races’ 
were bound to become extinct by laws of nature.220 Crucial to their survival was what Kidd 
termed ‘social efficiency’, which was the ability to organise and control natural instincts to 
the benefit of a community, which remained deeply connected to spirituality and 
civilisation.221 Not surprisingly, the European races were according to Kidd the best at ‘social 
efficiency’ and were therefore championing the racial struggle. Yet, Kidd still argued that the 
human races were all part of a ‘single, vast, orderly process of evolution.’222 The views on 
colonial rule expressed by Kidd therefore still perceived the indigenous peoples as part of 
the colonial project. In contrast, German scholars such as Paul Rohrbach contended that 
areas such as Southern Africa were to be settled by the white race ‘without any involvement 
of the natives.’223  
Kidd reveals how the idea of ‘survival of the fittest’ was recycled in scholarly work 
concerning the colonialism where the rule of the European powers should be dependent on 
biological and climatic factors. In the tropical colonies, rule should be a simple administration 
aimed to extract natural resources which would otherwise be lost due to the indigenous lack 
of ‘social efficiency.’ In the temperate places, however, the Europeans should more forcefully 
take control and settle, as these zones were more suited to their biological composition.224 
Thus, Kidd proposed a version of racialism that adhered to economic interests in the 
colonies. In Southern Africa, the mining industry and its insatiable demand for cheap labour 
were particularly an economic determinant in the definition of racism in this region and had 
significant socio-economic ramifications that are still evident today.225 This was, of course, 
similar to Rohrbach’s view, but in Kidd’s vision, the Africans still played a central role, 
although he might well have been convinced of their gradual and natural extinction. Social 
Darwinist opinions such as those of Kidd and Rohrbach therefore neatly translated into 
effective models of social policy and by extension presented different venues for the 
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execution and implementation of colonial rule. Furthermore, the racial discourse in London 
and Southern Africa at the time was assumedly a key factor for these officials when 
constructing their perceptions and responses to how colonial rule should function and the 
basis upon which colonial violence was perpetrated.226 
In the colonies themselves, scientific racist principles interacted with practical 
interests and circumstances. Indeed, the action that changed conceptualization of race into 
racism was part of political projects which were often derived from more practical and 
economic interests.227 As Bernard Magubane has argued, racism was far from a mere 
theoretical and rhetorical justification of violence: it also had roots in the material and 
economic exploitation of Africans.228 Similarly, Bethencourt argues that racism as prejudice 
paired with action was motivated and effectuated by political projects in which a struggle for 
control and monopoly over resources played a crucial role.229 As will be shown in both case 
studies, the economic incentive behind racist policies collided with humanitarian principles 
as officials in the colony disagreed with those in the metropole over the place and governing 
of Africans: were they to be an exploited but useful resource in building a healthy colony? 
Or were they to be saved from the sins of slavery? Ostensibly, the former applied to the 
interests of the colonial officer and the latter to that of the metropole. This dichotomy is 
imperative to the understanding of how the official mind perceived colonial rule because the 
stakes and pressure-points were widely different in each setting. If we focus on Southern 
Africa, the ‘native question’, especially in connection to labour issues, was according to 
several British officials at the time the most pressing issue for the colonial state and the 
British government.230 Indeed, while the ‘poor whites’ were considered to be the pressing 
concern in metropolitan Britain for which eugenics was the answer, the pressing matter in 
Southern Africa, from a racialist perspective, was the Africans.231 The settlers were grouped 
in ‘islands of white’, aware of their lesser numbers, and thus sought to maintain the social 
hierarchy and oppress the indigenous peoples through violent racist regimes. 
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What, then, can racism as an action and the scientific racist principles of the time tell us about 
how British officials perceived and responded to colonial violence and threats to stable rule? 
It remains clear that it was instrumental in constructing a framework within which these 
perceptions could be constructed in the first place. Their views on the colonised, their 
attributes and characteristics and how they were – according to the conceptions of right and 
wrong at the time – to be governed were all aspects imperative to their perception and 
responses. Racism and the scientific verification it obtained at the time created a mandate for 
the officials to rule and at times oppress and inflict violence upon their perceived inferiors. 
As Tacitus noted, ‘it is human nature to resent the one whom you have injured.’232 Thus, 
racism was an explanation just as much as a force of control. Consequently, racialism 
constructed a perception of Africans in which violence could more easily be perpetrated and 
justified. It was a dehumanisation of them as being lesser humans which made it seem 
plausible that people were forced to engage in what Rudyard Kipling called ‘savage wars of 
peace’ to free these ‘savages’ from ‘native despots’ and exploiters.233 Often, however, this 
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In March 1896, the settlers residing in the newly subjugated Matabeleland, were running for 
their lives. In the aftermath of the ill-fated Jameson Raid on the Transvaal in December 1895, 
the defences of this fragile company-ruled domain were laid bare, paving the way for the 
Ndebele to rise against their colonial overlords in what came to be a bloody affair that forced 
the British government to revise its policy regarding company rule in Southern Rhodesia and 
question its very moral foundations. It was estimated that a staggering 372 European settlers 
were killed and 129 wounded. At the time, the very idea that supposedly vile and savage 
Africans had killed and butchered innocent white settlers incited demands for resolute 
military reaction to crush the rebellion and retain stable colonial rule with the use of imperial 
troops.234  
In 1893, Matabeleland, under the notorious King Lobengula, was conquered by the 
BSAC in a dubious and rapidly fought war. The Ndebele was a breakout nation from the old 
Zulu Kingdom and was considered the most formidable African military presence by many 
Europeans, thereby constructing a basis for the British perception of the Ndebele, as these 
were the relatives of the old enemy they had fought at Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift.235 
Therefore, the decision to go to war in 1893 was not easy and was generally considered a 
risky option for the BSAC and the Europeans in Southern Africa in general. 
 As a colony, Southern Rhodesia had, on the one hand, disappointed expectations 
regarding mineral wealth, but on the other hand, it was soon considered an important and 
integral part of the British Empire in Southern Africa and a gateway to control its interior. 
The colonial past of Southern Rhodesia remains a widely researched and discussed topic. 
However, the 1896 rebellion has generally been marginalised in this historiography, as it tends 
to be overshadowed by the 1893 war. Also, the later anticolonial developments, especially 
the bush war in the 1960s and 1970s and the Declaration of Unilateral Independence in 1965, 
have cast a long shadow on both scholarly and popular attention to the Rhodesian past. 
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Indeed, the 1896 rebellions of the Ndebele and Shona are often called the first Chimurenga 
with the second being the bush war in the 1960s-1970s, aimed against Ian Smith and the 
white minority government.236 
The 1896 rebellion represents the dynamics of imperialism in a clear and concise 
manner. Not only was it an incident in which significant violence was perpetrated, it also saw 
the involvement of characters often considered to be personifications of the imperialistic 
culture and agenda at the time. These included Cecil Rhodes, who, in addition to being 
Director of the BSAC, was also Prime Minister of the Cape Colony until 1896, and Joseph 
Chamberlain, the recently appointed Secretary of State of the Colonies, who, alongside later 
High Commissioner to South Africa, Alfred Milner, advocated the importance of the Empire 
to the British public and is widely seen as a crucial figure in the outbreak of the South African 
War in 1899.237 The 1896 rebellion, therefore, represent a crisis of colonial rule that involved 
some of the most prominent and important figures in the British official mind of imperialism, 
not only of that time but perhaps altogether.  
The rebellion itself saw the use of ruthless military strategies being employed by both 
sides. In the initial phase when the Ndebele were on the offensive, no white settler, whether 
man, woman or child, was spared. Reports of savagery soon reached London and the rest of 
Britain and caused alarm among officials and the public alike. Upon the arrival of imperial 
troops, however, the tables soon turned, and through the use of, for instance, maxim guns 
and dynamite, the British forced the Ndebele into a long and bloody retreat. In the aftermath, 
the administrative framework of company rule was revised and linked the interests, politics 
and ideologies of colonial rule and violence. 
This case study will examine how British officials perceived and responded to this 
crisis of colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia. It will analyse the reasoning of the official mind 
in its decision-making regarding the combatting of this rebellion as well as its agenda and 
stakes that shaped the post-war policies of how colonial rule was to be effectuated 
henceforth. Thus, the main emphasis is mainly focused on the situation immediately after 
the rebellion where company rule and the violence perpetrated came under scrutiny. 
Moreover, since the British government intervened on behalf of the BSAC, it touches upon 
key relations between two central actors whose different and, as will be shown, often 
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opposing interests shaped the negotiations and outlook of Southern Rhodesia and its 
indigenous population.  
 
Historiography and Methodological Considerations 
 
The historiography of both Matabele wars and colonial Southern Rhodesia has mainly 
showcased imperial expansion as an agent of commercial interests.238 It cannot be denied 
that the commercial interests of the BSAC and imperialist agents, in general, were significant. 
This is particularly clear considering the fact that the BSACs headquarters in London was on 
15 St. Swithin’s Lane – conveniently in the same building as the Rothschild Corporation, 
which had funded much of the BSAC.239 Southern Rhodesia was believed to be home to vast 
mineral wealth. This was perhaps best illustrated by Rider Haggard’s contemporary epic King 
Solomon’s Mines (1885), which suggested that the legendary mines of the biblical figure, King 
Solomon, were in fact in Southern Rhodesia, thus romanticising the region as an imperialistic 
fable, or rather, an African El Dorado.   
The general literature on imperialism in Africa tends to focus on the First Matabele 
War in 1893, rather than on the 1896 rebellion.  The best example of this is, perhaps, H.L. 
Wesseling’s Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914 (1996), where it is only the First 
Matabele War that is explored. This exemplifies that the 1896 rebellion (also referred to as 
the Second Matabele War) has been somewhat left out of most scholarly literature, perhaps 
because the First Matabele War fits better into the notion of imperialism in Africa as being 
defined by European economic and mineral greed, as well as the technological gap that 
furnished imperial expansion, as the 1893 war was the first use of the maxim gun.240 In terms 
of the economic history of Southern Rhodesia, this has mainly been pioneered by Ian 
Phimister.241 However, due to the scope of this thesis, this aspect will be obscured although 
economic interests were the main incentive for Rhodes in his venture into Mashona and later 
Matabeleland. Instead, the 1896 rebellion was a violent affair that represented imperial 
expansion and administration, and was a colonial conflict that questioned the civilising 
principles of Empire and highlighted the racial tensions of Southern Africa. Thus, this 
particular event deserves further scholarly enquiry from the perspective of Whitehall and its 
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stakes and interests in order to fully grasp the complexity of colonial rule and violence in 
Southern Rhodesia.  
 
The aforementioned tendency to draw continuities from 1896 to the politics and wars of 
decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s led to a growing interest in colonial Southern Rhodesia 
as a whole. Especially in the 1960s, historians were preoccupied with the historical context 
of the new and extraordinary independence of Southern Rhodesia (Northern Rhodesia 
became Zambia), which was traced back to the colonial origins of the 1890s. Indeed, most 
contributions to the colonial era were written at this time in the shadow of independence 
and the violent struggle of decolonisation led by, among others, Robert Mugabe. Therefore, 
due to the many new developments within the wider historiography over the last few 
decades, particularly within imperial history, a new examination of early colonial Southern 
Rhodesia is now overdue. 
Nevertheless, the literature written in the light of decolonisation cannot, and should 
not, be disregarded. These works are each a representative of their time, and especially in the 
case of Southern Rhodesia, there are a number of works that deserve acclamation for their 
contribution. For instance, Arthur Keppel-Jones’ Rhodes and Rhodesia (1983) remains an 
important work, not so much because of its arguments but rather because it is a detailed 
overview of the period under scrutiny. The actions, stakes and interests of various actors are 
showcased as Keppel-Jones attempts to write a complete history of the early years of colonial 
Southern Rhodesia. But the lack of depth and a specific focus means that other publications 
are more relevant.242 Instead, this chapter relies more on what is perhaps the most notable 
publication on the 1896 rebellion, Ranger’s aforementioned Revolt in Southern Rhodesia (1967). 
Relying on source material from the National Archives in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia 
(Today Harare, Zimbabwe), Ranger examines the causes and developments of the 1896 
rebellion. In comparison, however, this case study deals with source material, particularly 
from the CO, stored at the National Archives in London, hence differing from Ranger on 
the content of source material: this has led to some divergences, as will be shown.243 This is 
not to suggest disagreement with Ranger’s arguments and observations: rather, it should be 
seen as a different case in that this chapter relies on different sources on the same aspect, 
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thus revealing different observations. However, commenting on the view of the colonial 
officer, Ranger notes that ‘official beliefs about African society were mostly ill-founded.’244 
In this case study, this will be nuanced, as officials, especially in London, were not exclusively 
ill-disposed towards the Ndebele. More generally, Ranger seeks to examine the Ndebele and 
Shona people’s incentives and beliefs surrounding the rebellion. Yet, as Ranger also alludes, 
these societies can be hard to penetrate and obtain oral sources from, and therefore, most 
sources are those of the BSAC. What is consequently evident is that Ranger uses sources 
which he himself considers to be ill-founded towards the peoples he seeks to examine. While 
this could be considered a grave methodological error, it is nonetheless understandable 
considering the accessibility of the sources on these events. In the case of oral sources, which 
were then relevant, as there were still living witnesses to the 1896 rebellion when Ranger 
wrote his book, the seventy years that had passed question the credibility of such sources.245  
Ranger gives little indication of the position from Whitehall; nor does he sufficiently 
disseminate the role of the CO: it is consistently comprised as an opposition to the BSAC, 
thus being a contrast to what he is actually examining and not a historical actor per se. Indeed, 
there seems to be a general tendency among scholars working with Southern Rhodesia in the 
period to disregard the role of Whitehall as a mere accomplice to the BSAC.246 This was 
perhaps in the spirit of the then recent declaration of independence, but it nonetheless falls 
short in that it ignores the complex relations between company and government and the 
various agendas and overarching imperial policies at play. Therefore, this case study can 
contribute by assessing the 1896 rebellion from the viewpoint of London, where Whitehall 
and the interests here are the primary object of investigation.  
When considering the historiography of Southern Rhodesia in the late nineteenth 
century, particularly with a focus on the 1896 rebellion, it becomes evident how important 
Ranger’s work has been. Most literature tends to base its historical accounts on Ranger’s 
representations hereof, often with little methodological critique. Such literary works include 
Robin Palmer’s Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (1977), Robert Blake’s A history of 
Rhodesia (1977) and Anthony De Perna’s A right to be proud: The Struggle for Self-Government and 
the Roots of White Nationalism in Rhodesia 1890-1922 (1978). All of these works base most of 
their investigation into the Rhodesian past on Ranger before making connections to 
contemporary issues regarding the state of Southern Rhodesia, as can be seen in their year 
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of publication and the consensus that the 1896 rebellion was a precursor to the African 
nationalists of the 1960s and 1970s.247 
The place of African nationalism is therefore intrinsic in the historiography of the 
‘first’ Chimurenga. Ranger contends that it was here that it originated and that this was 
perhaps the earliest incident on the entire continent in which a sentiment of national 
consciousness united Africans against their European colonisers, as it brought together the 
Ndebele and Shona, who had traditionally been rivals. Later publications, especially by Julian 
Cobbing and Daniel Beach (the latter focusing primarily on the Shona rebellion), have instead 
emphasised local grievances rather than overarching ideas of nationalism to have been the 
motive behind the rebellion(s).248 Indeed, this bears resemblance to the historiography of 
GSWA, as will be discussed later, where similar trajectories of national historiographies have 
set down confinements on the historical context of colonialism.  
Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matabeleland (2000), by 
Ranger, Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, discusses the Shangani Reserve in 
Northern Matabeleland as a geographical sphere of historical importance. The interesting 
use of violence as a rather abstract concept is particularly relevant. It is asserted that violence 
‘has so powerfully shaped the history and memory of the past in Matabeleland.’249 
Furthermore, the book seeks to investigate the relationships of resistance to various 
pressures: colonial expansion, nationalism, ethnicity, religion and of course, the guerrilla war 
that engulfed Southern Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s.250 The place of later political 
developments in Africa and how this has influenced the colonial past is crucial to draw from 
this work. Instead, Violence and Memory seeks to represent the Southern Rhodesian past 
outside the shadow of politicised discourses influenced by nationalist favouritism.251 It 
therefore serves well to illustrate the contentious nature of the history of Southern Rhodesia, 
where the environment and its associated memories remain subjected to contemporary 
politics and nationalist sentiments. 
Another important publication to promote is Charles van Onselen’s Chibaro: African 
Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900-1903 (1976), which gives an in-depth examination of 
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the issue of labour within a confined time period. The focus here is not on the historical 
development of Southern Rhodesia: rather, it exclusively aims to scrutinise the complex 
source material on the labour administration in the said period. Nevertheless, van Onselen, 
just like his contemporaries, almost blindly relies on Ranger’s work, but also makes the 
connection of Southern Rhodesia as being within a wider framework, particularly in the light 
of the South African War, due to its relevance for his time span.252 
Besides the work of Ranger, perhaps the most pivotal piece of work for this case 
study is Claire Palley’s The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965 (1966). 
Not only is it published just prior to Ranger’s work, it also uses source material from the 
National Archives in London. Palley successfully manages to give an eloquent and thorough 
examination of the legislative powers and privileges distributed in Southern Rhodesia over a 
relatively long period of time. However, the main focus is not the 1896 rebellion as such. 
Rather, Palley is focussed on the long-term developments of constitutional law and 
legislation in Southern Rhodesia up to 1965. Therefore, the 1896 rebellion is seen merely as 
part of a historical trajectory leading to later developments. Although using some of the same 
sources as this case study, Palley has not approached them exclusively as a historian, but 
rather from a legal perspective (Palley is indeed in law, both as an academic and a lawyer). 
Palley’s work is perhaps one of the most important, yet most overlooked contributions on 
Rhodesian history in general. It is true that it cannot be considered a historical work 
exclusively, yet she examines the legislative and constitutional negotiations of the aftermath 
of the 1896 rebellion in detail. However, since it focused on legislative and constitutional 
matters, it certainly does open up other interpretations, including social, political and imperial 
factors. Unfortunately, Palley rarely takes the leap from discussing the theoretical framework, 
as can be defined as the laws and legislation of Southern Rhodesia, to the practice: what 
actually happened and whether it violated (or adhered to) those principles she analyses. 
Furthermore, Palley mistakenly sees the position of the official mind as being based on two 
basic principles: financial issues and the BSAC being to blame for the Jameson Raid.253 
Instead, the hostile relationship between the BSAC and the CO, in particular, should also be 
seen in the light of a wider and more complicated framework that included geopolitical and 
imperial but also ideological factors. 
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It is important to reiterate that this case study primarily deals with the conflict in 
Matabeleland and not the one in Mashonaland to the north. There are several reasons for 
this. First of all, it would be erroneous to combine the two into one single conflict, although 
this has been the tendency in the wider historiography. The Ndebele and Shona did co-
operate in many incidents, but their efforts were also separated by chronology: the Shona 
rebellion came when the Ndebele were on the retreat. Second, when approaching the conflict 
from the standpoint of British officials, it remains clear that Matabeleland and the Ndebele 
present a very specific case and the one referred to by the German delegation in 1919. Third, 
and lastly, as will be shown in this case study, Matabeleland and the colonial rule regarding 
the Ndebele was different from Mashonaland, as the BSAC legalistically had more freedom 
in their administration of Matabeleland. The Charter granted to them was ostensibly 
extended to Matabeleland but did not incur full and strict obligations, as were applied in 
Mashonaland, because Matabeleland was conquered territory.254 
By first examining the wider chronological framework of the rebellion, this case study 
will analyse the principles of the BSAC as granted in its charter in 1889 and the following 
war in 1893, which was the precursor to the rebellion in 1896. Through an examination of 
the BSAC and the stance of the official mind on a series of issues in which its status as the 
civilised party would be questioned, it seeks to provide an alternative interpretation of the 
rebellion as it was asserted from London rather than from Southern Rhodesia itself. It is 
connected to a wider imperial perception of empire, justice, race and civilisation altogether, 
and will seek to address exactly how Britain, as the empire embarking on the mission to rid 
the world of slavery, dealt with overt contradictions on this exact issue.  
 
 
The Conquest of Southern Rhodesia and the Foundations of Company 
Rule 
 
European interests in what became Southern Rhodesia date back to Portuguese missionary 
missions in the eighteenth century. However, the foundations for the colonial state that was 
created here may be found in the 1880s where British and Cape officials sought to expand 
their sphere of influence due to fears of Boer expansion northwards. In 1888 the Moffat 
Treaty was signed where King Lobengula had promised to cease any contact with other 
foreign states, and in that same year he signed the contentious Rudd Concession, giving 
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Rhodes and his accomplices the mineral rights to his land in return for rifles and a steamboat. 
Although Lobengula later repudiated the Rudd Concession, it nonetheless laid the 
groundwork for the charter granted to Rhodes in 1889.255 
The royal charter of the BSAC from 1889 was very particular about the Company’s 
conduct within the colonial jurisdiction of the British Empire, especially when it came to the 
relations with indigenous peoples, where it was stated that ‘in case at any time any difference 
arises between any chief or tribe inhabiting any of the territories aforesaid and the Company, 
that difference shall, if Our Secretary of State so require, be submitted by the Company to 
him for his decision and the Company shall act in accordance with such decision.’256 In 
essence, this article meant that the BSAC had to follow the directions of the Secretary of 
State (for the Colonies) if a conflict with an indigenous group should emerge. Therefore, the 
British government was inevitably involved in the expansionist conduct of the BSAC, and 
furthermore, if a conflict should arise, the government was expected to intervene either to 
withdraw the BSAC from power or to provide support and reinstate colonial rule. It may be 
unnecessary at this stage to mention that it was of course the latter of these two possibilities 
that was preferred in the case of the 1896 rebellion, and probably in most other such cases.  
The charter of the BSAC not only concerned the relationship between government 
and private enterprise in the light of imperial expansion; when it came to the indigenous 
peoples themselves, the charter had several paragraphs which were included to prevent the 
ill-treatment of these peoples as well as being in line with the moral principles of empire vis-
à-vis the civilising mission and humanitarian ideology. For instance, the charter dictated that 
the BSAC should prevent slave trade or ‘any system of domestic servitude’ where it could.257 
This was directly duplicated from the aforementioned Berlin Treaty and company-ruled 
territory was therefore ostensibly entangled into the treaties the British government had 
entered concerning colonial rule in Africa. Consequently, the responsibilities and actions of 
the BSAC were, to some extent, under the umbrella of Whitehall.  
Perhaps foreseeing any troubles from this, it was determined in the charter that the 
BSAC should not interfere with African religion or culture unless ‘necessary for the interest 
of humanity.’258 Moreover, ‘the Company are not to interfere in any political or administrative 
matters whether regarding customs, laws or succession unless it will break any British laws 
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which be in force.’259 Thus, the BSAC was not allowed to interfere politically with the 
Ndebele to obtain interests, whether political or economic, except when certain practices 
were deemed repugnant to British values. For the BSAC, this meant that in order to wage 
war against the Ndebele and to conquer Matabeleland, they would need a casus belli or 
otherwise risk losing the territory when conquering it.260 
Nevertheless, what remains clear is that the charter was far more than a financial 
manifesto that promulgated an insatiable need for gold. It included political, ethical and even 
religious elements which would never lead to better business for Rhodes or his compatriots. 
Company rule was unpopular in the public and among British officials, especially due to its 
record of disrespecting ‘native trusteeship’, but at the time, the BSAC was considered the 
best way to secure broader strategic aims in Southern Africa.261 Indeed, the charter 
encouraged the Company to act as a sub-imperial expansionist agent to ‘settle any such 
territories and lands as aforesaid (Mashonaland), and to aid and promote immigration.’262 In 
other words, this was expansion through commerce: the BSAC was an imperial pioneer 
paving the way for the British Empire to enforce itself in a region aimed at expansion to 
secure the interior of Southern Africa, which could otherwise fall into the hands of Britain’s 
rivals.  
The geopolitical reasons for government intervention cannot be neglected: 
considering the wider region, it was necessary for Britain to consolidate its power by 
including Matabeleland in its sphere of control. Due to the rumoured gold deposits, an influx 
of white settlers was expected, and subsequently, this would lead to claims by Portugal, 
Germany and the Transvaal.263 The conviction that other European powers had their eye 
fixed on Matabeleland remained at the crux of South African governance, and as late as 1908, 
Rhodes was still considered to have ‘saved’ the interior of South Africa from Boer or German 
annexation.264 The BSAC’s proposed expansion north into the South African hinterland was 
therefore a timely and viable opportunity for Whitehall to prevent any rivals, especially 
Germany, from seizing their territory and thus threatening the delicate relationship between 
Britain and the Boer Republics. However, the main problem remained how to justify 
expansion into the interior, as it would be a costly affair. Therefore ‘the answer was found in 
the revival for a time of the system of chartered companies’, as was perhaps best 
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characterised by the East India Company and its eventual takeover by the crown in 1858.265 
Companies such as the BSAC could go where the government could not and work as sub-
imperial pioneers which ‘ensembles the basic criteria, institutions and frameworks of rule, 
which may later be taken over by the British government or its self-governing colonies.’266 
But crucially, the BSAC also imposed a degree of responsibility on the government, for if 
they were to secure their geopolitical interests in the region the Company demanded the 
support of the government. This was in part political, but the Company’s territory was soon 
painted red on the map and thus mentally considered part of the British Empire. 
Consequently, imperial reasoning dictated that in case of an African uprising against the 
BSAC, the government would defend the empire.267 
 
There may already have been an inclination to eventually seize company territory from the 
outset, and combined with the geopolitical situation, the administration of the nearby British 
territories and the BSAC were inseparable. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
powers of the colonial administration in the British Southern African colonies as well. Here, 
the High Commissioner remained a powerful figure, perhaps due to the British tradition of 
empire, which, of course, stretched further back than the telegraph, where such distribution 
of power was necessary to run a worldwide empire efficiently. Among the responsibilities of 
the High Commissioner was the welfare of the Africans: ‘The High Commissioner… shall 
respect any native laws or customs by which the civil relations of any native Chiefs, tribes, 
or populations under Her Majesty’s protection are now regulated, except so far as the same 
may be incompatible with the due exercise of Her Majesty’s power and jurisdiction.’268 
Consequently, both the BSAC and the High Commissioner of South Africa were 
obliged to respect African laws, customs and culture and to not interfere with them in any 
way that might cause a conflict. The powers and privileges for both the BSAC and the High 
Commissioner were thus unmistakably in conflict: on the one hand, it sought to motivate 
the BSAC to seek colonial expansion and to introduce settlers to new territory that was, albeit 
indirectly, part of the British Empire. On the other hand, both the BSAC and the High 
Commissioner were, whilst seeking to expand, obliged to respect the Ndebele, not to 
interfere with them in order to secure political or commercial interests, and most importantly, 
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to avoid triggering any conflict with them. In short, they were obliged to seek further colonial 
expansion into the African continent without angering, disrespecting or indeed fighting the 
indigenous peoples who lived on the land on which they expanded: a task nothing short of 
impossible. Furthermore, this indicates that there was an idea of a rather inherent right to 
expansion based on an ideology of civilising and the furthering of mankind as the moral 
impetus.  
 
The First Matabele War, 1893 
 
Lobengula was one of the most renowned and powerful African rulers in the region and had 
for years claimed tributes from other tribes. However, with the establishment of Fort 
Salisbury (today Harare) in 1890, many of these tribes’ chiefs believed they were now vassals 
to the British and should therefore not pay any tribute to Lobengula but, if it all, to the 
BSAC.269 Furthermore, Rhodes had Lobengula’s heirs attend a school in Cape Town, thus 
causing uncertainty among the Ndebele because of growing confusion on the issue of 
succession due to their absence.270 Because of pressure from within the Ndebele community 
and the loss of authority over nearby tribes, Lobengula was politically cornered and had no 
opportunity but to send out raiding parties against the Shona tribes that had refused to pay 
tribute in an attempt to consolidate his power. This was the casus belli the BSAC had been 
waiting for: in order to ‘defend’ the Shona, Matabeleland was invaded in 1893.271 The real 
interests were not just that annexing Matabeleland would connect the Company’s territory 
to the rest of Southern Africa, but also that the Ndebele capital, Bulawayo, was also 
conveniently believed to be situated in the middle of a supposed gold deposit.272 Indeed, 
Mashonaland had been a disappointment for speculators, and therefore expanding south 
could open up new potentialities that could save the BSAC.273 
Although the BSAC had already secured the mineral rights from Lobengula, seizing 
complete power and control of Bulawayo would be an asset to their business by, for instance, 
building a railroad to South Africa. Hence, there was significant suspicion from the British 
government that the BSAC had provoked Lobengula in order to create a casus belli. These 
suspicions were so certain that the government considered ending company rule altogether 
                                                 
 
269 John M. Mackenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester, 
1984), 52. 
270 Peter Baxter, Rhodesia: The Last Outpost of the British Empire 1890-1980 (Alberton ZA), 2010), 101. 
271 Julie Bonello, ‘The Development of Early Settler Identity in Southern Rhodesia: 1890–1914’, The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 43, 2 (2010), 346. 
272 See appendix C 
273 Galbraith, Crown and Charter, 300-1. 
68 
 
as a result of what they considered to be transgressing the powers outlined in the charter.274 
Moreover, the Brussels Treaty of 1890 had stated that there should be a joint attempt to 
diminish inland wars between Africans, thus corresponding to, and working as a justifying 
principle for, the BSACs reason to intervene.275 Nevertheless, it remains clear that the BSAC 
was unable to fulfill both countering obligations to expand and to preserve peace at the same 
time since this was impossible after the BSAC disrupted the political structures of the region. 
For instance, in 1892, the BSAC reported that the ‘Native Affairs’ of that year had been 
‘satisfactory’ and that ‘the occupation of the country (Mashonaland) has already had the 
effect of putting a stop to the periodical raids made by the Matabele.’276 The mere presence 
of the BSAC and the sovereignty it imposed on Mashonaland therefore deeply affected the 
political situation between the African tribes in the region. While it may have been a positive 
that the violent and oppressive raids of the Ndebele were ended, it nonetheless caused further 
resentment among the Ndebele and made war more likely. 
 
The First Matabele War broke out after a skirmish between a patrol and a Ndebele raiding 
party near the settlement of Victoria. The actual circumstances are somewhat unclear and 
many historians and contemporary critics have suggested that the BSAC deliberately 
provoked the war by, for instance, having the patrol led by an inexperienced officer. In 
response, the Company reiterated that it prevented the raiders from taking slaves to mitigate 
metropolitan criticism and stated that it had adhered to the charter, since ‘every effort had 
been made to avoid collision with the natives.’277 Adopting the argument of preventing 
African slavery was, of course, a forceful move, as immediate critique from humanitarian 
critics such as the APS could be averted. Furthermore, when the BSAC were later to come 
under scrutiny after the Jameson Raid in 1895, the First Matabele War was again promoted 
by the BSAC as an incident of benign company rule, where Lobengula had been prevented 
from imposing a savage regime and without any cost to the British taxpayer, as Rhodes ‘asked 
for no assistance from Her Majesty’s Government.’278 
The First Matabele War was in many ways the foundation for the later rebellion in 
1896 because the war was fought with such pace and aggression that the expansion into 
Matabeleland inevitably had consequences, not only in the immediate resistance that 
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constituted the first war, but also later when company rule was being implemented and the 
desire to resist the British expansion was still fresh in the Ndebele people’s memory. 
Although this was a company-led war, the British government was entangled into the whole 
affair. For instance, Governor of the Cape Colony, Hercules Robinson (from 1896 Lord 
Rosmead), had significant investments in the BSAC and was involved in securing the 
aforementioned charter in 1889. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins focus on this connection and 
track the chain of causation in Southern Africa that culminated in the South African War in 
1899 back to London through the intertwined interests of company and government 
individuals.279 However, Rhodes’ ‘Cape to Cairo’ vision, wherein Southern Rhodesia was 
earmarked as a stepping stone, was according to Robinson and Gallagher not ‘the aspiration 
of Whitehall, but of Cape railway and mineral interests.’280 The entanglement between 
Whitehall and the BSAC around 1893 was therefore ambiguous and complex; it cannot be 
reduced to a case where Robinson’s investments were the definitive factor, but rather the 
expansion into Matabeleland was mainly due to geopolitical concerns, individual aspirations 
and economic incentives, whether investments or dreams of gold mines.281 Using the lure of 
the supposed vast gold deposits, Rhodes developed his plan to expand British influence and 
realise his ambition of connecting the Cape to Cairo by railway and thus being a pioneer for 
Britain in the scramble for Africa.282 But Rhodes also used the railway to obtain support for 
the charter, as it would effectively ensure British control of the hinterland.283 Also, expansion, 
albeit through the BSAC, meant the surrounding of the Transvaal, which adhered to British 
strategies leading up to the South African War.  
Perhaps one of the reasons why British officials, particularly in London, allowed the 
Company to relatively freely establish its dominion over Matabeleland was the fact that a 
romantic image of Southern Rhodesia and the Ndebele had been painted by, for instance, 
Rider Haggard and his brother – the latter was in fact commissioned by the BSAC – which 
led British officials in London to perceive Lobengula and affairs in Southern Rhodesia in 
clichés.284 For instance, the First Matabele War was re-enacted in several performances such 
as Lobengula’s March, The Battle of Bembezi as well as other spectacles that not only hinted at 
the greatness and goodness of Empire, but also at the alleged savage nature of the half-naked, 
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war-dancing Ndebele.285 This may best be exemplified with the re-enactment of a Ndebele 
attack on Major Wilson’s party at the Earls Court Exhibition in 1899, titled Savage South 
Africa.286  
However, critique of the Company’s conduct was also rife. According to a pamphlet 
by an unknown author in 1894, the invasion of Matabeleland was immoral and connected to 
the liquor trade: 
 
The Mahometan invaded Africa accompanied by the Slave-Trade, but without the alcoholic liquor, which 
to him was an abomination. The Christian invades Africa with the liquor-cup, and Maxim-guns, and 




This not only highlights possible motives behind the invasion of Matabeleland, but also 
makes a clear reference to the technological gap – in this case, the Maxim guns – which 
rendered possible the invasion and the scramble for Africa in the first place.288 On the whole, 
this pamphlet sought to attack the very moral aspects of empire and expansion. The basis 
for the composing of this pamphlet was due to an Irish bishop who remains unnamed, but 
is most likely Bishop Alexander of Derry, who gave a speech at Westminster Abbey in 
January 1894 in which he allegedly ‘encouraged the policy of slaughtering the Matabele.’289  
The justification given by the British for intervening and subsequently invading 
Matabeleland to supposedly defend the other tribes in the area, particularly the Mashona, 
was according to this pamphlet a false motive because: 
 
Mashonaland contains forty thousand square miles suitable to colonisation by Europeans… but it is really 
the gold mines on which the future of Mashonaland depends: without gold the country may be self-
supporting, but not sufficiently rich to be valuable as speculating: so after this great scheme of benevolence, 




This quotation matches the aforementioned location of gold deposits. These supposedly vast 
gold deposits must have been of great interest not only to the BSAC but also to the British 
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government in seizing the valuables for themselves or at least making sure that no other 
European empire would do so.  
The unnamed author also keeps referring to pre-Norman Britain as a comparison to 
the expansion of the British Empire. The Ndebele are compared to Boadicea and Harold the 
Great trying to resist the Danish, Norman and Saxon invasions, thus turning the logic of the 
justification of imperial expansion upside down by making the Ndebele comparative to the 
heroes of British history while the British represen the vicious invaders of old. Another critic 
of the Company was a Mr. Ellis from The Society of Friends (Quaker Society), who sent a 
letter to Prime Minister Gladstone in which he addressed the practices of the Matabele 
campaign and hence the morality of empire:  
 
We have been deeply pained by the slaughter, which has taken place in Matabeleland by the armed forces 
of the Chartered Company of South Africa. We strongly feel, that such methods of prosecuting commercial 
enterprise are entirely incompatible with Christian religion, and we regard it a disgrace to our nation’s 
profession of Christianity that in this the settlement of our countrymen as colonists in uncivilised land has 
been accompanied by wars of extermination.
291 
 
Ellis’s letter also sought to press the government on the importance of securing future 
arrangements for the Ndebele, as he argued that it should be solidified that military 
interferences did not violate the ‘rights and liberties of native races, children with ourselves 
of one common Father.’ The responsibilities of the government were, according to Ellis, 
‘ensuring the treatment of the Matabele, not in a spirit of hostility and greed, but of policy 
of justice’, and this was deemed absolutely necessary ‘if Great Britain is to be able with any 
effect to exercise her influence to prevent similar high-handed encroachment on native races 
by other civilised powers.’292  
This indicates two important aspects. The first is that it was the responsibilities of 
the government and not the BSAC that Ellis discussed. This leads to the connection between 
the BSAC and the government as two different entities that are inevitably intertwined where 
the government was necessitated to intervene and help the BSAC during the 1896 rebellion. 
Secondly, the point of Britain needing to have a clean conscience in imperial practices in 
order to prevent later atrocities being committed by other ‘civilised powers’ is a particularly 
interesting one when considering the British stance on the war in GSWA as well as the 
diplomatic portrayals of German and British colonialism that were presented at Versailles. 
Indeed, Ellis here echoes the argument made by the Germans in the White Book that the 
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British claim of German colonial exceptionalism in terms of cruelty was hypocritical 
considering that Britain’s colonial conscience was not as clear as Ellis would have liked.  
In 1893, however, the general sentiment in the press was a mixture of lamenting the 
savagery and ‘evil creed’ of Lobengula and the Ndebele in their raid on the Shona on the one 
hand, and on the other, a broad suspicion towards the BSAC as being believed to have started 
the war to save itself from bankruptcy.293 Furthermore, it was contended that the war could, 
in the end, bring civilisation to Matabeleland where the savagery of the Ndebele had only 
exhibited the alarming need hereof. Indicatively, on the confrontation between the Company 
and the Ndebele, a Morning Post article proclaimed that ‘when civilisation and barbarism 
become coterminous the latter must inevitably succumb in the long run, and the only detail 
is the method by which the end is to be reached.’294 The conduct of the BSAC had thus 
claimed the attention of the public, officials, and humanitarian groups. On the issue of the 
methods by which the Ndebele barbarism was to be defeated, Prime Minister William 
Gladstone, in replying to Ellis’s letter, noted that ‘I can assure you, that we heartily share the 
desire of the Society of Friends, that the Matabele should be treated with justice and 
humanity and mercy.’ 295 
 
 
Warfare in the 1896 Rebellion 
 
According to Julian Cobbing, the Ndebele state ended in 1896 rather than 1893 – as claimed 
by, among others, Ranger – since the Ndebele were no longer under the leadership of a 
central figure but were instead divided into different clans with different interests, stakes and 
agendas.296 In particular, three main groupings had emerged after 1893, the Izigabo, the 
Tahabalala and the Ibutho, who were all connected through social relations, hereditary 
associations or common goals.297 Yet, the outbreak of hostilities in March 1896, while 
unifying different groups, was not a coordinated effort, but rather a cumulative result of 
various fragmented grievances that escalated into a full-flung uprising which nonetheless 
surprised the BSAC, the settlers and the British government.298 
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Dr. Leander Starr Jameson’s raid on the Transvaal in December 1895 meant that the 
vast majority of the police force was away. This rendered the Bulawayo, now a white 
settlement, defenceless, with only a few African policemen and armed volunteer settlers to 
fight the overwhelming number of rebels.299  The rebels swept across Matabeleland with little 
opposition, killing white settlers and African collaborators in their wake. In contrast to the 
events that transpired later in GSWA, the Ndebele killed all whites, including women and 
children, whereas the Herero in GSWA only targeted German men, leaving women and 
children alone. After the rebellion had broken out, the settlers in Bulawayo reported to High 
Commissioner Robinson about the situation in a plea for reinforcements and relief from the 
impending siege: 
 
Situation here very serious. Kaffirs massing around Bulawayo. Insufficient number of men, horses, 
provisions, and arms to guarantee safety of inhabitants, which include 300 women. Reinforcements urgently 
required at once. Do your best to help us. Wire reply.
300  
 
Despite these outright fears and the absence of a protection force, Robinson responded by 
asking Captain Nicholson, who was in Bulawayo, if the telegram was not a mere exaggeration, 
since he knew from military reports that the settlement was entirely safe.301 Nicholson agreed 
with Robinson and stated that there were at the time enough forces to defend Bulawayo, but 
no more than that, which meant the farms and smaller settlements were exposed.302  British 
actors were therefore able to communicate on the situation swiftly. Arguably, the failure of 
the rebels to cut off Bulawayo completely may have been a decisive factor in the conflict, as 
the British could effectively coordinate relief and military efforts. According to Cobbing, the 
Europeans had been deceived by the propaganda of ‘total victory’ in 1893 and the ‘cunning’ 
of the Ndebele had meant that they had been successful in the initial stages of the war.303 In 
April 1896, the rebels were close to two decisive victories at Fonseca’s Farm and Tuli Road, 
spawning concerns amongst officials, who now started to take the pleas from Bulawayo and 
elsewhere more seriously.304 This meant that whereas Robinson could respond rather 
nonchalantly to the situation in March 1896, the mood had swiftly changed after these 
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defeats. However, the Ndebele offensive was eventually broken at the banks of the Umgusa 
river, after which a long and bloody defensive began for the Ndebele rebels.305 
During the First Matabele War, the Ndebele warriors had mostly refused to use 
firearms, as these were not traditional weapons of Ndebele culture. Instead, they preferred 
to use the shortened spear – the assegai – as had been tradition since the Ndebele affiliation 
with the Zulu kingdom in the early nineteenth century.306 Undoubtedly this had a profound 
impact on the relative ease with which the BSAC secured victory in 1893. However, in 1896, 
the rebels used firearms and thus posed a much more serious threat than previously.  Yet 
these firearms were of poor standard and in many cases obsolete, with little ammunition. 
Furthermore, supplies of grains and other essentials were limited, and this soon began to 
encumber the Ndebele war effort.307 Consequently, by mid-June 1896, three months into the 
rebellion, the rebels had failed to sustain an efficient offensive or drive out the settlers. With 
the arrival of imperial troops, they now faced a long defensive campaign against the British, 
with little prospect of victory.308 
Matabeleland was a difficult place to fight a war: hills, woodlands, cliffs and other 
environmental factors made it hard for the British troops to implement their usual strategies 
of letting the enemy come rushing at them only to be shot down by repeating rifles and 
machine guns, as had been the case not only in 1893, but also later and perhaps most vividly 
portrayed at the battle of Omdurman in Sudan in 1898. Although fortune had turned against 
the Ndebele, the pressure was relieved by the Shona, the old Ndebele vassals, who also rose 
in rebellion in June 1896.309 Counterfactually, one could contend that if the Mashona had 
risen at the same time as the Ndebele, the outcome of the initial stages may have been 
different altogether, as the African resistance would have been overwhelming. 310  
 
For the British government in London, it was imperative to intervene, not only to save the 
colony from disaster but also through fear of rebellion spreading to imperial territories such 
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as neighbouring Bechuanaland.311 However, since it was a rebellion against the BSAC and 
not the government, such an intervention quickly became complicated. It was soon agreed 
that the BSAC had to pay for the forces and their operations. Although the government 
promised that ‘every effort be made to avoid incurring expense which is not absolutely 
necessary’, it remains clear that the Company was expecting a significant cost from the 
conflict.312 In terms of political and economic factors, the 1896 rebellion was therefore 
entangled into the relations between the government and the BSAC. The war effort was 
influenced by the demand for the troops to quell the rebellion without incurring expenses, 
as this might have resulted in more ruthless warfare. The aim was therefore to end the 
rebellion quickly to minimise the costs. In other words, they were there to quell the rebellion, 
but on a budget.  
Perhaps this was why the force sent to Southern Rhodesia was rather small. On 1 
May 1896, in a communiqué from the CO in London, Sir Frederick Carrington was 
appointed to lead the imperial forces against the Ndebele. In addition to 300 men from the 
7th Hussars and 720 colonial volunteers, he was to lead a force of 480 mounted infantrymen 
already garrisoned in Cape Town. However, ‘it is not expected that their services will be 
required in the front, but if you should find it necessary – which I do not anticipate – you 
will be at liberty to apply them to the High Commissioner.’ 313 For the officials in London, 
this small force was seen as being more than enough to quell the rebellion and showcases an 
official perception of its military reality. While the Shona had not yet risen at this point, it 
reveals the composure of the CO. But it also indicates an initial reluctance to come to the 
aid of the BSAC in a territory upon which they had so little influence. 
The military practices and the quelling of the rebellion were in many ways 
symptomatic of the ‘small wars’ that consumed Africa in the late nineteenth century. For 
example, when instructions were issued to Colonel Richard Martin, who later compiled a 
significant report on the BSACs administration of the territory, he was told that ‘there is not 
a possibility of defeat’ and therefore that he could rest assured that his reports and views on 
measures that were to be implemented after the rebellion were much needed sooner rather 
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than later.314 Hence, by starting to discuss the aftermath even before the rebellion had ended, 
and in fact before the main obstacle – the Matopo hills south of Bulawayo – had been cleared, 
the British authorities showed incredible confidence in their own superiority in dealing with 
an armed rebellion by so-called inferior races.  
This military overconfidence of the British official mind may have been sustained by 
various reports highlighting the relative ease with which they achieved victories in the open 
field. A report by Carrington describing a British attack on a kraal shows this: over 200 rebels 
were killed, even more were wounded and the attack caused many rebels to flee. Of the 
approximately 100 British troops who attacked the kraal, only three died and four were 
wounded.315 The target of the British imperial troops was mainly the Ndebele fighting men. 
However, there can be little doubt that because of the rumours and stories about settlers 
being murdered, the troops acted with a degree of vengeance, which was in turn reinforced 
by racial perceptions of the Ndebele as inferior savages. This was reflected in the brutal way 
in which kraals and villages were burnt as part of their strategies and the large-scale battles 
where the Ndebele were massacred in numbers. Yet, the British troops were to face a long 
and much more difficult task, as the Ndebele responded by taking up new tactics of guerrilla 
warfare.  
 
Military Superiority and Conduct 
 
Before discussing the developments in the Matopos, where the Ndebele efficiently employed 
guerrilla warfare tactics, it is first important to discuss how the British perceived the Ndebele 
rebels and the military conduct of the conflict. As mentioned, the military superiority of the 
British imperial troops was helped by the technological advantages of the day. Maxim guns, 
repeating rifles and the telegraph were just some of the ‘tools’ that allowed the British to 
have significant advantages over the Ndebele rebels. Such material superiority translated into 
a mentality in which the troops and generals considered themselves almost invincible.316 
Hence, whenever a British army was defeated in the colonies, it sparked fury, outrage and 
public scandal in Britain. The superiority in terms of material and tools meant that personnel 
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in the field became reliant upon this psychological as well as practical effect. According to 
Cobbing, the ‘over-optimism’ of the British in the field aided the Ndebele.317 
Perhaps because of this material superiority and because of their self-identification 
as being civilised, the British sought to maintain what they considered civilised proceedings. 
For instance, when a Captain Gibbs had given orders for his men to execute an Ndebele 
woman and a child for allegedly being spies, it immediately sparked attention from the 
government, as this could easily be picked up and could spark a potential public critique. 
Thus, the CO requested Lord Lansdowne, then Secretary of State for War, to make an inquiry 
into the matter.318 The case was considered of such importance and potential malice to the 
reputation of the British Empire that Carrington informed the Acting High Commissioner 
that ‘unless it is proved clearly that the order was open to misapprehension, I consider that 
the individuals responsible for execution should be put on trial for murder.’319 Gibb’s defence 
described how the woman had allegedly followed them and that the child was hidden under 
her clothes. The order he gave only concerned the woman, whereas he remained unaware of 
the presence of the child, who was discovered afterwards.320 He furthermore described in 
detail what happened and the reason for his suspicion was based on the woman saying that 
she was visiting friends in the Indemas region, and was running in the opposite direction 
when caught. Furthermore, the woman had said during the following interrogation that there 
were no rebels nearby, although an escort had recently been ambushed and the night before 
when Gibbs and his men had arrived at the location where they were to build a fort, they 
had spotted rebel fires during the night.321  
Gibbs contended that he could not let the woman go for several reasons: first, she 
had been into the camp and seen their numbers and occupation. Second, ‘the natives had 
undoubtedly sent her to find out all she could, thinking that, if caught, the white men would 
neither punish or detain her, being a female.’  Third, they had no natural cover where they 
were building the fort, thus exposing them in the open should they be attacked. Therefore, 
they were weary and suspicious of any actual or possible rebel activity. Fourth, Gibbs argued 
that if they had let her go, she would have told the rebels about their situation, and 
considering the aforementioned nearby skirmish, Gibbs would not risk it. Fifth, Gibbs 
contended that there was nowhere to keep her as a prisoner: they had neither the facilities 
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nor the supplies, and sending her to the nearest settlement, Gwelo, would have required a 
large force as escort. This force would furthermore be dismounted, since the horses they had 
were used for scouting the area. Finally, Gibbs noted that he had no means of 
communication at the time and could therefore not get in touch with the proper 
authorities.322 The information the woman could have passed on to the rebels was, according 
to Gibbs, crucial, because of their small numbers, the exposure of being in relatively open 
terrain and the fact that ‘she might have told them the important fact, in their eyes, that we 
had no Maxim gun with us. I attribute the fact of our party of 49 men employed in building 
Fort Shangani not being attacked or molested to the knowledge the rebels had that we were 
in possession of a Maxim gun.’323 From the British perspective, while it was a very useful 
weapon, the Maxim gun had a stronger psychological effect, not only on the rebels in the 
shape of fear but also on the British, giving them a sense of superiority. The fact that they 
did not have a Maxim gun with them was a great source of concern should the rebels find 
out, as it might have led to an attack.  
Eventually, the inquiry led by Carrington himself found that Gibbs was ‘guilty of a 
grave error of judgement’. However, he was of the belief that Gibbs acted on the basis of 
the safety of his men: ‘considering the critical situation of the small force under his command 
and the great risk involved by the possibility of the enemy becoming acquainted, through the 
woman, with the numbers of the detachment and its comparatively defenceless position.’324 
The court proceedings was sent from Robinson (now Lord Rosmead) to the CO in London, 
and in his transmission, Rosmead stated that he did not believe the evidence given in the 
case was sufficient to prove that the woman was a spy, and emphasised that he considered 
that ‘the proceedings were gravely irregular, inasmuch as the prisoner does not appear to 
have been informed either of the charge or sentence, or given a proper opportunity to defend 
herself.’  Moreover, Rosmead believed that the execution of the woman was not ‘entirely 
illegal’ and that the proceedings should have the ‘gravest censure’, after which he generally 
supported Gibb’s actions. Significant here is that he believed it deserved the ‘gravest censure’ 
and yet no punishment of those violating procedures. This indicates that the British 
authorities did not want such information to become public knowledge, which would smear 
the British Empire’s image domestically and internationally alike.325 It therefore reveals that 
British officials did indeed suppress sensitive information and reports to safeguard their own 
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position and avoid political and public outcries. Indeed, it may be assumed this incident, 
which Chamberlain considered ‘a parody of justice’326, would have been a solid argument in 
the White Book to display British colonial vices. 
On a whole, the conduct of imperial troops in Southern Rhodesia was under 
noticeable scrutiny from official circles. The importance of preventing accusations of 
mistreatment and excesses were pivotal to the legitimacy of the government’s intervention, 
but also to their agenda concerning Southern Rhodesia in the aftermath, as will be discussed 
later. Other cases of military officers breaking procedure occurred where rebel leaders such 
as Makoni and Uwini were both executed upon capture rather than being taken prisoner, 
which led to official inquiries into the matter. In the first case, Major Watts, who had shot 
Makoni, was lauded by the settlers in the district (Umtali) who sent a telegram with fifty 
signatures pleading for Watts to be exonerated.327 Again, the military situation was the 
defining factor that decided the outcome. Carrington had deemed that first, due to the terrain 
and ‘a superior number of well-armed natives of doubtful loyalty’ who would be ‘excited by 
the arrest of a great chief’ due to his relation to their own chief. This led Watts to take no 
risks regarding the ‘safety of his column.’ Secondly, had Makoni been rescued, it ‘would have 
done incalculable harm regards the suppression of the rising.’  Finally, bringing Makoni to a 
settlement would have delayed the confirmation of a court-martial and would demand an 
escort ‘stronger than the number of troops on the line of communication would admit 
without endangering the safety of posts and convoys.’ Carrington concluded that these 
considerations led Major Watts to the justifiable conviction ‘that the military exigencies of 
the case demanded prompt and vigorous action, and I am of the opinion that he acted to the 
best of his judgment in the interest of his force, and of the administration of the country.’328 
Uwini was executed after a field-court-marshal overseen by Colonel Robert Baden-
Powell in September 1896, having been sentenced to death on grounds of being in rebellion 
in arms against the crown and ‘inciting rebellion and murder.’ He was shot instantly. Just as 
in the case of Makoni, this was not in accordance with the procedures that officers had to 
follow in the event of capturing prisoners. Thus, it resulted in the order to ‘place Colonel 
Baden-Powell under open arrest’ and for a court of inquiry to begin. 329 However, Baden-
Powell’s arrest was postponed due to ‘vital military operations.’330 Baden-Powell’s illegal 
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action was soon exonerated, as the effect of Uwini’s death had hampered the Ndebele war 
effort, which had also been the case with Makoni in Mashonaland.331 Therefore, while the 
conduct of the troops came under scrutiny, the end always justified the means.  
The British perception of the conflict, therefore, was one where their superiority was 
confirmed in the field, but remained fragile following the initial defeats at Fonseca’s farm 
and Tuli Road. Going on the offensive, however, it became imperative to ensure that the war 
effort did not take excessive proportions because of potential anxieties among officers, 
whether due to technological superiority (Gibbs), supposed lack of troops (Watts) or 
personal hatred or desire for vengeance (Baden-Powell). This adheres to Schaller’s 
observation that colonial violence often emerged out of situations where fear amongst the 
soldier was widespread.332 In these cases, Gibbs and Watts both described their positions as 
being under threat, thus necessitating, in their view, violent measures to be taken in order to 
safeguard their position. Whenever the conduct of British troops did break proceedings, 
however, it was crucial to acquit the perpetrators and to suppress the circulation of potentially 
harmful reports. 
 
The Hunt for the Molimo 
 
The case of Uwini was special, as it also touched upon the perception of the rebel cause. 
According to a Native Commissioner, Val Gielgud, the killing of Uwini was not only positive 
but necessary, in the sense that it would send a strong message to the Ndebele, as Uwini was 
‘an Induna (chief or headman) appointed by the M’limo to compel the allegiance of the 
Maholi (A Ndebele clan) to his cause. He, as an Induna of the M’limo, worked upon the 
superstitious feelings of the people who attributed to him power of a more or less miraculous 
nature.’333 Hence, Gielgud sheds light on the reason why Uwini’s death had such a positive 
effect: it signified that the British could kill a holy warrior, thus breaking ‘native superstition.’ 
Thus, the superstition that was believed to be a central cause for the rebellion remained a 
significant factor in how the British perceived the conflict and the Ndebele.  
According to Ranger, the rebellion was centred around one crucial figure: the 
Molimo (or M’limo) priest who had induced the indunas to take up arms.334 Indeed, Ranger 
emphasises the spiritual aspects of Ndebele culture as a prime motive behind the rebellion 
where social and economic grievances were secondary. The Ndebele (and the Shona) had 
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found in the Molimo a spiritual leader whom they thought to be nearly divine and to have 
the power to turn bullets into water.335 For the British authorities, the Molimo was soon 
imagined to be the main instigator of the rebellion and it became an obsession for them to 
hunt him down and cut the head off the snake.336 Upon learning his whereabouts, American 
scout Frederick Burnham was sent out to assassinate the Molimo in what Keppel-Jones has 
called ‘an adventure worthy of Burnham’s wild western background.’ Supposedly Burnham 
sneaked into a cave and hid in the shadows before shooting the Molimo and escaping under 
pursuit.337 Incidentally, this event became one of widespread fame where depictions of the 
scouts as heroes venturing out to combat the superstitious and evil Molimo caught the 
imagination of a worldwide audience.338 Such perceptions of Ndebele culture reiterate the 
racial attitude prevalent in Britain at the time. Indeed, supposed African superstition was, in 
this case, reiterated as a factor that could not be doubted, as it had been empirically 
substantiated by various anthropological studies.339 The Molimo caught the imagination of 
the British officials, and also, after his assassination, the general public, as this particular event 
became a widely told story in children’s books and was an example for the Boy-Scout 
movement established by Baden-Powell.340  
The Molimo continued to fascinate and capture the attention of the official mind 
until his death.341 Therefore, while Ranger discloses the spiritual motivation from the 
perspective of the Ndebele rebels, it can actually be contended that this spiritual motivation 
was forceful for the British too, as they were convinced of its importance in the Ndebele 
spirit.342 Indeed, Uwini’s death was a move to psychologically strike at the Ndebele will to 
fight, which adhered to the racial prejudices of the ‘native mind’ by removing the 
smokescreen of superstition that the Molimo had cast over the supposedly naïve Ndebele. 
Indeed, the Molimo was perceived by the British to be the embodiment of the superstitious 
nature of the Ndebele as a race: ‘Through trickery and deceit’, it was argued, the Molimo had 
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gained acknowledgement and ‘the lower races hold him in the highest reverence, and this has 
induced them, acting under decree, to wipe out the whites.’343  
According to the British authorities, the Molimo had given prophecies prior to the 
First Matabele War that ‘the white man would sit in Bulawayo’, and had also ‘foreseen’ the 
arrival of the rinderpest, although the British believed he had gained this information from 
emissaries further north of the Zambesi river. Furthermore, this source, being a complaint 
by the settlers in Southern Rhodesia, also contemplated that the quelling of the rebellion was 
not harsh enough and that the authorities should seek to make sure that such superstitious 
rumours did not spread like wildfire, as had been the case.344 
African spirituality, however, was also at the centre of humanitarian critique. Echoing 
both the BSAC’s original charter and Article 6 of the Berlin Treaty, the APS stipulated that 
‘the natives’ should be allowed to have their religion and serve their gods as they wanted, and 
that this would eventually end the rebellion. In a response to this, Colonel Martin argued that  
 
Anyone who has had experience of Natives could tell him (Secretary Fox Bourne of the APS) that course 
would undoubtedly have had the effect of encouraging the Natives to cling the closer to their superstitions, 
and of fanning their religious frenzy, the result of which would, undoubtedly, have been far greater disasters 
to the white people than did befall them.
345  
 
Certainly, the concept of race and the idea of a civilising mission were at the core of the 
understanding of the Ndebele society and culture. But by reiterating the alleged superstitious 
nature of the Ndebele, it automatically painted a picture of the rebels as being fanatical, 
violent and savage, and thus impossible to convince of reason. This created a contrasting 
image where the assumed savage nature of the Ndebele not only legitimised the violent 
conduct of the British troops in both official and public circles but also caused excessive 
methods of dynamiting caves to be seen as a necessity to overcome this supposedly fanatical 
foe. 
 
Dynamiting Caves: The Matopo Hills 
 
In June 1896, the British imperial forces defeated the rebels at the battle of Umgusa, just 
outside Bulawayo. According to Terence Ranger, it was this carnage which caused the rebels 
to flee into the Matopo hills.346 The Matopos are to this day a place of culture, religion, and 
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memory for both Africans and Europeans (for instance, they are home to Cecil Rhodes’ 
burial site). Indeed, these hills have had a crucial role in the history of Southern Rhodesia 
and were a focal point for both the 1896 rebellion and the later bush wars in the 1960s and 
1970s.347  
The British forces pursued the rebels into the hills, and with a breakthrough on 20 
July 1896, the main resistance was eventually broken and the Ndebele scattered throughout 
the hills into caves to wage a guerrilla war.348 This new nature of the conflict became 
problematic for the British forces because their Maxim guns and repeating rifles were 
relatively inefficient in this rough terrain and the caves provided excellent cover and 
concealment for the rebels, making it easy for the Ndebele to ambush. Indeed, Ranger even 
claims that the British forces were losing the war in the Matopos.349 Although no such 
indication can be found in the sources left by the Colonial and War Offices, it nonetheless 
remains clear that the Matopos presented a much more formidable threat to the British than 
before and it was here that they suffered the most casualties and the hardest fighting of the 
entire war. This caused Chamberlain and the CO to be anxious about the outcome and how 
long the war would drag out. Chamberlain therefore communicated to Robinson to make 
sure that the military preparations were sufficient because ‘the history of war with South 
African natives contains several disasters.’ These disasters could prove to be dire for the 
government and Chamberlain complained that: 
 
…a disaster to the force attacking the Matopo Hills would probably entail the loss of life to very many of 
the White inhabitants of Matabeleland and Mashonaland, and would certainly entail the sending of an 
expeditionary force from the country. Public opinion would be certain to fix the responsibility for a disaster 





It was only just over a decade since General Gordon’s defeat at Khartoum (1885) and the 
British disaster at Isandlwana during the Anglo-Zulu War (1879). These defeats had become 
myths and had caused immense pressure upon the British government to act thereon. 
Gordon’s death, in particular, may have been a concern for Chamberlain, as it caused the 
government at the time to lose an election soon after.351 Therefore he warned Robinson that 
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‘the more full and careful your local preparations are the more relieved public opinion will 
be here, and the less pressure will be put on Her Majesty’s Government to send out 
reinforcements.’352 Thus, there was governmental pressure on the military officers to make 
sure that defeat was not an option. This pressure from Whitehall may have caused Carrington 
to apply ruthless tactics of blowing up caves: 
 
…regarding the attack on caves. These are generally situated in mountains and require many more men for 
their capture than our small columns can supply. The columns have to do, and have, I think, done the best 
they could under the circumstances. Very little reliance can be placed on most newspaper reports… I 




This meant the use of dynamite whenever the forces were fighting rebels hiding in caves. 
Whilst this contests Ranger’s claim about the British losing the war in the Matopos, it also 
implies the ruthless nature of the war: using dynamite against caves where women and 
children were hiding is a noteworthy disregard for human life. Alarmed by the potential 
scandal that could arise from this, Chamberlain sent a telegram to High Commissioner 
Rosmead regarding the use of dynamite in which he stated that ‘I presume that, in all cases 
where caves are blown up, ample opportunity is first afforded for the surrender of the 
occupants, and for the escape of women and children in the event of a refusal to surrender.’354 
Rosmead never truly replied, as this was part of a larger telegram concerning other important 
matters as well. Yet, it does indicate that even from the view of the official mind, this practice 
was somehow considered inhumane and frowned upon. 
While Chamberlain was initially concerned with the possibility of a defeat and the 
impact it would have on public opinion, the tactic employed to avoid exactly that also sparked 
public critique. Indeed, the dynamiting of the caves was considered an excessive method by 
many: both the public and humanitarian groups. Mr W. Evans wrote in October 1896 to the 
CO about the reports he had read in The Pall Mall Gazette regarding a certain Captain Pease 
who had besieged a cave and used dynamite in doing so.355 The newspaper sought to depict 
Pease as a hero of the empire, yet Evans complained that ‘I protest, as an Englishman, against 
the use of dynamite in war against people who have only been fighting for their own country, 
instinctively.’356  The CO took little time to respond to Evans and in doing so made known 
their official stance on the use of dynamite: ‘The use of mines [dynamite] is a necessary 
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incident of warfare, and to state that Mr Chamberlain has no reason to suppose that the 
proceedings to which you refer were inconsistent with the ordinary usages of civilised 
nations.’357 
British strategies were therefore consistently under scrutiny. From the perspective of 
the official mind, it was a choice between a possible defeat in the Matopos and then facing 
the public critique hereof, or instead, applying ruthless methods which were to cause much 
resentment amongst the public and humanitarian groups but could, they were convinced, 
secure victory and possibly minimicing expenses. They chose the latter, which had terrible 
consequences for the Ndebele, as it served to increase the violence and barbarism of the war. 
The ruthless strategy of dynamiting caves was one which the German delegation at Versailles 
could point to as an example of British excesses. However, whereas the German conduct in 
GSWA was genocidal, the brutal actions of the British in Southern Rhodesia were not. The 
mere scale and barbarism of the 1896 rebellion was far less brutal than that of the Herero 
and Nama genocide, which was organised and actively sought the extermination of the so-
called lesser races. The strategy employed by the British of dynamiting caves and burning 
kraals was certainly brutal, but is better understood as a case of total war where the Ndebele 
were to be completely subjugated, rather than a genocide where the extermination of the 
Ndebele was the aim. 
The bloody fighting in the Matopos did eventually lead to peace in Matabeleland. 
However, the road to peace was somewhat peculiar because the British themselves were split 
into three factions: the government, the BSAC, and the settlers. The initiative for peace talks 
came from Cecil Rhodes himself, who went to the Matopos and discussed peace terms with 
the Ndebele indunas without the backing of the government.358 This spectacular moment 
was lauded by many as an act of heroism by Rhodes, but it sparked anger among officials in 
Whitehall and South Africa because they believed that since they, after all, were the ones 
engaged in quelling the rebellion, they should be involved in these peace talks and more or 
less dictate them.359  Colonel Martin particularly was upset about Rhodes’ initiative and argued 
that the government should simply swoop in and take over the peace talks, whether Rhodes 
liked it or not. In fact, Martin, who came to play such a crucial role in the post-war affairs, 
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generally disliked Rhodes and the entire BSAC and supposedly this resentment was 
returned.360  
In early August 1896 hundreds of rebels began to gradually surrender as the tide of 
war changed against their favour.361 However, according to Lt. General Goodenough, many 
more were ready to surrender but ‘are withheld by the Indunas.’ The government had on 4 
July 1896 issued an amnesty proclamation in which all the rebel fighters could peacefully 
come in and lay down their arms and could, if they had not been involved in the murder of 
any white settlers, be allowed to leave.362  However, this did not extend to the indunas, and 
particularly not to those who had ordered the attacks on white settlers.363 Therefore, the 
indunas had no interest in surrendering on these terms and continued to fight. The amnesty 
proclamation also clearly defined the areas still considered to be in rebellion as well as the 
penalty for remaining in arms against the British Empire. The government sought to end the 
rebellion by appealing to the lower parts of the Ndebele hierarchy which would see the 
indunas removed from power after the rebellion. Rhodes, however, went straight for the 
elites to consolidate and to reach a status quo of power relations relative to the future of 
Southern Rhodesia so that the BSAC could continue to conduct its business without much 
interference from the government and Ndebele alike, as the indunas could be the key to 
secure both worthwhile peace and a steady supply of labour in the future. 
Rhodes’ peace negotiations, however, whilst being very unpopular with the officials, 
were appreciated by the imperial troops fighting in the Matopos because of the stalemate 
they were experiencing. This meant that while Rhodes had previously made contact in secret 
and initiated the negotiations, these negotiations were now out in the open.364 During the 
later stages of Rhodes’ negotiations, Carrington gave the order to the officers in the Matopos 
to ‘avoid any offensive movement against the rebels pending settlement of questions of 
surrender.’365 Ultimately, it ended with Rhodes successfully negotiating peace with the 
indunas, thus removing the main point of resistance of the rebellion, yet the war was not 
over: several indunas and their loyal followers could never submit to the conditions, as they 
would undoubtedly face the penalty of death.366 The result of the peace was that the Ndebele 
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surrendered en masse and only two indunas, Mkwati and Makumbi, continued the struggle 
due to their involvement in the killing of settlers. This partial surrender meant that many, but 
not all of the Ndebele surrendered and that those who sought to surrender and lay down 
their arms were threatened and often killed by the remaining rebels in order to keep them 
fighting the British. 367  
During the negotiations, however, the indunas had supposedly talked about the ill-
treatment by the Native Commissioners and Native Police, the seizure of cattle and other 
wrongs against them. 
 
The defects of company administration of which the indunas now so bitterly complained were in fact very 
much due to Rhodes himself, to his sense of priorities, to his choice of men, to his tolerance of the rough 
and ready method. But now he… tried to imagine the Ndebele situation, he was able to demonstrate, and 





Based on this, Ranger contends that Rhodes subsequently promised the indunas that such 
ill-treatment would never happen again.369 However, most of the settlers, having been the 
victims of massacres by the Ndebele in the initial stage of the rebellion, were nothing short 
of furious with the softness shown by Rhodes in these peace talks.370 
The negotiations that ended the rebellion had, according to Ranger, done more to 
settle the ‘native question’ than the preceding years of company rule. After 1893, the indunas 
were ignored and never consulted; now they were an authority, as in the old days under 
Lobengula, albeit with the central power being the BSAC. The issue of the power allocated 
to the indunas after the war remained a crucial aspect for the BSAC. Albert Grey, who had 
then recently been appointed Administrator of Southern Rhodesia as an employee by the 
BSAC, informed Rhodes’ solicitor, Bourchier Hawksley, that the BSAC had, by granting 
privileges to the indunas, ‘taken the best means open to us to secure the contentment of the 
natives and the continuance of peace.’371 Grey was at the time generally considered to be in 
the pocket of Rhodes himself.372 Perhaps that was why Grey assured the CO and 
Chamberlain that the BSAC would henceforth seek to accommodate the needs of the 
Ndebele and Shona as much as possible so that it ‘will be satisfactory even to the Aborigines 
Protection Society.’373 Moreover, Grey believed that the way in which they had won the war 
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in a few months, with supposedly few costs, was outright impressive, and suggested 
‘someone to be commissioned to make out a return, showing the comparative cost of the 
various Imperial wars in South Africa.’374 In many ways, the imperial practices implemented 
to quell the rebellion showed the nature of imperialism and the manner in which the official 
mind dealt with it: complete confidence and superiority in every action carried out. Yet, the 
interests of the government and the BSAC consistently clashed during the rebellion, which 
made for individual actions being taken and pulled the future of Southern Rhodesia in two 
separate directions: towards the intentions of the BSAC on the one hand and the intentions 
of the government on the other. 
 
 
The Jameson Raid: The BSAC and Government Relations in an 
International Context 
 
The Jameson Raid in 1895 was the pretext for the Ndebele rebellion in 1896 and a significant 
event in the increasing antagonism between Britain and the Boer republics, and thus had a 
profound influence on the relationship between the Company and the government. Before 
discussing how the government sought to ratify company rule after the 1896 rebellion, it is 
crucial first to ascertain how the Jameson Raid had complicated company-government 
relations in an international context. Indeed, as will be shown, the post-rebellion situation 
was embedded in the international scandal that followed the raid and saw imperial and 
foreign interests being intertwined. 
The raid itself took place on 29 December 1895. The plan was to simply move into 
the Transvaal and aid the British citizens (the uitlanders) who were to take up arms. Thereby 
the raid was supposed to appear as an act of support for the disenfranchised British citizens 
in the Boer republics. Preparations for this rebellion had been planned well in advance and 
weapons had been smuggled into the Transvaal. However, the uitlanders never rose in a 
coordinated effort: some did and others did not, and so a full-blown rebellion in 
Johannesburg never materialised. Eventually, the raid failed and Jameson and his men were 
trapped at Doornkop, where they surrendered on 1 January 1896.375 
To this day, there is much uncertainty regarding the actual circumstances and the 
immediate reactions to the raid. It is generally believed that the raid was planned and thought 
up by Rhodes himself, partly because he was director of the BSAC and partly because the 
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subsequent parliamentary inquiry deemed it so. However, upon hearing that Jameson had 
assembled and moved out, Rhodes sent him two letters urging him to turn around. There is 
therefore still a substantial reason to question who the main culprit behind the move actually 
was. The British government was also involved, if not directly, then indirectly. Hercules 
Robinson was believed to have been in the pocket of Rhodes and the BSAC and had helped 
to draft the plan. For Chamberlain, the matter remains more complicated, as his involvement 
is still unclear. It remains certain, however, that Chamberlain and the British government, if 
not directly involved, were kept well-informed of the plans.376  Soon after the news broke, 
Chamberlain communicated to President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal to repudiate the raid 
and any government involvement. However, there are suggestions that Chamberlain himself 
was indeed aware of the upcoming raid, albeit not directly involved in its planning. Liberal 
MP Henry Labouchere was convinced of Chamberlain’s involvement and demanded 
exposure of all documents on the matter, accusing him of ‘mixing up political and business 
interests.’377 However, he was unsuccessful, as many documents that could prove the 
involvement of Chamberlain and other officials were likely to have been destroyed. 
Chamberlain, nicknamed ‘pushful Joe’ due to his hard-driving and stern behaviour, 
was a radical when it came to domestic politics; however, in terms of foreign and colonial 
policy, he was a classical imperialist who ardently advocated the importance and future 
expansion of the empire.378 Travis Crosby contends that the main problem in Chamberlain 
and Rhodes’ hostile relationship was that they were too similar in that they were both 
independent individuals with an insatiable lust for power and control. In 1895, Rhodes and 
the BSAC had requested that the Bechuanaland Protectorate be ceded to the Company, 
which only rendered Chamberlain suspicious of Rhodes’ intentions towards the Boer 
republics.379 Eventually, the request was declined, after three Batawana chiefs – Khama, 
Bathoen, and Sebele – had travelled to London and spoken against the potential company 
takeover. Nevertheless, the raid eventually started from Bechuanaland territory, prompting 
further suspicion as to the British government’s involvement.380 
Such suspicions were serious, especially if central figures in the government in 
London were accomplices. It would mean that it was Britain as a sovereign nation and not a 
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renegade private company that had unjustly attacked another sovereign nation.381 Around 
Europe, Britain was smeared in newspapers and regarded as a bullying superpower with 
expansionistic ambitions: this was later echoed in the famous speech by Prime Minister 
Salisbury on the ‘living and dying nations’ in 1898, where countries such as the Transvaal 
were doomed to be absorbed by the empires.382 Consequently, the Transvaal received much 
sympathy from other small countries or ‘dying nations’. For instance, the conservative and 
usually pro-British Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten lamented Britain for ‘having been too 
greedy in the Transvaal’ and having, because of the raid, been weakened by criticism from 
Germany and France. Furthermore, it was reported that rumours in Germany suggested that 
the Boers had burned Jameson and his men alive and that this would soon result in war.383 
Of course, such rumours were false, but they illustrate the international attention and 
euphoria when it came to international and colonial scandals. Indeed, the raid captivated an 
international audience and made Britain out to be a greedy leviathan, similar to how Germany 
was portrayed in 1918. 
In Germany, sympathy for the Boer republics was widespread both among the public 
and in the Reichstag. The German ambassador in London was even instructed to ‘ask 
whether the British Government approves of the crossing of the frontier of the Transvaal 
State by the Chartered Company’s troops’ and ‘if you have the impression that the infraction 
of International Law is approved, you will ask for your passports.’384 The Jameson Raid, 
therefore, placed significant strain on Anglo-German relations as well. Not only in terms of 
the raid itself, because upon hearing of the failure of the raid, Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a 
telegram to Kruger congratulating him on defeating the ‘armed hordes that invaded your 
country as disturbers of peace.’385 This so-called Kruger telegram illustrates the importance 
of the raid and the wider regional and international scandal that followed. Indeed, it is 
considered a momentous event in the growing antagonism between Britain and the Boer 
republics, but also between Britain and Germany leading up to the First World War. German 
sympathy and later support for the Boers during the South African War sparked the bonfires 
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of jingoism in Britain against Germany.386 While the sentiment towards Britain around 
Europe was negative, it was ambiguous at best within Britain itself. Jameson and Rhodes 
were of course criticised and demands for repercussions demanded. However, in the face of 
the denunciations, it created a sense of national loyalty, as the actions of the Kaiser were 
refuted and condemned. Because of these international repercussions, the Jameson Raid 
placed severe strain on the relationship between the government and the BSAC. At the time, 
the Transvaal had gradually become less dependent on British and Cape imports because of 
the German presence in GSWA and the completion of the Pretoria-Delagoa Railway in 
1895.387 In 1893 Britain supplied 80% of its imports and Germany a mere 14%. However, by 
1897, Britain was supplying 64% and Germany a sizeable 32%.388 Therefore, the raid not 
only created a bad image of Britain, but also furnished German influence and sympathy in 
the region as well as permanently ruining Britain’s relationship with the Transvaal.389  
The Jameson Raid was so badly received by the government that it directly threatened 
to dissolve the BSAC: ‘If the Company were privy to Jameson’s marauding behaviour…Her 
Majesty’s Government would at once have to face a demand for the revocation of the Charter 
and the dissolution of the corporation.’390 But criticism at home and abroad demanded a 
scapegoat. The Jyllandsposten asked, ‘as Napoleon was exiled to Elba – will the same happen 
to Rhodes?’391 To mitigate public opinion at home and abroad, the British government 
created a Parliamentary Committee, headed by Chamberlain (since he was the Secretary of 
Colonies), to inquire into the Jameson Raid and by extension the causes of 1896 rebellion.392 
This inquiry was famously called ‘the great lying of state in Westminster.’393 The inquiry was 
not just aimed at Jameson and Rhodes, but also indirectly at Chamberlain and the CO in 
general, since it had been contended that they were somehow involved.394  
Many of the still existing views on the involvement of the CO are based on missing 
telegrams, which can only be assumed to have been burnt after Rhodes’ death in 1902, as 
these would definitively prove whether or not the CO was involved in the Jameson Raid. 
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Graham Bower, who was secretary to the High Commissioner to South Africa when the raid 
happened, remained an ardent critic of the inquiry and of the raid. In his edited memoirs, 
Bower claimed that he had been censured in his statements at the inquiry and that the whole 
affair was a farce. Indeed, Bower argued, Chamberlain, who was in effect also on trial, picked 
the members of the jury and eventually included himself. This, and the general scandal that 
had arisen, meant according to Bower that the case was similar to the contemporary Dreyfus 
affair in France, which had also caused a political scandal.395  
The inquiry and the entire ‘blame-game’ incurred by the Jameson Raid and the 
subsequent 1896 rebellion was also part of the wider geopolitical interests of Southern 
Africa.396 The BSAC was strategically nothing short of indispensable for the consolidation of 
British influence and power in the region at a time where particularly German expansion was 
seen as a possible threat to Britain’s dominance of the Southern African interior and its policy 
towards the Boer Republics. Therefore, this inquiry did not have any wider repercussions for 
either Chamberlain or Rhodes on a larger scale. Considering that the raid had inexorably 
broken international law by attacking a then neutral state, they both escaped rather easily.397 
Eventually, the inquiry committee completely exonerated Chamberlain and partially 
exonerated Hercules Robinson, who was instead exhibited as having been complicit but 
unknowing. Although Jameson had led the raid, he was not condemned by many: in fact, the 
great poet of the day, Rudyard Kipling, wrote the poem If in Jameson’s honour as a hero of 
the British Empire. The big loser in the inquiry was Rhodes, who was deemed the main 
culprit, and ultimately it ended in his resignation as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony in 
1896 and later as Managing Director for the BSAC, although he was reinstated by the 
stakeholders two years later.398 In contrast, Chamberlain came out of the inquiry in a stronger 
position than that in which he had entered it. As the entire CO was under suspicion, 
Chamberlain now had the opportunity to revamp the entire personnel.  Most notably, this 
led to the appointment of Alfred Milner – whom Crosby describes as a man ‘cut in 
Chamberlain’s mould’399 – as High Commissioner to South Africa in April 1897. 
 
The geopolitical threat that the Transvaal posed to British South Africa was undoubtedly 
serious, and according to many scholars, including Robinson and Gallagher, it threatened to 
                                                 
 
395 Schreuder and Butler, Sir Graham Bower’s Secret History, 122. 
396 For a contemporary and detailed description of the proceedings, see The Standard, 20 February 1897, 4. 
397 Crosby, Chamberlain, 137-39. 
398 Antoinette Burton (ed.), Politics and Empire: A Reader (London, 2001), 275. See also Crosby, Chamberlain, 
140-141 and Louis Raphael, The Cape to Cairo Dream: A study in British imperialism, 2nd ed. [org. 1936] (New 
York, 1973), 188. 
399 Crosby, Chamberlain, 142. 
93 
 
turn Southern Africa away from the British Empire.400 However, to prevent this, Whitehall 
could only seek to keep its influence intact by pointing to the uitlander question and rely on 
the support of Southern Rhodesia. These became focal-points in the increasingly hostile 
Boer-British tensions that culminated with the outbreak of war in 1899.401 The Jameson Raid, 
therefore, remains a crucial event in order to comprehend how British officials perceived 
colonial rule in Southern Rhodesia and GSWA because of the involvement of the BSAC and 
the provocations made by Germany and the Kaiser. The affair deeply affected the relations 
between the BSAC and the government and cast the British Empire into a scandal 
domestically and internationally. There were therefore international and domestic pressures 
to scrutinise the BSAC and its administration of Southern Rhodesia. Thus, the parliamentary 
committee was not only intended to provide a scapegoat and exonerate the British 
government from complicity in the raid and the scandal it had caused, but also as a way to 
put company rule in Southern Rhodesia, as a whole, under scrutiny. Indeed, there were clear 
indications that the British Government, and especially the joint Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Salisbury, had, according to a German diplomat, suggested he did not wish 
‘to increase further the authority and power of Cecil Rhodes.’402 Therefore, the Jameson Raid 
was a pretext for a governmental inquiry into the affairs of the Company and a way to build 
a case to try and put Rhodes and the BSAC on a leash that would keep them committed to 
the agenda and interests of the British Empire. This served as a double-edged sword to curb 
international criticism by exonerating the British government and to further official interests 
and control of Southern Africa as a whole, as opposed to Rhodes and the BSAC claiming 
further influence and power. Therefore, in 1896, the BSAC had not only caused an 
international scandal, prompting heavy criticism of the government, but had also dragged 
the government into a colonial war. It was therefore inviting for the British officials to curb 
the power and influence of the BSAC to avoid being drawn into any future problems and to 
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Causes of the Rebellion: Company Rule under Scrutiny 
 
Since the government had been dragged into a colonial war and faced the scandal that arose 
out of the Jameson Raid, it now sought to investigate the affairs of the BSAC. The causes of 
the rebellion were at the crux of this investigation, as it would reveal whether company rule 
had violated the terms upon which it was legitimised. After the First Matabele War, the 
privileges of the BSAC in ruling Southern Rhodesia had been laid down in the Matabeleland 
Order in Council of 1894 (Henceforth the 1894 Order). This order constituted the terms of 
the defeated Ndebele and their new position under company rule and was in effect a 
Versailles treaty of Matabeleland. In 1893, the British government decided that since it was 
the BSAC that had waged the war, this justified company rule in Matabeleland. Furthermore, 
they had little judicial reason and no political mandate to refuse Rhodes and the Company 
the expansion of its borders to the south. Therefore, to avoid laying an unexpected and 
unwanted additional cost upon the British taxpayer and potentially antagonising pro-
company supporters in Southern Africa, the British government decided against the 
annexation of Matabeleland. In fact, the government’s mandate to negotiate the terms of 
Matabeleland was so weak in 1893 that they dropped their only real demand of having a 
government official residing in Bulawayo when Rhodes opposed it.403 Eventually, John 
Moffat was appointed to report to the government on affairs in Matabeleland, but he was to 
be paid by the BSAC and was of little use to inform the CO of anything, leaving it with no 
eyes or ears on the ground.404 Indeed, as Keppel-Jones rightly observes, the stance of the CO 
after 1893 was to seek ‘power without responsibility’, and in this they failed.405 
This resulted in the 1894 Order effectively being a carte blanche for the BSAC in 
governing Matabeleland. In theory, however, company rule was subjected to the 
government’s approval whenever new ordinances and regulations were to be passed, 
especially those concerning ‘native policies’. The British government had indeed inserted 
specific clauses intended to protect the indigenous peoples from exploitation and, most 
importantly, from conditions comparable to slavery. It was therefore a provision in the 1894 
Order that any such new regulations had to be approved by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, the High Commissioner to South Africa or, alternatively, the Secretary of State.406 
                                                 
 
403 Palley, The Constitutional History, 113-14. 
404 Casper Andersen, ‘Handelskompagniet British South Africa Company som ikke-statslig voldsaktør, 1889-
1994’ in Mikkel Thorup and Morten Brænder (eds.), Antiterrorismens Idéhistorie. Stater og Vold i 500 år (Aarhus, 
2007), 114. 
405 Keppel-Jones, Rhodes and Rhodesia, 320. Also cited in Parry, ‘Review: Rhodes and Rhodesia…’. 
406 Palley, The Constitutional History, 115-16. 
95 
 
On paper, these may seem to be stringent terms of imperial control from London, but since 
Whitehall had no real eyes on the ground, they were effectively unable to monitor whether 
such policies were followed.407 
One of the failures of the 1894 Order was that it did not pragmatically consider the 
economic premises upon which the BSAC was conducting its affairs. This included demands 
for cheap labour and the gradual expropriation of Ndebele lands and cattle, as will be 
discussed below. By setting down a set of rules which the BSAC was to follow and refer to, 
the government did indeed seek some degree of control; however, it maintained a certain 
distance in its way of doing so. As Palley rightly contends, ‘despite the elements of imperial 
control enumerated, the CO’s intention was to permit the Company to exercise its power 
freely.’408 Several reasons may have swayed the CO to decide to take such a laissez-faire 
approach: both geopolitical interests of not antagonising pro-BSAC elements in Southern 
Africa, and also not stirring public opinion and laying an additional burden upon the taxpayer 
for a new colony which they had not even acquired themselves. Thus, after 1893, the 
government were more than willing to leave the administration of Matabeleland to the 
Company. As John Galbraith has concluded, ‘between 1889 and 1896, the Chartered 
Company was an engine without a governor.’409 
This nearly unrestricted power in Matabeleland rendered it possible for the BSAC to 
introduce no less than five ordinances in 1895 alone, primarily for the purpose of imposing 
hut-taxes on the Ndebele.410 These hut taxes were resented among the Ndebele, both because 
of the tax in itself and also because it was collected by Africans who in many cases belonged 
to tribes and clans that had been subjugated by the Ndebele prior to 1893. This showcases 
the ignorance of the BSAC towards African social cultures, as it was a significant humiliation 
and grievance for the Ndebele which may certainly have incited them to rebel in 1896.  
Nevertheless, by not establishing itself as a presence in Matabeleland, nor demanding 
any real influence or receiving timely reports from the BSAC in its administration, the British 
government fell to a role on the fringes, functioning at best as a verifying entity with no real 
power or clear purpose. Although there was a long and renowned history of company-based 
imperialism in India with the East India Company, it was very different in this case, because 
in Matabeleland the government never fully acknowledged the economic premises of 
company rule. The Ndebele and later governmental disregard of the administration of 
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Matabeleland, therefore, partly resulted from Whitehall’s lack of will and interest, but also of 
understanding of the real situation in Southern Rhodesia. This lack of understanding of the 
BSACs premises, interests and intentions paved the way for the BSAC to reach a position 
where it had the opportunity to implement regulations that would eventually question the 
moral foundations of the British Empire. 
 
Cattle Administration after 1893 
 
After the mining industry, Southern Rhodesia’s most important economy was cattle 
herding.411 It was believed that the BSAC had by the end of 1895 seized about half of the 
Ndebele cattle. This rendered the government rather suspicious towards to the BSAC 
because the seizing of cattle may not only have been a reason for rebellion, but might also 
have been in direct violation of the principles laid out in the BSAC’s privileges in 
administering Southern Rhodesia, thus harming the already complicated relationship 
between the BSAC and the government.412  
Deputy Commissioner, Colonel Richard Martin was commissioned to compile a 
report on the causes of the rebellion that examined various aspects of company 
administration in Matabeleland, where the seizure of cattle was one of the main issues 
addressed. In essence, what Martin was looking for in his report was whether the BSAC had 
violated its powers and privileges of the 1894 Order. It is important to note how the 1894 
Order, as a revision of the original charter made in the wake of the First Matabele War, 
directly dealt with the issue of cattle and the general livelihood of the Ndebele. In fact, it 
obliged the BSAC to provide sufficient ‘land, cattle and resources’ to sustain the livelihood 
of the defeated Ndebele. A central allegation put forward in Martin’s report, therefore, was 
that the BSAC was in violation of the obligations outlined in the 1894 Order.413 
Naturally, even before Martin had finished his report, Whitehall had its postulations 
of what reasons lay behind the rebellion. In a telegram to Rosmead, Chamberlain stated that 
the report Martin was compiling would give him more insight into the events and the 
responsibility of the BSAC in the outbreak and that ‘the report will of course deal with cattle 
and labour questions and any personal grievances of Matabele.’ Therefore, the government 
had noteworthy suspicions about the conduct – or rather, misconduct – of the BSAC prior 
to the rebellion. Yet, this was not all emanating from newly uncovered incidents of 
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maladministration, for the officials in London were aware of the seizure of cattle and the 
labour regulations before 1896: they simply did not have conclusive evidence for it; nor did 
they have a motive to act on it.414 This can only be contended, not proven, yet in another 
case – that of the Tati Concession Ltd., a similar company based in neighbouring 
Bechuanaland – the picture was quite different. In March 1896, as the first reports of 
rebellion in Matabeleland came in, the CO directly instructed the Tati Concession Ltd. to be 
more ‘discreet’ and careful in seizing cattle from ‘the natives’ to avoid a repetition or spread 
of the rebellion in nearby Matabeleland. Moreover, there were prevalent concerns that such 
practices could be a point of criticism of colonial administration.415  
On the matter of seizing cattle, Martin emphasised it as being a grievance and thus a 
direct cause for the Ndebele to take up arms. The BSAC had erroneously supposed that the 
entire stock of Ndebele cattle under Lobengula had been the property of the King, and 
therefore, after the BSAC had won the war in 1893, that it was theirs by right of conquest.416 
Cattle were therefore initially herded to be counted by the BSAC and were subsequently 
systematically distributed back to the Ndebele as a part of the 1894 Order. Not only did this 
incur a prolonged timespan where the Ndebele had been deprived of their main livelihood, 
it also coincided with the outbreak of rinderpest: 
 
By this distribution 40,930 cattle, in most of which the natives up to that time had only milking rights, were 
given over to the natives as their absolute property. The distribution was almost accomplished by the time 
the rinderpest broke out.
417  
 
The combination of the seizing of cattle and the rinderpest led the Ndebele to believe that 
none of this was accidental, but premeditated by the British. The rinderpest left cattle stocks 
scarce, and when the BSAC continued to seize whatever cattle remained, it caused starvation, 
which spawned further resentment among the Ndebele.418  
The BSAC’s assumption that all cattle had been theirs by right of conquest was 
criticised by Martin as being wrong and unjust, as the Company had simply assumed all cattle 
to have been Lobengula’s, as they were faced with difficulties in distinguishing the ownership 
of various herds. The assumption therefore conveniently solved this problem and put the 
Company in control of the entire cattle stock of Matabeleland. Yet, as has already been 
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mentioned, this news was not new to Whitehall. According to Palley, the government had in 
1893-4 consented to all cattle being the Company’s by right of conquest.419 Whereas it was 
seen as unproblematic in 1893-4, government inaction was rapidly swept under the carpet 
after the 1896 rebellion and instead protracted as maladministration, purely being the result 
of company rule with no mention of official consent. 
Immediately after the war in 1893, many cattle herds had remained under the 
supervision of different clans and groups until a final decision had been made. However, 
when the decision to claim all the cattle had been made, each induna was required to supply 
the BSAC with fifty head of cattle each month through the agency of the much resented 
Native Police.  
 
This practice must have been a source of great irritation and discontent to the Natives…many of those 
under whose charge the Company had placed cattle had possessed a certain number of their own, and still 
considered some of the cattle claimed by the Company but left in their charge as their own property, and 





In December 1895, the BSAC redistributed the cattle to the Ndebele, but the fear that they 
would soon be systematically deprived of their cattle continued to persist. Martin argued that 
‘the native mind’ did not understand ‘on what grounds the Company could place restrictions 
on his own personal property.’421 Therefore, the mistake by the BSAC of claiming the cattle 
as the property of the deposed King after the war rendered the ‘native mind’ uncertain and 
suspicious towards the British, especially due to the ‘frequent drafts (of cattle) made by the 
Native police.’ 422 Furthermore, Martin asserted that it was not only in material terms that the 
seizure of cattle impelled the Ndebele to rebel, but also in cultural terms. In order for a young 
Ndebele man to ‘purchase’ a wife in accordance to Ndebele tradition, he needed to own 
cattle. By seizing and later redistributing cattle, the BSAC disrupted the ‘native customs’ and 
angered many young men who could then not take any wives.423  
Approximately 40,000 cattle were returned to the Ndebele, before being decimated 
by rinderpest. According to the APS, this figure was extremely low and unfair, since they 
believed that the Ndebele were in possession of close to ‘200,000 or more’ prior to 1893 and 
this was certainly not ‘the cattle sufficient for their needs’ as was required of the BSAC in the 
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1894 Order. 424  It was therefore clear that seizing the cattle after the First Matabele War was 
not reasonably in accordance to the relevant estimations, and moreover, it collided with the 
spread of rinderpest, which then paved the way for further grievances and resentment.  
Instead of being the result of a policy, Lt. General Goodenough, the Commander-
in-Chief of the forces in South Africa, believed that the outbreak of the rebellion was due to 
bad luck and random circumstances and not to the administration and distribution of cattle 
after the war itself, because it unfortunately collided with the outbreak of rinderpest.425 
However, as Ian Phimister has observed, the Company had probably already sold a 
significant number of the seized cattle on the Kimberley and Johannesburg markets shortly 
after claiming them as loot in 1893.426 The rinderpest may therefore also have been a 
convenient excuse for the Company in hiding the real number of cattle seized and 
redistributed. Certainly, the issue of cattle affected the socio-economic and cultural tensions 
between the BSAC and the Ndebele and remained a key incitement for the rebellion in 1896 
and therefore also an issue for which the British government lamented company rule. The 
chaotic proceedings and the lack of clarity deriving from the rinderpest and the ownership 
of cattle only served to complicate the whole affair, but it remains clear that the BSAC saw 
a possibility to advance the economy of Southern Rhodesia by seizing the cattle relatively 
indiscriminately.  
 
The Company Labour Scheme 
 
The issue of cattle, however, remained minuscule compared to the matter of ‘native labour’ 
before and after the uprising, which touched upon the very moral foundations of the British 
Empire. As a part of the administrative regulations imposed after the war in 1893, the indunas 
had to supply a certain amount of labour to the BSAC to work in the mines and on farms. 
The issue of labour was a rather sensitive one because the British Empire was on a self-
designated campaign to rid the world and particularly Africa of the sin of slavery vis-à-vis the 
civilising mission. The labour scheme imposed by the BSAC after the First Matabele War 
was therefore a critical issue, as it could be interpreted as a form of slavery, thus causing 
ruptures in the principles and moral legitimation of the British Empire.  
After the 1894 Order was imposed, it determined rather stringent terms for labour 
and that ‘labour could not even be accepted in lieu of hut tax.’ A critical aspect of Martin’s 
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report, therefore, was whether or not the BSAC was in violation of both the labour 
regulations as decided in 1894 and broader imperial morality.427 Martin evaluated and 
subsequently criticised the BSAC, particularly on the issue of labour, which he claimed was 
a systematic compulsory labour scheme. He concluded that ‘compulsory labour did 
undoubtedly exist in Matabeleland’ and ‘labour was procured by the various Native 
Commissioners for the various requirements of the Government (BSAC administration in 
Salisbury), mining companies and private persons.’ Furthermore, ‘the Native 
Commissioners, in the first instance, endeavoured to obtain labour through the indunas, but, 
failing in this, they procured it by force.’428 Martin’s report, therefore, raised eyebrows, as it 
had now officially been uncovered that a systematic labour scheme at odds with British 
imperial morality and law existed. 
Indeed, there can be little doubt that a labour scheme existed in Matabeleland, 
especially when one considers the mining industry and the expectations of discovering gold. 
In order to keep the mining industry afloat, a great deal of labour was needed: the answer to 
that problem was to pressure the indunas into supplying cheap labour. Moreover, the 
financial situation of the BSAC was somewhat gloomy, since neither Mashona nor 
Matabeleland had yet proved to be the lost kingdom of Ophir holding King Solomon’s 
legendary mines. Indeed, a report circulated by the BSAC to its stakeholders sought to 
conceal the disappointment of Southern Rhodesia’s mineral wealth and instead blamed ‘the 
ancients’ for having exhausted the mines, urging the stakeholders to be patient, as these 
deposits were deeper than initially expected.429 Furthermore, with the planning of large 
construction projects, especially railroads, a substantial supply of cheap African labour was 
deemed necessary for the future development of Southern Rhodesia, thus giving further 
reason for the Company to obtain labour forcibly.430   
The evidence of a compulsory labour scheme presented in Martin’s report is very 
substantial; of the fifteen Native Commissioners from whom he had gathered reports, eight 
had directly admitted that compulsory labour existed in their areas of jurisdiction. Only two 
denied it, and each of the others ‘either avoids the question or argues it was not exactly 
compulsory labour.’431 Of course, Martin, just like others of his time, also had severe 
reservations about the Ndebele as a race. Whilst his report was to explore the various causes 
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of the rebellion, he also suggested that the Ndebele themselves were ‘essentially a warlike 
people’ and that history should have taught the British the lesson that these peoples would 
eventually rise again: ‘The old Zulu daring, cruelty, and determination, still existed in the 
Matabele, though, perhaps in a somewhat modified degree up to advent of their white 
conquerors.’432 This led him to two conclusions: on the one hand, Martin believed one of the 
causes of the rebellion was, as discussed above, they were not completely defeated after the 
first war, and as they were a violent race, the rebellion in 1896 was inevitable. On the other 
hand, the administration after the first war directly clashed with the Ndebele perception of 
life itself. Supposedly, they considered labour to be derogatory; they lived off plunder and 
war, and forcing them to work on farms and in mines was too much of a transition from 
their alleged ‘savage’ mentality.433 Therefore, Martin believed that it would be a good idea to 
somewhat forcibly teach the Ndebele the ‘advantages of labour.’434  
 
Common prudence alone ought to have been enough to deter the Government from introducing a practice 
which, viewed in the most lenient light, can only be interpreted as a mild form of compulsory labour, and 




Accordingly, Martin suggested that the labour scheme was lenient, but due to the ‘native 
mind’ of the Ndebele, it was perceived much worse: as slavery. Therefore, while the labour 
scheme was a cause behind the rebellion, Martin still believed it necessary to develop the 
colony. Yet, at the same time, he advocated the supposed advantages of having imposed 
compulsory labour and based this on principles connected to racial stereotypes of the savage 
Ndebele needing to be exposed to Christian virtues and work ethics. Such suppositions 
therefore merged the more practical and economic aspect of British imperialism with the 
moral foundations. A ‘soft’ and voluntarily civilising mission would not always work and 
therefore the process of civilising could allegedly be sped up through force and coercion. 
One central point of critique that remained, however, was the method by which the 
BSAC obtained this labour. This happened through the Native Police, who simply rode out 
to the kraals and forcibly took with them able men for the mines.  Martin considered it ‘a 
most dangerous practice’ because the Native Police would abuse their powers and this would 
only reinforce the already prevalent hatred of the Native Police among the Ndebele. This 
practice therefore completely excluded any possibility of reconciliation with the different 
tribes and disrupted the balance of power within the Ndebele community itself. Native Police 
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officers were often people who had previously had little or no power, and they were now 
forcing individuals, traditionally higher up in the hierarchy, to do hard labour in the mines. 
Furthermore, Martin alerted that granting such powers to the Native Police was also 
dangerous because of their supposedly inferior racial traits: ‘these Native Police were let loose 
amongst them, free to give vent to all their natural greed and passion, and this, I fear, they 
were not backward in doing.’436  
Accordingly, Martin contended that tasking the Native Police with obtaining the 
labour was a crucial mistake since they themselves were African and due to their racial traits 
were not trustworthy. Moreover, Martin argued that the BSAC should have been better at 
selecting people for the Native Police and that they should have sent white policemen to the 
kraals to not seem too derogative towards the Ndebele.437 Martin’s views certainly derived 
from racist preoccupations, but he was not alone in assuming that the racial traits of the 
Ndebele were a key factor behind the uprising: ‘Native Commissioner Jackson says the 
natives in his district, Belingwe, were wild, more like bucks than human beings, and forcing 
them to work, had tended towards taming them.’438 This indicates two things: first, that a 
harsh labour scheme was undoubtedly in place, as Jackson refers to the allegedly positive 
effects that forced labour had already had, and second, that the general perception of the 
Ndebele was steeped in racial rhetoric.  
To summarise Martin’s report, it is contemplated that the cause of the rebellion was 
due to both the administration and mismanagement of the BSAC after the First Matabele 
War and due to the racial characteristics of the Ndebele in being incapable of developing and 
undertaking hard labour. Much adhering to Osterhammel’s suggestion that conflict arose 
when the ‘barbarian’ did not willingly take the gifts of the ‘civilised’, the Ndebele remained 
hostile to colonial rule and the alleged improvement that came with it.  
 
This leaves us with the question of what premises and purposes there were behind the 
compiling of Martin’s report. According to historian Robert Blake, who bases most of his 
work on Ranger’s research, Chamberlain had directly ordered Martin to disrupt the 
aforementioned peace settlement in the Matopos because he wanted to implement more 
‘punitive measures’ against the defeated rebels. Furthermore, Martin’s inquiry into the 
administration of Matabeleland was supposedly more due to Chamberlain’s personal hatred 
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of Rhodes than to actual official business.439 This seems unlikely to have been the case, as it 
was unsurprising that the government was interested in inquiring into the causes of the 
rebellion which they had allocated troops to quell. Furthermore, given the unpopularity of 
the BSAC, such inquiry was perhaps not out of personal hatred of Rhodes and the Company, 
but rather as part of a wider strategy concerning imperial policy in Southern Africa.  
Instead, the decision to have Martin compile a report on the administration of the 
BSAC resulted from the government seizing an opportunity to rectify the position that was 
established in the 1894 Order. With the outbreak of the rebellion, they now had a reliable 
and officially recognised man-on-the-spot to act as eyes and ears, who provided conclusive 
evidence which could prompt further governmental intervention into the administration of 
Southern Rhodesia. However, with the outbreak of the war and the disclosure of company 
maladministration, another question that arose was why the CO had not intervened and 
brought the Company to stand by the obligations agreed to in 1894. But here, the reason was 
simply that by not having an official on the spot, they were unable to do so and that they 
were unaware of such violations.440 Thus, the official mind chose to turn a blind eye for as 
long as it could; yet when the rebellion broke out and had the potential to spread allegations 
of misconduct and further upheaval, they intervened and made sure the BSAC was depicted 
as the culprit, which conveniently came at a time where the sentiment towards the Company 
and its main figures were critical due to the ongoing Jameson Raid scandal. 
In broader public opinion, the issue of how the BSAC had procured labour for its 
mines received growing attention and critique. Because of the parliamentary inquiry into the 
affairs of Rhodes and the BSAC, the administration of Southern Rhodesia had also come 
under scrutiny. Indeed, several notable newspapers published outlines of Martin’s report on 
the maladministration of the BSAC.441 This prompted the new administrator in Southern 
Rhodesia, Albert Grey, to respond to such critique, where it was suggested that Martin’s 
claim of a compulsory labour scheme suggested that labour was procured by physical force. 
Instead, Grey cited a Native Commissioner who claimed that he had experienced the 
Ndebele to be happy to work for the Company because they received wages, which they did 
not under Lobengula.442 However, the accusations of maladministration were far-reaching in 
Britain and were published in more local newspapers, such as The North-Eastern Daily Gazette 
and elsewhere, long before Martin’s report had been compiled and reported on.443  
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At the forefront of such critique were humanitarian groups such as the APS, who 
lamented the labour scheme, as it distanced the Ndebele from influence which could furnish 
grievances and may thus have been a cause for the rebellion. But the main issue for the APS 
was, of course, that to them, the labour conditions were reminiscent of slavery: 
 
Our Committee is aware that forms of slavery in Matabeleland before it was taken possession of by the 
Chartered Company, and that the proposed system has counterparts in portions of the South African 
Republic, and of the Portuguese territories in Africa. But it cannot suppose that Her Majesty’s Government 
will allow any system of forced labour, even with such supposed safeguards as Earl Grey and others of 
humane disposition may suggest, to be revived, or to remain in force, under whatever scheme of 




The use of the word ‘slavery’ is key, as it echoed the moral foundations of the civilising 
mission and encompassed a powerful argument due to its popularity among officials and the 
public. Furthermore, it was a powerful accusation in a legal sense too, as the Berlin Treaty 
had, as shown, established anti-slavery to be at the top of the moral and legal pedestal of 
imperial expansion, and it would thus morally and judicially de-legitimise company rule in 
Southern Rhodesia.  
In 1897, Henry Fox Bourne, Secretary of the APS, published a report in which he 
described the maladministration of the BSAC and its immoral treatment of the Ndebele. It 
was claimed, that in February 1896 – a month before the rebellion – the Company had 
introduced new measures of forcibly procuring labour where 9,000 Ndebele ‘boys’ were 
hired.445 The BSAC did not simply sit by whilst the critique of their administration and 
conduct escalated and weakened their position and reputation. One attempt to prove that 
their labour scheme was not similar to slavery nor obtained through force was presented in 
a telegram by W.H. Milton, the acting Administrator in Salisbury. In this telegram, Milton 
enclosed a series of reports from prominent religious figures in Southern Rhodesia. The first 
report, by Father Daignault, Priest in charge of the Roman Catholic Mission in Southern 
Rhodesia, was very favourable in its tone towards the BSAC. Not only were the accusations 
of a forced labour scheme rejected, but also the report suggested that labour, in general, was 
healthy for the African race: 
 
In my opinion the natives of this country must be considered, and in reality are, but grown up children. 
Unfortunately, they do not possess the innocence of children, but are on the contrary given too many vices, 
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Thus, Daignault blamed all the misfortunes of the Ndebele on the men being lazy and child-
like. Since they did not care about working, they could not improve their land. They had no 
Christian work ethic and therefore they starved and gradually perished before eventually 
becoming extinct altogether. 
 
White men are obliged to work in order to meet the exigencies of laws and regulations concerning lands, 
dwellings, sanitary arrangements etc.; they are obliged to work to pay the taxes and rates imposed for the 
general good of the State. I believe these laws and regulations to be even more necessary for the natives, 
and, if enforced, the natives would be obliged to work. This, in my opinion, is the kind of forced labour 




The distinction between the races was here based upon the issue of labour. Since race, as in 
this case, was based upon the racial trait of having a healthy work ethic, the whole issue of 
race therefore relied upon Christian morals.  Of course, this is only strengthened by the fact 
that the above statements were made by a man of the church. Nonetheless, it may be 
suggested that the Roman Catholic Mission was in fact patronised and supported by the 
BSAC and perhaps even by Rhodes himself. Such a claim becomes even more believable 
considering that the Roman Catholic Mission was granted 6,000 acres of land and two farms 
by the BSAC after the rebellion.448 
During the parliamentary inquiry into the Jameson Raid, the issue of colonial labour 
also became a focal point of public and official attention. On one occasion, Chamberlain, as 
part of the committee, interviewed two Boer witnesses who had worked for the mine owners 
in Southern Rhodesia. The witnesses stated that company rule was benign and was more 
popular and efficient than imperial rule in Southern Rhodesia would ever be. In regard to 
the treatment of the Ndebele, Chamberlain eventually pressured them on the question of 
labour, and, based on their answers, concluded that conditions were that workers could 
neither chose their own employers, bargain their wages nor chose their own working times, 
and ‘thus, they (workers) were forced labour for masters who were imposed upon them, for 
wages which were settled for them, and at a time which was fixed for them. What is the 
difference between that and slavery?’449 This directly reflected the views of the APS who had 
appealed to the CO that in addition to the conditions of labour, the procurement hereof was 
also lamentable and urged the government to seek to assume full control of Southern 
Rhodesia in order to prevent further mistreatment of the Ndebele at the hands of the 
BSAC.450 
                                                 
 
447 Ibid., 2-3. 
448 TNA: CO 879/53: Milner to Chamberlain, 31 December 1897. 
449 Excerpt from inquiry in The Standard, 10 March 1897. 
450 TNA: CO 879/52: APS to CO, 28 July 1897, 1-2.  
106 
 
This was welcomed by Chamberlain, who was now of the belief that imperial control 
was superior to company rule. However, directly annexing Southern Rhodesia would be a 
controversial move for both political and financial reasons. But the humanitarian critique by 
the APS and others was here an ally of the British government, as it supported them to 
impose further control over Southern Rhodesia and the BSAC. Indicatively, in a debate in 
April 1897, where several MPs were present, the issue of imperialism and the responsibility 
of the coloniser towards the colonised was discussed, and one of the major points was indeed 
Matabeleland. Former Chief Secretary of State for Ireland John Morley was particularly 
critical towards the labour scheme, which he saw as being little different from slavery. 
However, more importantly, he stressed that if the state of forced labour continued to persist 
in Matabeleland, ‘the Imperial Government and the CO would be responsible, and it would 
be for public opinion in this country to decide whether it would permit under the name of 
“labour regulations” a return to an old system of Slavery which our forefathers did so much 
to put down.’451 This statement illustrates both the public and political pressure upon how 
the CO should enter the negotiations with the BSAC regarding future ‘native administration.’ 
It was the government that was responsible for securing the rights and the welfare of the 
Ndebele, and only by imposing new and more humanitarian regulations could they prevent 
it. On the one hand, this came to pose pressure on Whitehall, but on the other, it also 




The Aftermath: Labour Regulations and Imperial Policies 
 
The issue of labour not only persisted during the enquiries into the causes of the rebellion, 
but was also a central issue concerning the intended future of Southern Rhodesia. The BSAC 
wanted to implement a new labour scheme to sustain the mining industry, but the 
government was suspicious and unaccommodating when it came to Southern Rhodesia and 
labour. While the previous chapter has disclosed the importance of the labour issue in 
Southern Rhodesia in public and political opinion, it is therefore worth exploring the views 
of the official mind on this matter as the post-rebellion negotiations unfolded. 
The post-war Native Regulations, as they were called, were negotiated between the 
CO, led by Chamberlain, and the BSAC itself. The CO predominantly relied on reports from 
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Southern Rhodesia, particularly those already discussed by Martin. According to Keppel-
Jones, the government did not have the right to alter the original charter until 1914, but since 
the BSAC feared its complete revocation, they accepted fundamental changes in their powers 
and privileges after 1896.452 Furthermore, the ill-will towards the BSAC originating from 
claims of maladministration and the Jameson Raid undermined any complaints from Rhodes 
and his compatriots. Consequently, the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898 
[henceforth the 1898 Order] which came into effect was ostensibly a modification of the 
original charter and the 1894 Order and brought about fundamental changes to the rights of 
the Company pertaining to the administration of Southern Rhodesia. 
Most crucially was the future place of the Ndebele and the labour provisions that 
was to be implemented. Before the war, there had been a provision for ‘public works’ which 
had ostensibly allowed the Company to obtain labour for constructions projects such as 
roads and wells, but in reality it was for mines and farms. The rationale of public works as a 
concept was that it could purposefully justify forced labour, as the alleged development of 
the colony would bring civilisation and trade to the Africans and thus serve as a means to a 
brighter end.453 Perhaps due to the anti-slavery articles of the Berlin Treaty, the 
implementation of rhetoric and terms deliberately seeking to exonerate coercion was created 
and one of these was the use of ‘public works’ as a legalistic attempt to provide a source of 
labour. The official status of ‘public works’, however, did not fool humanitarians nor the 
Africans themselves, and the invocation of the word ‘Chibaro’ – literally meaning ‘slave’ – 
was widespread among the Africans in Southern Rhodesia.454 Therefore, public works was a 
potential opportunity for the BSAC to acquire labour in the same vein as prior to the 
rebellion.  
The issue of not only how to control the indigenous peoples, but also how to utilise 
them, was perhaps the most central point of discussion after the rebellion. Martin had 
suggested that the labour scheme was, in fact, necessary and healthy, albeit a cause for the 
rebellion. Thus, it was not just an economic necessity: it was also good for the alleged savages. 
Rosmead agreed to such view, stressing that a future labour scheme would also have the 
intention to ‘teach Natives advantages which will result to themselves from industrial 
habits.’455 Similarly, Milner stated that if labour was not drawn from the Africans, ‘the 
development of the country will be retarded and the natives themselves will be to a great 
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extent idle, and consequently restless and dangerous.’456 Therefore, it was perceived that it 
was not only absolutely necessary for the economic future of Southern Rhodesia to impose 
a labour scheme and allow public works, but it was supposedly also good for the Ndebele, 
as it was deemed healthy for their racial development so that they might rid themselves of 
the inherent idleness of their race. 
For humanitarian groups, the issue of forced labour was a serious one and in 1897 
the APS had publicly stated that ‘forced labour is a form of slavery which the Chartered 
Company had no right to establish in Matabeleland’ regardless of the awareness and 
sanctioning of such measures by the British government’s representatives.457 It would be 
reasonable to surmise that the British government were to an extent aware of the measures 
taken in Southern Rhodesia to procure labour, and in particular, representatives in Southern 
Africa would likely have been aware hereof. The problem for these officials was, as Milner 
himself stated clearly, that in order to procure labour, the Ndebele had to forcibly be 
compelled to work, and this, he believed, could lead to ‘mistaken accusations of slavery.’458 
Moreover, Milner called for the BSAC and the government to reconcile with the Ndebele 
and Shona and make sure that what he called ‘the native problem’ was at the top of their 
respective agendas, thus highlighting how central the issue of labour and the administration 
of the Africans themselves actually was.459  
Milner was in many ways the personification of the values associated with empire. 
His book England in Egypt (1892), for instance, echoed the views of John Seeley’s The 
Expansion of England (1883) and Rudyard Kipling’s poem The White Man’s Burden (1899).460 
Clearly, Milner’s views on race and empire were evident in the arguments he expressed 
regarding labour and the powers of the BSAC during the post-rebellion negotiations. Here 
Milner was key, since he mediated between Southern Rhodesia and London, and whilst he 
was in fact in the service of the government and thus a representative of the official mind, 
his job meant that he was focussed on the success of his designated region and in that respect 
was entangled into the affairs of the BSAC. Although Martin’s report clearly concluded that 
a harsh labour system had been in place prior to the rebellion, Milner believed that these 
claims did not represent the truth:  
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The Company’s present agents in framing these Regulations have sought to provide against harsh and 
arbitrary treatment of the natives, and to lay the foundations of a system which will tend to promote 




It can be surmised that Milner’s views were somewhat adhering to the racist discourse of his 
time. Indeed, Milner argued that ‘they [Ndebele] have never been used to work, except for 
the purpose of obtaining the bare necessaries of life, otherwise than under compulsion.’ 
Milner therefore implied not just that a compulsory labour scheme was a good idea to 
implement after the rebellion, but also the whole argument was based on his experience of 
compulsory labour being efficient, thus proving that although he had just denied the 
existence of such a scheme, it was without a doubt in place before the rebellion.462 
There can be no doubt that a racialised view of the civilising mission was the premise 
of Milner’s views regarding labour: ‘They [Ndebele] require to be educated to the idea of 
habit and regular work… and it seems to me the duty of their white rulers, for the good of 
the natives themselves, as well as in the interest of the development of the country.’463 Surely, 
the civilising mission could not merely have been hypocrisy made in order to justify the 
expansion into Africa, since it was here used internally by officials in discussing the future of 
Southern Rhodesia. In fact, this indicates that the official mind was deeply influenced by, 
and relied upon, the premises of humanitarian ideology and racist prejudices.  
Thus, the principles of the civilising mission were at the core of the negotiations on 
the future of Southern Rhodesia, particularly when concerning the regulations intended to 
solve the ‘native problem’: it was contended that ‘without earning some money outside, the 
inhabitants of the reserves will have no means of improving their condition or raising 
themselves to the scale of civilisation. They will remain in their old savage state.’464 The 
arguments for maintaining a labour scheme were a combination of forcibly civilising the 
Ndebele from their savage state and also accommodating practical issues of earning a wage 
and thus sustaining a livelihood. However, it remained impossible for the officials to allow 
such provisions, as the rhetoric of anti-slavery was an intrinsic doctrine within the ranks of 
the CO and among the wider public to whom they were responsible. Indeed, Milner lamented 
the difficulty of the situation by stating that ‘there is no system which could be proposed 
involving any degree of compulsion upon the natives to work, which is less likely than this 
to excite opposition on the part of reasonable advocates of native rights.’ Of course, Milner 
here refers to the APS and other humanitarian movements. However, the conflict expected 
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by Milner was not concerning whether or not the British Empire should seek the material 
and spiritual advancement of its colonial subjects, but rather how it should do so. 
Indeed, while Milner’s view of the Ndebele was certainly derogatory, it was 
nonetheless a different vision of how to implement a civilising process to uplift the Ndebele 
from savagery. For him, it meant a more adamant and rigidly defined administrative 
framework pertaining to ‘native affairs’. Communication and efficiency were key to ensure 
its success and this meant more frequent use of ‘native messengers’ and the hiring of more 
Native Commissioners to ensure a quick response on various issues and to solve potential 
conflicts and grievances immediately to prevent any escalation. Furthermore, the 
Administrator, Milner suggested, was to have more power, but these powers were limited 
regarding ‘Native Affairs’, as a Native Affairs Department would be established in Southern 
Rhodesia as part of the wider restructuring of the administration.465 Milner also stressed the 
importance of ensuring that the new reserves were comprised of land suitable for the 
Ndebele to sustain a livelihood as well as seeking to include them in the Southern Rhodesia’s 
future, rather than excluding them and hiding them away in reservations with few or no 
resources. In other words, he suggested that the BSAC lived up to the aforementioned 1894 
Order, clause 49 where they were to provide sufficient land, cattle and resources.466      
The post-rebellion negotiations were, of course, connected to the then fragile mining 
industry in Southern Rhodesia. Connected to this was a struggle between the commercial 
incentives of imperialism against the moral principles. This was especially relevant 
considering that the BSAC’s mineral rights over Southern Rhodesia, which had been laid out 
in the 1894 Order, were still applicable immediately after the rebellion: 
 
If the Company should require any such land for the purpose of mineral development or as sites of 
townships, or for railways or other public works, the Land Commission may order the natives to remove 
from such land or any portion thereof, and shall assign to them just and liberal compensation in land 
elsewhere.
467   
 
However, these rights were soon revised, as the CO did not allow the BSAC to implement a 
labour scheme which was so vital for the future success for the mines. The ‘native question’ 
was of great importance to the CO and especially to Chamberlain himself. Indeed, every 
request by the BSAC to introduce anything that resembled a provision for a labour scheme 
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was adamantly rejected by Chamberlain.468 The official minds’ stance on the Native 
Regulations issue was stern and any clause giving the BSAC the right to obtain ‘native labour’ 
was omitted from the charter concerning Native Regulations.469 
 
Mr Chamberlain is not prepared to accept any provision for compulsory labour, and the words introduced 
by the Administrator in Part I. Clause 4, authorising the Administrator in Council to call upon Chiefs and 




First of all, the omission of public works is important here, as it was deliberately removed as 
a way for the BSAC to obtain labour. The CO was therefore well aware that such a term 
could easily be abused and the Africans were drawn to work forcibly in mines and on farms. 
Secondly, the Part I, Clause 4 which was referred to, was part of the initial Native Regulations 
proclamation draft sent from the BSAC, to Milner to the CO. Milner, in mediating this draft 
from the BSAC represented the official mind in the region as being influenced by the BSAC 
by advocating compulsory labour to be virtuous and beneficial for Britain and the Ndebele 
alike.471 Yet, the Native Regulations proclamation was passed and proclaimed on 25 
November 1898 as part of the wider 1898 Order, without containing a clause in which the 
BSAC could legally obtain compulsory labour from the Ndebele.472 
There was, without a doubt, a clear distinction between the official mind and the 
BSAC’s intentions with Matabeleland and its indigenous population, with the official mind 
seeking a safer administration to hinder further rebellions and potential political discrediting 
and the BSAC seeking to change their financial fortunes in Southern Rhodesia by using cheap 
labour. This was the reason why, in a telegram to Milner, Chamberlain expressed his concern 
that reports about the Native Regulation Proclamation had been violated by the BSAC. 
 
The indunas, whilst they were clearly informed by him that the Government would not allow forced labour, 
were at the same time led to understand that they were expected to supply the necessary number of 





When considering the Southern Rhodesian mining industry’s situation, it becomes quite clear 
that the BSAC did indeed continue its harsh labour scheme after 1896. As shown by Charles 
van Onselen, the labour scheme continued to persist after the rebellion.  Indeed, van Onselen 
reveals that the BSAC obtained Ndebele labour illegally. In 1895, just before the rebellion, 
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the Southern Rhodesian mining industry was producing an acceptable output, but by 1898 
‘it had slumped to a state of depression.’474 Because the rebellion halted the supply of labour 
to the mines, a steady supply therefore seemed to have been indispensable to the success of 
mining industry. Ultimately it resulted in the BSAC’s stock market crash in London in 1903, 
which came despite a steady rise in the income from gold and mineral production in Southern 
Rhodesia.475 The outbreak of the South African War in 1899 was the final piece in the jigsaw 
that saw the mining industry collapse due to the disruption of railways. It has been stipulated 
that the rebellion and the subsequent collapse of the mining industry, was the end of 
Southern Rhodesia as a frontier colony where the arrival of prospectors and the mystification 
of the region stopped because it had become clear that the mineral wealth was wildly 
overestimated. Perhaps reinforced by romantic novels such as King Solomon’s Mines, this old 
pioneering or gold-rush imperialism was eventually overtaken by agricultural development, 
which sought to lure new settlers to Southern Rhodesia with the promise of land instead of 
gold.476  
This turn towards an agrarian economy had significant ramifications for the Ndebele 
and Shona, as it meant the gradual takeover of their ancestral land by the increasing number 
of settlers and their extended demand for land for cattle herding and farming. Through 
various reforms and measures, the BSAC managed to increase the influx of settlers to 
Southern Rhodesia and curbed African cultivation and livelihoods in the process. In 1905-6, 
for instance, the newly established Land Department restricted the number of African 
tenants on land owned by European settlers, as these ‘Kaffir farmers’ were disrupting the 
cultivation and progress of the colony by taking up space which could purposefully be settled 
by white farmers.477 Post-rebellion Southern Rhodesia, therefore, while on paper seeking to 
eradicate forced labour, instead saw the increasing expropriation of African lands as the 
settler population grew. Presumably, Whitehall saw little trouble in these developments, as 
they only meant that Southern Rhodesia was moving towards a white dominion and could 
possibly naturally develop into the domain of British South Africa rather than company rule. 
Regarding the mining industry, van Onselen’s research has shown that between 
October 1900 and March 1901, of the 8,429 workers ‘engaged’ by the BSAC’s Labour Board 
in Southern Rhodesia, 2,160 deserted, which suggests that the mining industry continued 
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with the use of forced labour and held its labourers in lamentable conditions.478 This did not 
pass unnoticed by Chamberlain and the CO, who in 1899 made direct contact with the BSAC 
to remind them that they were not allowed to obtain labour through such methods. In fact, 
the BSAC was reminded that the right to obtain compulsory labour was omitted on 
purpose.479 While the official mind sought to rid Southern Rhodesia of a compulsory labour 
scheme, they had simultaneously also wanted the BSAC to continue to hire labour from 
within Southern Rhodesia to keep the indigenous communities from ‘idleness’. The Ndebele 
workers had complained about the conditions, salaries and the food they had received whilst 
working in the mines, and hence, the government was alerted by the potential ramifications 
of the situation. Of course, the BSAC was not prohibited from hiring any Ndebele to work 
in the mines; they were simply not allowed to obtain such labour through coercion.480  
 
Imperial Policies and the Restraining of the BSAC 
 
The issue of labour was perhaps the most evident and pressing concern when it came to 
deciding the future administration of the BSAC. But it far transcended the locality of 
Southern Rhodesia and was in fact part of a broader framework of British imperial policies 
and intentions. Therefore, from 1896 to 1898, the government abandoned its former 
stance of allowing the BSAC licence to do almost whatever it saw fit and instead 
intervened in its territories to establish appropriate governmental forms of control which 
would secure the objectives of a wider imperial policy.481  
The intention was to completely restructure the administration regarding the 
indigenous peoples, since Martin’s report had showcased the incapability of the BSAC to 
effectively govern Southern Rhodesia and also furnished further suspicion towards company 
rule in general. Still, much power remained with the BSAC. For instance, the newly 
established Native Department, headed by a Secretary for Native Affairs, had the power to 
make decisions on disputes of chieftainship or succession where he saw fit.482 Yet, the 
immediate attention was not aimed at the indigenous people as such, but rather at the 
distribution of power within the administration itself. As Milner had suggested, more Native 
Commissioners were appointed to various districts so that the different tribes and clans could 
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easily communicate with the new administration.483 Implicit in this was, of course, the subtle 
intention that it was also easier to keep an eye on the various tribes and to be able to respond 
to a potential future rebellion more quickly in order to prevent it from spreading to a new 
full-scale rebellion. In many ways, the chiefs became vassals of the British Empire and the 
BSAC, as they would carry out duties and report on various issues such as crime and disease, 
help suppress future rebellions and supply labour to public works.484  
Although Chamberlain reiterated frequently that the government had no interest in 
hampering the BSAC’s business and internal administration of their territories, ‘they [the 
CO] are necessarily deeply interested in the success of the native policy of the Company’ 
because they assumed that it ‘may have far-reaching results in South Africa and may thus 
involve Her Majesty’s Government in grave responsibilities.’485 This should be seen in the 
context of the Jameson Raid where the BSAC had indeed involved the government in a grave 
international scandal. However, it also indicated that colonial rule by one actor could have 
potential spill-over effects. Indeed, there were prevalent fears that the Ndebele rebellion 
would spread into the Bechuanaland territory or affect the precarious relations with the Boer 
Republics.486 Therefore, ill-treatment of indigenous groups by the BSAC – or, for that matter, 
other colonial actors – was a matter of concern for the British government, as it posed 
potential geopolitical complications on a regional and international scale. 
 
According to Robert Blake, the 1898 Order was the work of Chamberlain and Milner. 
However, what can clearly be incurred from the above is that it was not so much the work 
of Milner as Chamberlain due to the restrictions on obtaining labour. Furthermore, it 
suggests a contradiction in Blake’s argument, since he on the one hand accuses the 
government of being racist and punishing the Ndebele and Shona, whilst on the other hand 
he argues that they were behind the 1898 Order which ostensibly sought to prevent the same 
ill-treatment.487    
Instead, what is evident in examining the negotiations over the 1898 Order, in 
general, is that the issue of ‘Native Administration’ was a top priority for the government. 
Therefore, it introduced a new administrative structure and established the Native Affairs 
Department, which largely stayed the same until 1965, albeit having its name changed to the 
Department of Internal Affairs. The decision to establish this department was ambiguous. 
                                                 
 
483 Ibid., 21-22. 
484 Ibid., 22-23. 
485 TNA: CO 879/47: Chamberlain to Rosmead, 10 December 1896. 
486 TNA: CO 879/47: Chamberlain to Robinson, 14 April 1896. 
487 Blake, A history of Rhodesia, 148. 
115 
 
First of all, a strong stance towards the BSAC in light of alleged ill-treatment could also 
distance the Boer Republics because of their harsh labour policies. Secondly, it was widely 
believed that, due to the inaccessibility of many outer regions of Southern Rhodesia, it was 
practical to appoint a local, European official. This last issue was based on the presumption 
that the Ndebele and Shona were used to having a chieftain (or rather, king), and would 
therefore have little trouble integrating into their new, subjugated role under the British flag. 
Furthermore, it also provides evidence of further control and decision-making from the 
government concerning Southern Rhodesia, since the appointment of these European 
officials in the outer regions was to be made by the Secretary of State of the Colonies, i.e. 
Chamberlain. Yet their loyalty could be doubted, as they were to be paid for by the BSAC, 
probably because the CO was reluctant to allocate further funds which could burden the 
British taxpayer.488 Nevertheless, on the whole, it remains clear that in the aftermath of the 
rebellion, the government sought to reinforce its position in Southern Rhodesia and monitor 
the affairs of the BSAC.489 
 
To curb company rule, the legislative future of Southern Rhodesia’s governance and its place 
within the British Empire thus came under scrutiny. Among British officials both in London 
and South Africa, there was a general interest in containing Rhodes and Southern Rhodesia. 
For instance, in 1897, Milner wrote to Selborne, the Under Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, that ‘Rhodes looks to make the territory into a separate colony ultimately self-
governed.’ While this would mean that the BSAC kept mineral and other valuable rights, but 
gave up administration, Milner believed that it would see Rhodes as a de facto monarch. Yet, 
Milner condoned this scheme, as it could combine pressure upon the Boer republics ‘to drive 
them into a S. African federation.’ The problem, however, remained Rhodes. Milner 
considered him ‘the only man big enough to carry out such work’, but due to the Jameson 
Raid he remained an ill-favoured figure. Nevertheless, Milner contended that even if this was 
to work, Rhodes would himself also be a problem, as he ‘is too strong a man to be merely 
used. He will work for his own ends in his own ways – we must accept that – but, on the 
other hand we must, to a great extent, guide and restrain him.’490 Selborne’s reply was simple: 
‘You cannot write too many such letters as this one… They help us immensely and so far we 
have all [in the CO] agreed with every word of them.’491 Hence, there were clear inclinations 
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to impose further governmental control and to have a man-on-the-spot in Southern 
Rhodesia to efficiently represent the British government and act as its eyes and ears, 
especially since Rhodes would detest it.492 For central official actors such as Chamberlain, 
Milner and Selborne, therefore, the post-rebellion negotiations, in which Rhodes was still 
suffering from the Jameson Raid, presented a viable opportunity to impose further control 
and finally get rid of the pre-1896 regulations which had obscured governmental control and 
influence of Southern Rhodesia.493  
When visiting Southern Rhodesia, Milner reported back to Chamberlain that he was 
pleased with the economic prospects of the territory and that while the Company had wasted 
much money, they had also spent a lot on ‘developing the estate.’494 However, the integration 
of Southern Rhodesia into the British Empire was to him a clear matter: 
 
In respect of legislation, particularly native legislation, as well as in respect of appointments, the Company’s 
Agents, for their own sake, ought to welcome effective Imperial control. The question is, how to exercise 
this control in a manner which (1) shall be based on full information and therefore really useful; (2) shall 
not cause intolerable friction with the Company; and (3) shall satisfy public opinion at home.
495 
 
Not only does this reveal the interests of British officials in taming the BSAC and rendering 
it a loyal and controllable sub-imperial actor, it also showcases that public opinion remained 
a factor in the calculation of interests and actions on the imperial stage. The scandals of the 
Jameson Raid and maladministration that had been revealed after 1896 were therefore ways 
in which to both mitigate public support and to wield it in order to achieve imperialistic 
interests. This should be understood in the wider geopolitical context of the time where the 
three aforementioned actors – Chamberlain, Milner and Selborne – were all central figures 
who have often come to personify the gradual movement up towards the South African War, 
which has indeed been referred to as ‘Milner’s War’.496 Of course, as Ronald Hyam has 
pointed out, this term falls short of including other crucial actors such as the above and Paul 
Kruger, not to mention the problematique of reducing the outbreak of the war to the result 
of personal ambition.497 Nevertheless, all three had colonialism high on their political agenda 
and sought to secure South Africa for the British Empire. In terms of their respective political 
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and ideological convictions, however, Selborne and Milner can be said to have been more 
pragmatic than the ideological Chamberlain, as exemplified by the fact that they were both 
in favour of a labour scheme for the mining industry in Southern Rhodesia despite the 
humanitarian critique.498 
Selborne, however, can also be ascribed to be an advocate of broader imperial 
achievements. The renowned ‘Selborne Memorandum’, which outlined the plans and 
ambitions for South Africa before the outbreak of the war in 1899, is symptomatic hereof. 
On the British colonial ‘project’ in South Africa, he asked: 
 
…are the British possessions in South Africa more likely to become separated from the British Empire, (i) 
if they become confederated with the two Republics under British flag as a British African Domain, or (ii) 
if they remain now as separate unities under various forms of Government and continue to have as their 




The matter was simple: was South Africa to become a new Canada – loyal and part of the 
Empire? Or was it to become a new United States – rebellious and a geopolitical and 
economic rival? The problem remained that the Transvaal was ‘the richest spot on earth’ and 
so the balance would eventually mean that it would surpass the British territories, as it would 
be the centre of commerce, industry and social and political life. Furthermore, there was the 
external pressure of Germany and France in GSWA and Madagascar respectively. If a ‘United 
States of South Africa’ were to become a reality, he argued, Germany would become a force 
in Africa, seizing the enclave of Walvis Bay and connecting colonies in the east and west.500 
For Selborne, there was no doubt: increased imperial control and force, with the purpose of 
subjugating the Boer republics.  
 
The future of Southern Rhodesia was entangled into this broad geopolitical image. If it 
remained as a company-dominated colony where its future loyalty was doubtful at best, 
further control could secure the northern frontier and put further pressure on the Boer 
republics. This resulted in the gradual transition of Southern Rhodesia to becoming a settler 
colony.501 However, this was a gradual change and company rule was still in effect until 1923, 
possibly because the British victory in 1902, the creation of the South African Union in 1910 
and the outbreak of war in 1914 delayed the process. 
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But the 1896 rebellion posed serious changes to the administration of Southern 
Rhodesia. The settlers welcomed further governmental control, particularly since the 
situation after the rebellion had left the administration of both Mashona and Matabeleland 
marginal, particularly in Mashonaland to the north.502 Furthermore, the situation in Southern 
Rhodesia was ‘not only unsatisfactory, but dangerous.’ Therefore, the government limited 
company rule by removing its right to make new ordinances and by creating a new 
administrative framework.503 In the 1898 Order, it was agreed that the Administrator of 
Southern Rhodesia should still be appointed and paid by the BSAC, but would only assume 
office upon the approval of the Secretary of State in London.504 Furthermore, there was to 
be established a ‘legislative council’ consisting of five members chosen by the BSAC and 
four chosen by the settlers in addition to the Administrator and Resident Commissioner.505 
Eventually, this council was overtaken by the settlers, and, as L.H. Gann has observed, the 
1898 Order laid the foundations for settler rule in 1923.506 However, most importantly, the 
BSAC retained its mineral rights, even in land which had been allocated to the Ndebele. On 
this issue, the 1898 Order was very similar in its wording of §51 of the 1894 Order: 
 
If the Company should require any such land [Land allocated to the Ndebele] for the purpose of mineral 
development or as sites of townships, or for railways or other public works, the Administrator in Executive 
Council, may, with the approval of the High Commissioner, order the natives to remove from such land 
or any portion thereof, and shall assign to them just and liberal compensation in land elsewhere… sufficient 
and suitable for their agricultural and pastoral requirements, containing a fair and equitable proportion of 
springs or permanent water, and, as far as possible, equally suitable for the requirements in all respects as 




Compared to the pre-1896 mineral rights, this legislation incurred significantly more control 
from the High Commissioner in Cape Town, whereas previously only the Land Commission 
had needed to grant approval. Although the ‘native lands’ were still susceptible for company 
takeover if they were found to hold mineral wealth, the requirements for the new lands on 
which the relocated Ndebele were to settle were now more explicitly stated. Of course, this 
did not mean that the Ndebele were in an improved situation, but it indicates that there was 
a general tendency to seek further control over company administration relating to ‘native 
policies’.  
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After the 1898 Order in Council had been agreed, there were still several issues that 
had to be addressed. In fact, it was suggested that the legislative power of the BSAC should 
be completely removed and that the Company should be disbanded, in the same way as the 
arguments put forward by the government after the Jameson Raid in 1895. Moreover, 
according to Prime Minister Salisbury, the administration of Northern Rhodesia should be 
placed under the control of the commissioner at Zomba in present-day Malawi.508 In 1894, 
any administration of the territory would need to be endowed by the Crown and therefore it 
had full authority to make the provision for the governing of Southern Rhodesia at that time. 
However, the government decided against annexation, since they believed that ‘under the 
existing system there were serious objections to the creation of a Crown colony in that region, 
or to placing Matabeleland under the direct administration of the High Commissioner.’509 
Annexation of the Company’s territory was not without precedent: indeed, when the 
Imperial British East Africa Company went bankrupt in 1894, Uganda became a British 
protectorate.510 But in Southern Rhodesia, the government instead sought to establish itself 
as a more powerful entity for political reasons, as Rhodes and the BSAC remained too 
significant and powerful to annex. Furthermore, there were prevalent concerns about the 
expenses it would incur. Outright annexation would not only anger influential stakeholders 
in the City of London: it would also transfer the expenses to being the responsibility of the 
British state. But to make sure it was not liable even after the extension of governmental 
control in Southern Rhodesia, an article was included in a supplementary charter to the 1898 
Order to prevent any misunderstandings and cases made by the BSAC or other actors 
regarding financial matters.511 
Although Southern Rhodesia did not end up being under the direct control of the 
government after the rebellion, intentions to assume full control were clearly genuine; in fact, 
the CO had consulted judicial officers in order to establish whether or not they would be 
legally allowed to do so. The verdict was that Southern Rhodesia was to be considered a 
British Domain and could therefore be considered a protectorate.512  More precisely, this 
meant that ‘a regulation after promulgation can be disallowed by a Secretary of State or by 
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the Company within one year.’513 The ambitions of the government, therefore, remained 
clear: the aspiration was that Southern Rhodesia was to become a self-governing colony like 
that of the Cape and Natal and should in time enter into a South African Federation, or, as 
it were, Union.514 However, Southern Rhodesia did not enter into the Union but remained 
independent, as fully reiterated in the unilateral declaration and ultimate separation from the 
British Empire in 1965. 
But at the crux of these geopolitical and intra-imperial negotiations and antagonisms, 
the role of colonial rule and violence remained central. The excesses of the BSAC had not 
only invited government ambitions to include Southern Rhodesia in their imperial policies 
towards Southern Africa; they had also facilitated a move to make sure Southern Rhodesia 
fitted within the British sphere in order to keep it as cohesive as possible. For British officials 
in London, therefore, the second Ndebele war was a political and moral turning-point for 
colonialism in Southern Africa, as it was here that they could reveal the government to be a 
force in colonial matters in which it lived up the responsibilities as expected by the public 





Martin Wiener’s aforementioned proposition that law played a paradoxical role – on the one 
hand facilitating criticism of colonialism by putting it on trial, and on the other making the 
subjugation of the colonised lawful – adheres well to the situation in Southern Rhodesia 
around the 1896 rebellion. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, however, the collision between 
humanitarian ideals and the authoritarian nature of colonial rule was more complex due to 
the presence of the BSAC. The government and company relations pertaining to ‘native 
administration’ was not a clear case of empire being put on trial directly, but indirectly 
through a private enterprise. Company rule in Southern Rhodesia was certainly put on trial, 
however, in two interconnected ways: through the Jameson Raid and the subsequent 
disclosure of the maladministration of the indigenous population.  
The scandal of the Jameson Raid had damaged British imperial prestige at home and 
abroad, but by imposing new regulations and pointing to certain scapegoats, officials both 
exonerated themselves from responsibility and attempted to replenish their moral capital by 
                                                 
 
513 LSE: DT 751: The British South Africa Company, Report on the Company’s proceedings and the 
conditions of the territories within the sphere of its operation, 1896-1897, April 1898, 1-2. 
514 Palley, The Constitutional History, 132. 
121 
 
exposing company misrule in Southern Rhodesia and acting thereon. This shows that there 
was a need for humanitarian principles to be in place for colonial rule to be justified. When 
they were broken, it was the duty of the British government to intervene and make sure that 
such principles remained at the crux of their imperial project to safeguard Britain’s 
respectability at home and overseas.  
Indeed, Britain’s respectability and prestige were at stake, and therefore the conduct 
of the military and company rule came under scrutiny. In terms of military conduct, we are 
not only faced with a case of technological overmatch, which spawned psychological over-
confidence, but also with a high degree of brutality in the way the war was fought, especially 
when British forces were engaged in a guerrilla skirmish in the Matopos. This latter applies 
to both sides, as the conduct of the rebels in the initial stages cannot be condoned and the 
excesses of the imperial troops in the Matopos were equally brutal. Yet for the official mind, 
maintaining an image of a war fought along the lines of ‘civilised behaviour’ was essential 
and hence the inquiries into individual incidents of the breaking of protocol remained an 
important aspect. Indicatively, as has been shown, military practices were monitored by 
officials to prevent scandals emerging from military excesses, and when sensitive cases were 
reported on, these were suppressed to prevent further circulation. This shows that at least 
from an administrative – or rather, legalistic – view, colonial wars were ill-conceived by the 
official mind. Thus, it was a concern for the ideological framework of empire in which 
humanitarianism and the civilising mission would be directly contradicted and exhibited to 
the public. Hence, where British officials had a direct and judicial responsibility – i.e. when 
dispatching troops to Southern Rhodesia – they were at the same time keen to make sure no 
atrocities were committed, if not for purely humane reasons, then for political.  
What is therefore evident is that the British official mind was faced with a paradox: 
on the one hand, a defeat would be disastrous, and thus they sought to win the war with 
every means necessary. On the other hand, it had to be done on what were considered as 
civilised terms which were effectuated in scrutinising the conduct of military personnel. 
However, the great contradiction that came to the fore was that they allowed and publicly 
defended the practice of blowing up caves, whereas they adamantly refused any provision 
for indentured or forced labour. In other words, violence could be justified as a regrettable 
consequence of war, whereas coercion and labour conditions, which could be lamented as 
similar to slavery, were inexcusable. This was the main issue at stake during the post-rebellion 
negotiations where the CO adamantly refused any clause that would ostensibly allow for 
forced labour to be obtained. Despite being argued against by referring to the allegedly 
positive effect that forced labour would have on the ‘native mind’, humanitarian persuasion 
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and the prevailing anti-slavery doctrine were simply too strong to amend in the metropole, 
regardless of colonial interests and practicalities which would in this case have benefited the 
BSAC’s financial situation.  
 
British officials’ perception of company rule changed over time in accordance to the situation 
of both company and empire. Initially, it was welcomed as an easy and inexpensive way to 
secure the interior of Southern Africa, but the BSAC continued to be a difficult sub-imperial 
agent to keep in line with British imperial interests as seen from Whitehall. In 1896, the 
situation was dire for the British government, as both the war and the Jameson Raid had led 
to public and international criticism. The responsibility of the government regarding 
maladministration was that they had allowed the BSAC to expand by the charter and initially 
left them with a carte blanche in terms of governing Matabeleland in the 1894 Order in Council. 
As the APS lamented in 1897, the introduction of Company administration in Matabeleland 
was ‘haphazard’ and done by ‘amateurs, profiteers and men motivated by greed’ and 
therefore allowed the BSAC to assume full control with little governmental influence.515 
Indeed, with the charter including paragraphs echoing the Berlin Treaty, the government had 
already attempted to distance itself from responsibility by disallowing, on paper, company 
interferences with African tribes. This evidences how Whitehall in Southern Rhodesia saw 
fit to restrain a sub-imperial actor that already had, and could in future, further problematise 
British strategic and imperial interests in the region while also possibly dragging the 
government into debates and scandals pertaining to company misrule due to its legal 
responsibility.  
However, after 1896 the strategy towards the BSAC changed. By emphasising 
administrative excesses, the CO diverted the humanitarian responsibility and blame to the 
BSAC. The issue of forced labour, in particular, was one that the government could 
effectively put to use in light of lobby groups such as the APS and the general public. The 
threat that was posed by company rule in Southern Rhodesia was that it highlighted the 
contradictory morality of empire: that violence and oppression went hand in hand with the 
alleged humanitarian ideals of civilisation and that emancipation was imposed through 
dominance. Whitehall, therefore, not only responded to financial and geopolitical concerns, 
but also to public opinion both as an immediate reaction and also as an expectancy of a given 
reaction: i.e., they pre-emptively responded to a public opinion that was not yet formulated 
but merely had the potential to spark public criticism or even scandal.  
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Furthermore, in a broader geopolitical perspective, the British government were both 
interested in and compelled by domestic and international expectancy in the wake of the 
Jameson Raid to make sure that the BSAC did not become a renegade authority that they 
would be unable to contain. Thus, by adopting humanitarianism as a policy towards the 
BSAC, the direct responsibility of the CO and government was avoided. By exposing the 
maladministration of the Company during the investigations of the Jameson Raid, the 
government diverted attention away from the excesses of the imperial forces in the Matopos 
and the fact that their hitherto laissez-faire policy towards company rule had furnished 
maladministration.  
The post-war situation therefore facilitated an opportunity for the government to put 
a leash on Rhodes and the BSAC, safeguarding Southern Rhodesia in the increasingly 
complex puzzle of Southern Africa where British imperial policy was being threatened by 
Boers and Germans in particular. Indeed, it secured Southern Rhodesia as an ally in 
Selborne’s Southern African imperial project. This gradual governmental influence and 
restraining of the BSAC follows Janice Thompson’s argument that non-governmental actors 
initially acted freely and could violently subjugate locals. Later, however, government sought 
to ratify and control these actors.516 However, the opportunity to restrain the BSAC did not 
arise on its own. In fact, it was the Ndebele people who, in taking up arms, forced the British 
government to intervene and oversee future legislation. When the Company broke 
humanitarian principles as laid down in the various regulations, the CO were also compelled 
to impose more surveillance and control – at least on paper. Despite these treaties and 
obligations, they were not necessarily followed, as demonstrated by the ongoing use of forced 
labour.517 Indeed, Chibaro continued to exist.518 Furthermore, with the turn towards the 
creation of an agrarian economy attracting more settlers, the Africans also saw the takeover 
of their lands. Nevertheless, immediately after 1896, the rights given to the BSAC were far 
from based on mere commercial and geopolitical interests of the British state: they were also 
based upon humanitarianism – both as an ideology and as a policy rooted in realpolitik and 
public opinion.  
The expression of such humanitarian views against coercion, instead demanding a 
greater deal of protection, it also constituted a discourse in which indigenous cultures were, 
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by definition, weak and in need of active ‘help’.519 The civilising mission, therefore, in 
becoming an ideology of protection, also became an expansionist ideology. This was the 
great contradiction at the crux of the very identity of the British Empire: the brutal expansion 
through ‘savage wars of peace’ and the establishment of coercive administration while at the 
same time attempting to civilise and free the supposedly lesser races from cruelty and 
enslavement. It was a collision between the spread of British humanitarian ideals and the 



























                                                 
 












In 1904, having been subjected to continuous oppression, violence and injustices by settlers, 
officers and administrators, the Herero under the leadership of Chief Samuel Maherero, took 
up arms in a desperate bid to oust German colonial rule from their land. The rebellion came 
on 12 January 1904 and struck the Germans with complete surprise.520 Immediately, the 
Herero were superior and swept across Hereroland – the western parts of GSWA. Over 100 
German settlers were killed by the rebels and these killings soon caused great anger and 
resentment throughout the German Empire.521 Indeed, as Horst Drechsler noted, the Herero 
rebellion ‘marked the beginning of Germany’s bloodiest and most protracted colonial war.’522 
GSWA was in many ways a desolate colony with little economic or strategic 
importance. Germany’s annexation of the territory was considered peculiar by many, but at 
the same time was also typical of the nature of the imperialist scramble for Africa. From the 
British perspective, they now had to deal with the fact that Germany, a European rival, had 
acquired a considerable portion of land in their colonial backyard, thus affecting the wider 
policies and international relations concerning the Boer republics.523 The Herero-Nama war 
and subsequent genocide in GSWA remains one of the darkest periods of colonial history. 
As mentioned earlier, the Blue Book’s exact figure of 92,258 victims is contestable and is 
probably part of the British strategy at Versailles, where a high mortality rate would only 
serve to highlight German colonial maladministration. However, the exact figures also 
remain uncertain in the scholarly literature. For instance, Jeremy Sarkin notes that somewhere 
between 60,000 and 100,000 Herero and Nama were killed between 1904 and 1908.524 
Although estimations regarding the victims of the brutal methods employed by the Germans 
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are uncertain, there can be little doubt as to the genocidal intentions. Indeed, General Lothar 
von Trotha made his intentions to seek the physical extermination of the Herero and later 
the Nama clear by issuing the infamous Vernichtungsbefehl [extermination order] in which 
every Herero and Nama was to be shot at sight or driven into the desert. Yet these atrocities 
have almost exclusively been studied from a German standpoint, ignoring others, such as 
that of the British neighbour. Only recently have scholars highlighted the role of the British 
Empire in this affair. In particular, Tilman Dedering and Ulrike Lindner have pointed to 
various cases of collaboration, entanglement and involvement.525 
The Herero and Nama genocide, which came in the wake of the rebellions in 1904, 
has long been seen as a ‘forgotten genocide’.526 In recent years, however, increasing attention 
has finally claimed these terrible events’ rightful place in the history books. Nevertheless, the 
British neighbour in Southern Africa has generally remained a marginal factor in the attempts 
to disclose the horrors that unfolded. Therefore, by applying a transnational approach in 
which German colonial administration is examined through British contemporaries, this case 
study will attempt to place these atrocities in a wider regional and imperial context. Its main 
focus is thereby not on the understanding of the experiences of the victims of the genocide 
– and of colonialism in general – but more on the methods of colonial rule and how these 
were perceived and responded to by British officials. 
While the previous case study on Southern Rhodesia showed how Whitehall 
perceived and dealt with colonial excesses within their own sphere of influence, this case 
study will disclose how Britain perceived such excesses outside their direct sphere of 
influence. It will therefore examine whether there was consistency in how British officials 
perceived colonial scandals, whether or not they were within their immediate sphere of 
control and responsibility. More precisely, it will disclose how Britain and Germany 
interacted to end the conflict and what was at stake. Here, ideologies of humanitarianism, 
and outright practices of racism intersected broader Anglo-German relations and British 
imperial interests. It can therefore reveal how moralities and convictions of colonial rule and 
violence had an impact on British imperial and foreign policy. 
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Historiography and Methodological Considerations 
 
The approach aims to examine how colonial violence and excesses were perpetrated, 
perceived and ultimately used diplomatically. Indeed, this case study will highlight the ways 
in which British officials and local agents not only corresponded internally and with the 
German authorities during the war and genocide, but also how they collaborated and were a 
direct part of the bloodshed that unfolded. The entanglement of British and German 
colonialism in Southern Africa during the Herero-Nama War is therefore crucial to this 
study. Additionally, it is not merely an analysis of British perceptions of the war and genocide 
in GSWA: it is also a study of German colonial administration, and hence it will first discuss 
how the Herero and Nama were gradually subjugated by the encroaching German colonial 
expansion. Then the place of the indigenous peoples in German colonial policies as well as 
the ambitions of a German overseas empire will be analysed, as it is crucial to understand the 
functions and operations of GSWA and German colonialism in its own right before 
ascertaining the involvement and perceptions of the British.  
This case study will combine both British and German source material. More 
precisely, it will approach the topic by cross-examining official source material from the 
Bundesarchiv, Berlin and the National Archives in Kew, where especially Foreign and 
Colonial Office records reveal the British perceptions and reactions to the unfolding of the 
crisis across the border. However, since this case study does not include sources from the 
Namibian archives nor from the colonised, it is important to stress that it does not seek, in 
any way, to call for revision of the genocide, nor to for a questioning of the extent of the 
violence that unfolded. Instead, the focus here is on what officials in London and Berlin did 
and what they thought of the conflict and subsequent genocide. Whereas the former chapter 
on Southern Rhodesia showed how British officials in Whitehall gradually grew frustrated 
with Company rule and eventually intervened in order to impose more control and to 
exonerate themselves from humanitarian responsibility, it is also worth discussing whether 
such actions were taken in an international light: in other words, whether humanitarianism – 
as a policy and critique – was an exogenous force as well as an endogenous one.  
 
As mentioned, connections to the Namibian struggle for independence have been influential 
in the historiography of GSWA. However, it is clear that most recent literature places itself 
in the colonial Sonderweg and consequently, this is also where this case study is mainly focused. 
Since the genocide in GSWA has been termed the ‘first genocide of the twentieth century’, 
and since it was committed by Germany, this historic event has often been seen in the context 
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of the Holocaust.527 Sonderweg, directly translated, means ‘special path’, and stipulates that 
Germany’s historical development since unification in 1871 was special and unique. In a 
somewhat deterministic spirit, it suggests that there was continuity from Bismarck to Hitler, 
thus suggesting that the Holocaust was the outcome of a long-standing trajectory that is 
almost inherent in German history. In post-war Europe, most scholarly attention to German 
history sought to explore the roots of the Nazi Empire based on the contention that the 
Second World War and the Holocaust were European imperialism turned on itself.528  
Fritz Fischer and later Hans-Ulrich Wehler were the first to advocate the Sonderweg 
in the 1960s. Until then, the dominant question in German history – why and how Hitler 
came to power – was interpreted as the result of relatively random and unfortunate 
developments (Betriebsunfall) such as the ramifications of the Versailles Treaty and the 1929 
Stock Market Crash. Instead, Wehler and Fischer suggested that the historical developments 
of Germany were far from coincidental, but were indeed the results of continuities and 
dynamics inherent in German bourgeois culture and society.529 As Wolfgang Mommsen later 
argued, in Germany there was a ‘revolution from above’ wherein democracy never truly 
developed and the constitutional framework from the Bismarck era therefore allowed 
totalitarianism to persist.530  
In relation to German colonialism, Wehler, for instance, focused on the idea of social 
imperialism, which suggested that Bismarck’s sudden turn to colonies in 1884 (Weltpolitik) 
was a bid to maintain a social hierarchy and to prevent turmoil within Germany, rather than 
to secure overseas stakes and interests. It was an exogenous force directed by the socio-
economic situation in Germany, which was suffering from rapid urbanisation, 
industrialisation and economic crisis, prompting instability and threats of revolutions from, 
for instance, socialists: hence the term ‘social imperialism’, where the social hierarchy could 
be preserved. Moreover, in addition to diverting attention outwards, colonial expansion was 
also believed to break the negative cycle in the German economy.531 Hence, the Sonderweg is 
a rather Eurocentric approach to colonialism, where Germany’s and Bismarck’s intention of 
                                                 
 
527 The so-called Vergangenheitsbewältigung (‘coming to terms with the past’) of post-World War II Germany, 
has arguably mainly been focused on the crimes of National Socialism rather than those of Germany’s 
colonial past. 
528 This was most popularly stipulated by Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951) and 
Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, translated by Joan Pinkham [org. 1955] (New York, 2000).  
529 See, for instance, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Bismarck’s Imperialism 1862-1890’, Past & Present, 48 (1970) and 
Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War [org. 1961] (New York, 1968). The latter in particular is 
important as it was contended that Germany was the main culprit in the outbreak of war in 1914. 
530 Wolfgang Mommsen, Der Autoritäre Nationalstaat. Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur in deutschen Kaiserreich 
(Frankfurt-am-Main, 1990). 
531 Wehler, ‘Bismarck’s Imperialism’, 153. 
129 
 
‘claiming a place in the sun’ was directed by internal pressures and interests and discourses 
of nationalism. Central to the Sonderweg thesis, therefore, is the notion of German 
exceptionalism. If Germany took a special path that inevitably had to end in the First and 
later, the Second World War and the Holocaust, then Germany, per definition, was (and is) 
exceptional. Of course, one could simply suggest that all countries (or other historical 
entities) are exceptional, but while this criticism is true, it is far from sufficient to disprove 
or scrutinise the Sonderweg. Important to note here, therefore, is the still prevalent notion that 
Germany’s past – including its colonial past – is being considered exceptional and inherently 
different in a negative light. What may therefore be termed the continuity thesis, or at least 
the notion of German exceptionalism, is still an influential discourse in German 
historiography.  
In fact, a new Sonderweg has been revived by the increased exposure of the Herero 
and Nama genocide and has formulated what has been termed the ‘colonial Sonderweg’.532 
Considering the genocidal horrors that unfolded in GSWA, this event has been considered 
a direct colonial precursor to the Holocaust. This view has especially been advocated by 
Jürgen Zimmerer who contends the genocide was not merely a grim inspiration to the 
Holocaust but was also a decisive causal factor in the rise of Nazi Germany, as it was the 
first ‘break’ with taboo which rationalised and allowed for the mass exterminations in the 
Holocaust.533  
Despite claims that the Sonderweg is no longer the dominating tendency in German 
history,534 this notion still persists when it comes to the study of GSWA and German 
colonialism. Numerous titles on the Herero and Nama genocide, such as David Olusoga and 
Casper Erichsen’s The Kaiser’s Holocaust (2010), which suggests continuity in terms of racist 
ideas and practices, and Jeremy Sarkin’s Germany’s Genocide (2010), which claims that a direct 
connection was evident between the practices in GSWA and those in Holocaust, are 
indicative of a still existing Sonderweg.535  Another example is Isabel Hull, who argues that 
there was a military culture that was carried on from the colonies to the Third Reich.536 These 
examples indicate that an implicit Sonderweg is influential upon how GSWA is examined to 
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this day, but they remain implicit, as they do not intend to uncover the roots nor causes of 
the Third Reich, but to rather contextualise their studies to it. Thus, instead of attempting to 
find the roots of totalitarianism, these works are seeking to uncover the consequences of 
German colonialism. The answer is the same –  that it ended in genocide –  but the approach 
by which it is reached is turned upside down. As Matt Fitzpatrick has rightly noted, 
continuities exist, but are subtle. It is therefore unsatisfying to replace the simplistic etiquette 
of continuity, ‘From Bismarck to Hitler’ with a ‘From Waterberg to Auschwitz’ narrative.537 
Therefore, the notion of German exceptionalism continues to be a deep-rooted tendency in 
the understanding of Germany’s history, whether colonial or not.538 
GSWA and German history, in general, has recently been subject to several 
transnational approaches. However, transnational history does not in itself repudiate the 
existence of continuity between the Third Reich and German colonialism and therefore 
historians are still encouraged to break the illusion of German exceptionalism.539 As Sebastian 
Conrad and Birthe Kundrus have shown separately, many parallels are evident between 
colonialism in Africa and the excesses of the Nazi Empire, however, the ‘colonialism’ of the 
Third Reich was a different kind of ‘colonialism’.540 However, parallels do not, per se, prove 
continuity or causality, but instead indicate connectivity through time and space, which may 
be similar, but is not necessarily correlated. 
With the recent turn towards transnational history, however, GSWA and German 
colonialism, in general, is increasingly being approached from another angle. As previously 
mentioned, Lindner has shown how Anglo-German colonialism interacted and worked 
together in what she terms a ‘colonial project.’ Relying on source material from Britain, 
Germany and Africa, Lindner has provided an insightful and comprehensive account of how 
administrators co-operated, although there is a tendency to emphasise the German aspect of 
the relationship rather than the British.541 Albeit minuscule, the attention to Britain in the 
history of GSWA is therefore not non-existent. Another example is R.F. Dreyer’s The Mind 
of Official Imperialism (1987) which, in many ways, applies the methodology and theoretical 
framework developed by Robinson and Gallagher to the Anglo-German context concerning 
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the early years of GSWA.542 Dreyer’s book resembles the view of Anglo-German relations at 
the time, as being steeped in a spirit of antagonism as perhaps most convincingly studied by 
Paul Kennedy in his monumental The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism (1980).543 In Southern 
Africa, Dreyer observes that the Kruger Telegram in 1896 was a crucial turning point in 
Anglo-German relations, revealing how international relations were a core dynamic of 
imperialism in Africa. For instance, where Britain had little problem with Germany taking 
over GSWA in 1884, they still maintained the strategically important enclave of Walvis Bay. 
Furthermore, Britain’s acceptance towards having a German neighbour, changed as gold was 
found in 1886 in Witwatersrand and Anglo-German relations were further complicated with 
the establishment of the South West African Company – a British and South African-based 
company working in GSWA. Indeed, as Dreyer shows, the German government invited 
British companies to invest in GSWA to kick-start the economy.544 It is, therefore, inviting 
to further examine the British and South African entanglements with GSWA and how this 
may have affected Britain’s stance and perceptions in later years.  
 
 
The Colonial Beginnings of GSWA: Policies and Entanglements 
 
Similar to Southern Rhodesia, German expansion into GSWA was initially pioneered by a 
private enterprise. After German businessman Frederick Lüderitz had established a trading 
post in the Bay of Angra Pequeña in 1884, the German government claimed South-West 
Africa as a German protectorate (Schutzgebiet). GSWA was a desolate territory with little 
economic or prestigious gain to be found. In fact, Drechsler describes it as ‘one of the most 
inaccessible regions of Africa. Along the coast is the Namib, a sandy desert 50 to 70 
kilometres wide, that makes it difficult to reach the interior, and in the eastern part the 
Kalahari has the same effect.’545 Nevertheless, it soon became part of an imperial project for 
the newly unified Germany, which sought to claim its ‘place in the sun’, competing with its 
European rivals, including the British as part of the new Weltpolitik.546 Again, similar to 
Southern Rhodesia, the economy of GSWA was based on cattle herding for the indigenous 
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population as well as the settlers. GSWA was an intended settler colony in which Germany 
hoped to divert the exodus of immigrants leaving for America to a German colony instead.547 
Soon GSWA became a romanticised colony, where the settler lifestyle became appreciated 
as a positive racial trait of a hardworking farmer, creating a German Heimat away from 
home.548 While Lüderitz was perhaps the first actual town to be established, others soon 
followed: Swakopmund, close to the British Walvis Bay enclave became an important 
harbour for German operations. Windhoek (Windhuk during the German era) in the centre 
of the colony, Namibia’s current capital, also became a central point of operation, as it 
controlled the plateaus on which cattle herding was prevalent, but was not a noteworthy 
settlement until later, when the interior had been fully subjugated.549 The pre-colonial 
composition of Namibia was divided into three large groups; the Herero, the Nama and the 
Ovambo. These comprised many smaller clans and tribes linked by culture, language and 
history.550 Many Herero and Nama clans had family and relatives residing within British 
territory, thus linking the connections between British and German territory even further. 
The Herero occupied most of the central parts of GSWA, while their ancient enemy, the 
Nama mainly resided in the south. 
The German presence in GSWA was at first marginal. The first Imperial 
Commissioner, R.E Göring, father to Hermann Göring of the later Luftwaffe, attempted in 
1896 to subjugate the indigenous peoples, especially the Herero, to German rule through 
treaties. But it was not until he was replaced by Curt von François – a man of military 
background who had served, among other places, in the Congo Free State – that a small but 
permanent military presence was established, which led to the beginnings of a German civil 
administration in GSWA.551 According to Alison Palmer, the colonial state structure in 
GSWA ‘fused both civil and military elements, with much administration performed by army 
officers.’552 This is true; however, considering the number of German troops in GSWA prior 
to the 1904 rebellion, this overlap between military and civil elements was perhaps more 
administrative than political. In 1890, there was only a German force of seventy in GSWA, 
while in 1904 this had increased to about 14,000.553 Arguably, the reason why the military 
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presence is emphasised by many scholars is to prove the militaristic and perhaps even 
authoritarian roots of German history. If GSWA was a strictly militaristic colony, it would 
support claims of German exceptionalism and continuity to the Third Reich.  
When GSWA was proclaimed to be under German control, there soon followed a 
treaty between the Germans and the Herero in 1888. This ‘Treaty of Friendship’ was, 
however, turned upside-down; it was the Herero who, supposedly, sought the protection of 
the German Kaiser: ‘The Head Chief Maherero, guided with the wish to confirm the friendly 
relations in which he and his people have lived with the Germans for years, prays for His 
Majesty the German Emperor to take over the protection of himself and his people.’554 While 
such rhetoric in European-African treaties was not unique at the time, it nevertheless portrays 
the racial discrimination and civilising motivations inherent in colonialism. The more 
interesting aspect, however, may be jurisdictional; while this in many ways appears archetypal 
of the encroachment of European colonialism, it also shows that African authorities, albeit 
being seen as weak and savage, still held the rights to the land. Clearly, however, such treaties 
were not aimed at obtaining internal recognition from the Herero per se, but rather at 
international recognition to keep rivals at bay and expand German colonial rule in lieu of 
effective occupation, in a similar way to the treaties and concessions signed by Lobengula 
prior to 1893. Indeed, such international intentions were evident in article II of the same 
treaty, which stated that Samuel Maherero, the Head Chief of the Herero, ‘undertakes not to 
transfer his country, nor any part of it, to any other nation or subject thereof, without the 
consent of His Majesty the German Emperor.’555 
In return, the Herero people received the protection of the German Kaiser and 
recognition of their rights and the authority of Maherero. According to Drechsler, the 
conclusion of this treaty was a success for the settlers, as it ended the potential for 
confrontation with the Witbooi clan (Nama) and the Herero.556 The treaty also stated that 
‘German subjects’ were ‘bound to respect the existing customs and usages prevailing in the 
territory of Maherero.’ Furthermore, they were also bound to pay taxes and stay within 
German penal laws.557 As was also the case in Southern Rhodesia, such treaties and legislation 
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were often violated. But nonetheless, it indicates that colonial rule, whether British or 
German, was expected to have certain moral standards. This also applied to the international 
context hereof where such treaties officially announced the formal control of Germany. 
However, it also meant that German colonial rule could be scrutinised both morally and 
legally, as Germany ostensibly had to uphold such treaties. Therefore, these treaties should 
not simply be discarded as irrelevant ‘excuses’ for empire, only designed to trick their victims. 
They also functioned as confinements in determining the responsibility of the colonising 
power in question. 
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that such treaties of ‘protection’ had more 
sinister intentions and were means of social and political control. Indicatively, German 
subjects as well as those ‘entitled to German protection living in Hereroland’ were ‘to be 
judged according to the German law in all disputes, both civil and criminal.’  In cases which 
involved German subjects against one or more Herero, these were to be reserved for ‘a 
special arrangement between the Government and the Chiefs in Hereroland.’ But since such 
arrangement was still not in place, these were ‘decided by the Imperial Commissioner.’558 In 
other words, until anything else had been agreed upon, the German authorities had full 
judicial control and power should there arise any legal issues between settlers and Herero.  
 
In 1890 the Germans occupied the plains of Windhoek and established a settlement there. 
This area was well inside Herero territory, but due to their ongoing war with the Nama, the 
Herero, while being further antagonised by the Germans, still opted for German 
protection.559 Indeed, the war between the Herero and the Nama was crucial in how German 
colonialism gradually encroached in GSWA: it allowed them to build up their settlements 
and move inland, as the indigenous peoples were fighting amongst themselves, and were thus 
unable to put up efficient resistance. Therefore, when peace was concluded between the 
Herero and the Nama in November 1892, the political situation – particularly for the 
Germans in Windhoek – completely changed. Similar to Ranger’s stipulation regarding the 
African resistance in Rhodesia, Drechsler claims that the peace came as a ‘united African 
response’ to the advancement of German colonialism. While this underplays other interests 
and circumstances, it appears plausible, as von François had 214 troops dispatched to GSWA 
as a response.560 Indeed, the peace between the Herero and the Nama changed Berlin’s policy 
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towards GSWA from disinterest and following a policy where war was to be avoided to 
proactive engagement in the political affairs of the colony.  
In an attempt to subject Nama Chief Hendrik Witbooi to a protection treaty which 
would finally accept German colonial authority, von François raided the Nama settlement of 
Hoornkranz in 1893, killing eighty women and children.561 According to Witbooi, François 
made a surprise attack while he was sleeping and ‘he sacked my settlement, killing 
indiscriminately small children, women and men.’ Witbooi informed John Cleverly, the 
British Magistrate at Walvis Bay, about this and asked him to let both London and Berlin 
know of these atrocities and support him with rifles and ammunition against the Germans.562 
Cleverly, however, stated he could not help him with supplies, but promised to forward this 
information to Europe on the next ship. Regarding the violence, he noted that ‘I cannot 
understand how there could have been a killing of women and children. European nations 
do not make war in that way.’563 
Witbooi seemed to have some relation or other with Cleverly at Walvis Bay as he had 
also visited him prior to the massacre at Hoornkranz and informed him that he did not 
understand why the Germans ruled SWA and that he instead sought to have British 
protection over the territory.564 The reason for Witbooi’s visit to Cleverly seems to have been 
to express his discontent with German rule and to complain about their general misrule over 
GSWA. He gave explicit statements about his experiences, thus revealing that the British 
government had reports on German mismanagement early on, although Witbooi’s 
statements were most likely deemed exaggerations. This may also have been the reason 
behind the reply Witbooi received from the British.  
 
The British Government has promised Germany not to interfere in certain parts of [South] West Africa 
among which is your district, and it is impossible to take back that promise. That the British Government 
has no knowledge of and is in no way responsible for anything that may have been done in those countries 
over which German Protection is exercised, and would advise if you have any complaints, to lay them 




In many ways this was, as shall be shown, a precedent for British policy vis-à-vis GSWA: a 
policy of non-intervention despite detailed knowledge of what unfolded. Indeed, as Witbooi 
was expressly informed, ‘the Colonial Government therefore, cannot interfere in any matter 
occurring within the area of the German Protectorate.’ 
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The ensuing conflict between Witbooi and the Germans – who were largely confined 
to operations near Windhoek – dragged on and caused much resentment in GSWA towards 
François, who was blamed for causing it. Traders were unable to conduct their business, and 
when François failed to safeguard the interests of the German Southwest Africa Company, 
he also lost the confidence of Berlin, prompting his replacement by Theodor Leutwein in 
1893. Leutwein stayed as governor until 1904, when he was forced to resign his post because 
of the Herero rebellion. Leutwein was keen to establish a sovereign state in GSWA, which 
could promote both German immigration and economic interests.566 As he assumed his new 
position in a state of war, however, his first move was to assure the absolute security of 
GSWA so that he could build up the state structures he wished for. First, he subjugated lesser 
Nama clans through force to accept German authority, before moving on to subjugate 
Witbooi who was still in open rebellion in the southern parts of GSWA. After much heavy 
fighting where the Germans’ superior weaponry proved decisive, Witbooi was forced to 
surrender and submit to a protection treaty, as the Herero had done. Leutwein, however, had 
changed the wording of the treaty so that Witbooi was not to accept German ‘protection’, 
but German ‘suzerainty.’567  
In effect, the Nama were now subjects in a colony annexed by the German Reich 
which was part of Leutwein’s scheme of state-building. This was followed by several reforms 
where GSWA was divided into districts and the establishment of elective councils in 1899, 
consisting of German settlers – a move very similar to the establishment of a comparable 
council in Southern Rhodesia that same year.568 Nevertheless, the European population of 
GSWA continued to be minuscule; in 1896, for instance, it was a mere 2,000, and although 
it had increased to 4,682 in 1903, the German presence remained marginal.569 At this time, 
Windhoek remained the main centre of population, but since the size of the colony was so 
vast, the few settlers there were, were spread out over immense distances. Therefore, the 
systematic division of administrative bodies through elected councils served not only to 
satisfy settler demands but also to accommodate Leutwein in his state-building enterprise.  
Yet, as GSWA covered an area as large as 835,100 square kilometres – one and half 
times the size of Germany – the enforcement of a state authority was not straightforward. 
As Dedering has noted, the attempts to subjugate the indigenous peoples were ‘impeded by 
financial restrictions and German ignorance of the political and historical realities of 
                                                 
 
566 Helmut Bley, Namibia under German Rule, 7. 
567 Drechsler, Let us Die Fighting, 77. 
568 Palmer, ‘Colonial Genocides’, 229. 
569 Bley, Namibia under German Rule, 73. Also Goldblatt, History of South-West Africa, 200.  
137 
 
Namibia.’ Thus, it was not until 1894 that Leutwein could consolidate his power through 
central and parts of southern Namibia, where for instance Windhoek is situated, through 
treaties of protection.570 Windhoek was important for the Germans, as it controlled the plains 
best suited for cattle herding in the country, and therefore it was coveted by the German 
settlers and administration and interlocked them in a struggle with the Herero over the 
control of this fertile land, which was a key reason for the outbreak of war in 1904.571 
According to the White Book, the rinderpest decimated the Herero stock of cattle to less 
than 5% of its original size.572 This estimate is confirmed by other independent studies of the 
rinderpest, which similarly point to the cataclysmic spread and effects of the epidemic.573 
Although it cannot be explored in depth here, one may assume that the spread of rinderpest 
which disrupted socio-economic foundations throughout Southern Africa, was a significant 
factor in causing uprisings. Indeed, just as had happened in Southern Rhodesia, the 
rinderpest in GSWA had severe consequences. It compelled the Herero to gradually sell off 
their land to German settlers, who protected their cattle from the rinderpest more efficiently. 
Therefore, the rinderpest created a vacuum which the German settlers could fill, thus 
spreading German colonial administration and rule, particularly to the regions which had 
hitherto been within the Herero sphere of control.  
Perhaps swayed by the gradual expropriation of the Herero grazing lands at 
Windhoek, Leutwein was convinced that the indigenous peoples of GSWA would gradually 
(almost automatically) yield to the German presence and state-building. However, the 
outbreak of hostilities in 1904 witnessed that the Herero, and later the Nama, were not willing 
to submit to the Germans without resistance.574 Until 1904, Leutwein and arguably most 
German colonial officials were convinced of the stability of GSWA. Thus, the perception of 
the Herero and Nama having accepted, and ultimately subjected themselves to German rule 
therefore functioned as a self-imposed smokescreen which concealed the weakness of 
colonial rule. Leutwein’s treaties of protection combined with the destructive effects of the 
rinderpest had thus created an illusion of a strong state which had convinced Leutwein 
himself, Berlin and perhaps even the settlers of its importance and hegemony. But this was 
far from the reality as the Herero and Nama had only accepted the German presence on 
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paper, but in reality, being against their presence and angered by the encroachment and 
mistreatment, they soon revealed the weakness of the German colonial state.  
The outbreak of war in 1904 therefore profoundly influenced colonial policy 
pertaining to GSWA. In fact, after the main fighting had been quelled, the so-called Native 
Regulations of 1906 were introduced and revealed a drastic change in the perception of how 
colonial policy, in GSWA was to be enforced. Unlike the former policy, in which the 
underpinning belief was subtle and, to an extent, even voluntarily subjection by the 
indigenous peoples, the regulations of 1906 were symptomatic of a more ruthless policy. 
These new regulations came out of a ‘fear of a bad peace’ in which the settlers demanded a 
much harsher governing of the indigenous subjects. Soon, all ‘tribal property’, whether fully 
or partly involved in the war, was confiscated by the German authorities.575 Before then, 
longstanding plans for reserves, in which the sustainability of the inhabitants was legally 
ensured in ways much similar to agreements in Southern Rhodesia, were abolished, and 
instead the Kaiser signed an expropriation order in 1905. This order meant, that all tribal 
lands, including ‘the entire movable and fixed property of the tribe’ – in other words, 
livestock and land upon which the subsistence of the indigenous peoples depended – were 
to be taken by the Germans.576 Although the Reichstag had a resolution passed in which it 
demanded that the Herero had sufficient land and resources for their subsistence, this was 
ignored by the Reichskolonialamt.577 Yet expropriation was only one aspect of the future plans 
for GSWA. According to Helmut Bley, the Native Regulations was an attempt ‘to create an 
unbroken network of oppressive controls.’578 The division between settlers and indigenous 
peoples, therefore, became embedded in legal discrimination because only by obtaining a 
permit from the Governor could the Herero and the Nama now acquire land. These 
legislative changes should be seen in the context of the war and the racial beliefs in Germany. 
As Jürgen Zimmerer has contended, the utopian beliefs of the state in GSWA mainly derived 
from racial conceptualisations and were deeply influential in the ‘native policies’. Therefore, 
the war in 1904-8 changed the social structures in GSWA, which necessitated a new policy 
that attempted to completely subjugate, if not almost eradicate, the indigenous peoples.579 
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Anglo-German Economic and Geopolitical Entanglement  
 
As discussed earlier, Southern Rhodesia was believed to be the home of King Solomon’s 
legendary mines. Similarly, in GSWA, prospectors were soon drooling at the thought of 
stumbling upon gold and diamonds in the deserts of GSWA. The discovery of gold in 
Witwatersrand in the Transvaal in 1886 sparked many gold rushes across the globe. Southern 
Rhodesia remains such an example, and the same can be said of Klondike in the Yukon 
Territory of Canada. Both were, at the time, on the brink of ‘civilisation’: Southern Rhodesia 
was unclaimed by any Europeans and was home to a martial race; the Ndebele. Therefore, 
the very idea of discovering minerals in the most inhospitable places on the earth persisted. 
It would be wrong to suggest that GSWA saw a major gold rush, but nonetheless, it claimed 
the attention of hopefuls. 
Frederick Lüderitz was one such hopeful who had hoped to stumble upon gold and 
diamonds in Namibia. However, due to continuous financial hardships – in part brought 
about by the inexistence of such minerals – Lüderitz’s venture was taken over by the Deutsche 
Kolonial Gesellschaft für Südwest Afrika (The German Colonial Company of Southwest Africa), 
which was established by a German consortium in 1884. Bismarck had hoped to grant them 
a charter to transfer the colonial administration to a private enterprise, but due to its financial 
incapability, the Gesellschaft continuously rejected this. According to Richard Voeltz, it was 
‘too underfinanced and too undermanned to administer or commercially exploit the territory 
of South West Africa.’580 
One of the economic interests in GSWA from early on was the potential mineral 
wealth. This was also evident in the protection treaties where the transfer of land from local 
authorities to Europeans was to be approved by the German government. However, in 1888 
the Herero granted a Cape trader and associate of Cecil Rhodes, Robert Lewis, a mining 
concession to the potentially rich copper deposits in the Otavi region.581 This directly violated 
the protection treaty which the Herero had signed with the Germans and gave Britain the 
chance to press for further claims in the region. According to Voeltz, this was the reason 
why Bismarck decided to send von François to GSWA and establish a firm colonial 
administration instead of working for the establishment of a colony under the rule of a 
chartered company. From the perspective of Cape officials, this was a potential chance to 
seize SWA, which they believed to be part of their domain in all but formality. Indeed, Cape 
officials, including Rhodes, had been left disappointed by the lack of interest from London 
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in acquiring SWA, and some even felt deceived by the British government.582 In fact, the 
Cape Administration had from the 1870s sent numerous special commissions led by William 
Palgrave to Herero and Namaqualand to obtain indigenous support for South African 
sovereignty, only to be left disappointed by the formal German takeover in 1884.583 
 
The economy of GSWA was indisputably entangled with the Cape Colony and therefore also 
with the British imperial economy. Therefore, frictions regarding the borders in Southern 
Africa between Britain and Germany continued as a pressing matter. In the case of GSWA, 
two territories were disputed; Walvis Bay and nearby Damaraland.  
According to an 1887 Blue Book on Walvis Bay, there was little rain in this area and 
few possibilities for cultivation, and it was far from being an asset to the British Empire. 
Indeed, in 1886, the total revenue was £20,416, while its expenditure was £29,775.584 
Therefore ‘Walvis Bay may continue to be held up for reasons of state, but from every other 
point of view it must always be the most unpromising and unprofitable of our colonial 
possessions.’  It may therefore appear peculiar that this desolate and expensive enclave was 
at the centrepiece of Anglo-German relations in Southern Africa. Britain, it seems, was keen 
to keep it despite it being so unpromising, for the mere purpose of not allowing their rival 
to have it. The importance of Walvis Bay was not only commercial, it was also geopolitical 
because it was the only deep-water harbour on the entire Namibian coastline. This not only 
meant, that significant portions of overseas trade went through British territory, but also 
meant that troop deployment from Germany was limited.585 Indicatively, in 1904, only days 
after the Herero rebellion broke out, plans to expand the harbour at Swakopmund were 
drawn up, as the continuous German pressure on Britain to either sell, hand over or trade 
the enclave were consistently rejected.586  
In the case of Damaraland, this was another mix of geopolitical and economic issues: 
Rhodes himself had wanted it annexed by the Cape as an extension from Walvis Bay, not 
only for its possible mineral wealth but also for geopolitical reasons. The ongoing failure of 
the Gesellschaft and the full implementation of German administration in GSWA caused 
sporadic unrests by the indigenous peoples, which the Cape authorities feared would cause 
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problems in their own territory.587 Nevertheless, the frictions over territory stemming from 
financial uncertainty and weakness of colonial rule in GSWA led to discussions about an 
envisioned Anglo-German company in Damaraland.588 While the company as originally 
intended did not end up being as transnational as it was supposed to be, it was nonetheless 
established and entangled British and German financial interests in the region. In the end, 
the consequence of Lewis’ influence on the Herero, which led to his concession to the Otavi 
mines, eventually caused the establishment of the South West Africa Company in 1893. 
Clearly, there were firm financial interests at the heart of Anglo-German relations concerning 
GSWA as the South West African Company was partially owned by many South African and 
British investors. As such, speculations regarding mineral wealth and the potential discovery 
of diamonds and mines were taken over by Britain, causing GSWA to be a German colony 
in principle, but perhaps a de facto British colony – at least in terms of financial matters.  
Nevertheless, the company continued to be a failure and consequently Anglo-
German co-operation through the company was already drawing to a close by 1894.589 While 
this chapter does not seek to address the financial aspects of imperialism, it is nonetheless a 
factor worth mentioning, as it was undoubtedly key to many of the developments and 
policies adopted in the region. Furthermore, it might have been in consideration by British 
officials when the 1904 rebellion broke out. GSWA’s dependency on the British possessions 
is crucial in ascertaining how the Herero rebellion and subsequent genocide was not only 
perceived by British – and for that matter, German – officials, but it is also important in 
understanding how and why they acted as they did. Indeed, as will be shown throughout this 
case study, Britain had stakes in GSWA: not only economical but also ideological, political 
and in terms of ‘native administration’, not to mention security issues.  
 
German Colonial Policies and Ambitions and the British Neighbour 
 
Anglo-German entanglement in Southern Africa was not only evident in purely commercial 
and geopolitical matters, but also in colonial policies and ambitions. Indeed, the initial hype 
in Germany over the acquisition of colonies was based on the assumption that the Empire 
had made Britain a great power.590 The idea of a German India or German Africa was 
significantly tempting in German popular opinion. It was therefore natural that Germany, as 
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a newcomer to the colonial stage, looked to Britain for inspiration.591 Indicatively, legislation 
regarding the administration and distribution of power in GSWA was often inspired by the 
British policies in the region. 
 
In particular, the German Colonial Society has presented specific proposals in a petition to the 
Reichskansler which advocates for the introduction of an advisory board such as the legislative councils in 





Inspired by the British Empire, the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (German Colonial Society, 
GCS) advocated for the distribution of power in the colonies to be more favourable to the 
local authorities. Settlers and local officials should have more influence and authority but 
would remain loyal to the Kaiser, just as the settler colonies of Australia, Canada and to an 
extent, South Africa, remained loyal.593 In other words, the GCS supported the eventual 
establishment of a self-governing colony with a responsible government in GSWA. The 
overall ambition of the German colonial project was, among others, driven by the ideology 
of Lebensraum coined by Philip Ratzel in 1896, which has long been considered equivalent to 
Hitler’s eastern ambitions, but was indeed part of a wider raison d’être behind the colonial 
project that included immigration and the establishment of settler colonies.594  
However, the German government was reluctant to give the settlers too much 
influence, particularly because GSWA was home to many non-Germans, as will be discussed 
below. At the close of 1904, the GCS suggested that the German settlers should have the 
opportunity to be in the Gouvernmentsrat (Government Council) but that certain conditions 
were to be met first. These included having resided in GSWA for several years and, more 
importantly, being able to prove that one had had proper relations with the indigenous 
peoples.595 This move was intended to build on Leutwein’s establishment of an elective 
council in 1899. However, this indicates an internal schism between the imperial centre and 
the colonial periphery. The settlers and traders in GSWA wanted a greater deal of autonomy 
and were supported by the GCS. But the German government was unwilling to surrender 
complete control, possibly because they feared that it would sway towards being under either 
British or Boer control. Indeed, just as there had been an uitlander crisis in the Transvaal up 
to the outbreak of the South African War, similar tendencies were evident in GSWA up to 
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and during the Herero-Nama rebellion in 1904, which, as will be shown, was the pretext for 
Germany to impose clearer and more authoritative control over a colony over which they 
had hitherto only been in control on paper. 
 
Comparing British and German methods of colonial rule was prevalent among German 
officials and scholars. For instance, Dr Georg Hartmann, geographer and director for the 
Otavi Mining and Railway Company, published a pamphlet titled Die Zukunft Deutsch-
Südwestafrika, Beitrag zur Besiedlungs- und Eingeborenenfrage (The Future of GSWA. Thoughts on 
the settler and native questions). While this is not an official source, is was nonetheless kept 
by the Reichskolonialamt among its reports and correspondence and considering the obscurity 
of the Reichskolonialamt compared to its British equivalent, it is plausible that it was perhaps 
more easily swayed by pressure from intellectual groups and social scientists: i.e., supposed 
experts on colonialism.596 
According to Hartmann, the early stages of colonisation in GSWA were, as 
mentioned, troublesome and expensive, and saw little fruition of the ambitions of merchants 
and speculators compared to other subtropical colonies such as those in South America, 
South Africa and Australia. Indeed, he argued that these had all been through 
Entwicklungsphasen (phases of development), which were gruesome years, but in the long term 
would establish a colony of ‘substantial benefit for the Motherland.’597 Hartmann also 
contended that a colony with settler administration would stay loyal to the Kaiser, but only 
if it was a colony with the same ‘flesh and blood as the Motherland.’598 This correlates to the 
German ideal of Heimat: a concept of ‘home’. GSWA was to become a new Heimat: a German 
overseas state, similar to, for instance, Bavaria or Saxony albeit in Africa. In order to become 
this, Hartmann argued, it was necessary to create a peasantry which would render the colony 
able to support itself, and, when minerals were found, as he was convinced they would be, it 
was important to form a ‘mining population.’599 
The economic sustainability of GSWA was then pivotal in the ambitions for the 
success of the colony, whether from the perspective of the settlers, government or indeed 
intellectuals. While Hartmann did not explicitly define who the mining population was, it can 
plausibly be surmised that this role was earmarked for the indigenous peoples, because, for 
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the colony to develop economically, ‘it is necessary to rapidly change the land in favour of 
the whites.’ But it was still the German government’s responsibility to bring ‘peace and order 
to the land’ where the ‘white traders have plundered and killed.’600 In Hartmann’s view, the 
Africans did not pose an obstacle to the creation of such a state, but their treatment by 
settlers could potentially cause strife and turmoil and thereby disrupt the development of the 
colony. Similar patterns were seen in Southern Rhodesia, where the perceived mineral wealth 
also dictated ‘native policy’ and may thus suggest a correlation between these two, or perhaps 
even – although no sources indicate this – that Hartmann and others were indeed looking to 
colonial policy in British colonies such as Southern Rhodesia, where again a ‘mining 
population’ was considered imperative for the sustainability of the colony. 
Hartmann contended that the main threat to the creation of a German Heimat was 
the British neighbour with its ‘protectionist aspirations’, and because GSWA was dependable 
upon imports from the Cape, he sought to have it ‘emancipated from Great Britain.’601 
GSWA was dependent on British and especially South African imports, particularly of wool 
and foodstuffs. For instance, German shipments to and from GSWA went through British 
territory, and various private enterprises, such as Covey & Co., made a business on Anglo-
German trade agreements between the Cape, Walvis Bay and into GSWA.602 Clearly, the 
Cape was key to the success of GSWA as a colony, and both Germany and Britain were 
aware of this. 
 
According to the Badisches Foreign Ministry (the German State of Baden-Baden), British 
and Boer land was most fertile in the Transvaal, the Cape and Southern Rhodesia, but they 
considered GSWA ‘as the best farmland for cattle.’603 Furthermore, due to the accelerating 
growth in population, and consequentially emigration, GSWA seemed promising to either 
lure settlers to a German outpost or, alternatively, to break the supposed forthcoming crisis 
of a Malthusian trap: 
 
When a satisfactory form of Government has been adopted, the German territory, with its millions of 
uncultivated acres grasping for water and the plough, its pastoral resources and mining possibilities, may 
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Such ideals were only reinforced with the outbreak of war, which was believed to facilitate 
the introduction of legislative measures to ensure these. Indeed, Hartmann argued that 
confiscating the indigenous peoples’ lands and making them labourers would not only be 
welcomed by the settlers but would also see more settlers immigrate to GSWA.605  
In many ways, the aforementioned Native Regulations of 1906 were the 
envisagement of such colonial ideals or at least the attempt thereof. They were a means of 
social control over the indigenous peoples of GSWA and an attempt to realise a colonial 
project and to create the long-desired settler colony based on the total subjugation of the 
Herero and Nama into serfdom in order to improve the colony. Much of this was rooted in 
racial thoughts predominant in Germany, which were particularly evident in the new 
marriage laws that were enforced. As anywhere else in Africa, there had been cases where 
Germans had taken African wives. This ‘race-mixing’ was at the crux of a socio-political issue 
regarding Germany’s colonial ambitions and intentions. According to German law, children 
of a German father would inherent his citizenship, and therefore, there would, on paper, be 
mixed-race Germans. For societies such as the Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene (Society for Racial 
Hygiene), this was unacceptable and was deemed the undoing of the German colonial 
project, as it prevented the creation of a Heimat in GSWA as well as ‘polluting’ the German 
race.606 For those settlers who had taken African wives (and sometimes husbands), the new 
marriage laws meant that they would also be demoted to the same legal status as an African. 
In other words, they would lose their judicial rights and relations to Germany. This was a 
crucial aspect in which Britain became directly involved due to the many British subjects 
residing within GSWA. Because of these laws, many British subjects were now 
disenfranchised and were – legalistically – perceived as ‘natives’. The British authorities in 
Africa and London, therefore, had to react in order to safeguard the legal status of their 
subjects, communicating with the Auswärtiges Amt on the matter.607 The mixed-race marriage 
issue is therefore an example in which the entanglement as well as the discourses 
underpinning German colonial legislations and beliefs were transformed into practice for a 
significant number of British subjects who resided in German territory and were therefore 
subject to German law. In 1907 the Windhoek Court nullified all existing marriages between 
whites and Africans. Pertaining to the inheritance of German citizenship from father to son, 
it decided that ‘once a bloodline had been contaminated with black blood, nothing could 
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change the status of subsequent generations.’ Thus, mixed-race children with German fathers 
were without citizenship.608  
Scientific racialism in Germany was influential on colonial policies and practices. For 
instance, views on how race-mixing would degenerate the purity of the German race, directly 
translated into legislation in GSWA.609 The German preoccupation with race in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century was a belief in ‘assumed superiority which made 
possible a treatment of native peoples then almost unthinkable within Europe itself.’610 As 
later argued by Aimé Césaire, such unthinkable treatment supposedly transferred back to 
Europe in the shape of the Holocaust.611 Césaire’s logic has arguably been replicated in the 
Sonderweg literature, where the Holocaust is the logical heir to the Herero-Nama genocide. 
However, this obscures contextual similarities to, for instance, South Africa, and instead 
promotes a perspective derived from hindsight. In terms of legislation, the development of 
apartheid and segregation in South Africa may appear as a more historically suitable 
comparison. Here Africans were equally subjected to an increasingly racialist rhetoric and 
legislations that determined and confined them to a socio-economic status based on their 
race.612  
 
Entanglements such as the British settlers in GSWA have long been unnoticed due to the 
overshadowing emphasis on Anglo-German antagonism prior to 1914. Therefore, the 
context of British actions and perceptions of German colonial rule in GSWA are part of a 
wider historiographical tendency of diplomatic and international history. In 1890, Britain and 
Germany signed the Zanzibar-Heligoland treaty, signalling an Anglo-German alliance, or at 
least, friendship. However, due to the developments between Britain and France from the 
Fashoda crisis in 1898 and later the Entente Cordiale in 1904, Germany was gradually 
deterred by the British at the same time as the Germans started building up a fleet – 
antagonising the British due to their navalism and ‘ruling the waves’.613 It is conventionally 
believed that when Britain opted to support France over the Moroccan question at the 
Algericas Conference in 1906, the lines were drawn and the Anglo-French alliance was 
solidified.614 Thus, from a traditional view, Anglo-German relations at the time would suggest 
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that Britain’s stance during the Herero-Nama war and genocide was part of a growing 
tendency towards antagonism. This is in no way an incorrect position: just as there was much 
entanglement and dependency, so also was there a tendencies of antagonism and rivalry, not 
only on a wider national and international basis but also in smaller internal and personal 
circumstances. For instance, the Badisches foreign ministry continued its lengthy telegram 
by discussing how the British mockery of German colonialism as oppressive and despotic 
was wrong. It was Britain that was pursuing the wrong policy, as it was not as free as it 
claimed but was subdued by the ‘slavery of taxation and tariffs’ while Germany was merely 
emphasising order.615 However, the problem with the dependency upon Britain was not, it 
was argued, due to the ideological antagonism, but because so many German settlers and 
indigenous people traded across the border where the facilities and market supply were 
better, causing the Reich to ‘annually lose hundreds of thousands of Mark.’616  
The British neighbour was therefore not merely problematic because of GSWA’s 
dependency thereon, but also because it prevented the internal economy from developing 
and thus becoming a Heimat. Furthermore, the lack of German settlers in GSWA continued 
to be a problem at a time when millions of immigrants were leaving Germany for America. 
In order to divert some of these settlers to remain within German territory, GSWA was 
branded as a potential location.617 Yet it remained difficult to attract settlers to GSWA, and 
the outbreak of the Herero rebellion in 1904 only made matters worse. In response, German 
authorities tried to lure settlers to GSWA by granting them 15,000 Mark for settling there.618  
Immigrants from Germany were not only thought to be important for the economic 
development of GSWA but were also an attempt to minimise non-German influence. 
According to Dedering, in 1902, out of a total of 4,635 white settlers, there were 1,455 Boers 
and 452 British in GSWA, and in June that same year, a further 400 Boer emigrants arrived.619 
Robbie Aitken, however, contends that the number of Boer settlers in GSWA was somewhat 
lower, but in 1902 it comprised at least a quarter of the total settler population.620 Despite 
such diverse estimations, both Dedering and Aitken agree that the quantity of non-German 
settlers in GSWA was substantial, and while several German governors such as Göring and 
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Leutwein had considered Boer immigration beneficial, officials in Berlin considered it 
problematic, as it undermined the German character of SWA.621 Thus, German officials 
feared that the colony would lose its ties to the motherland, particularly as the many Boer 
settlers continued to refuse to integrate into the German settler society.622  
Due to the large quantity of non-German settlers, GSWA cannot be considered a 
disconnected colony in the sense that it was a kind of extension of the German nation. 
Nevertheless, it was a crucial part of the German colonial project. Helmut Bley has noted 
that there was not a political confrontation between the settlers and the authorities before 
the outbreak of the Herero rebellion.623 Therefore, in order to fully comprehend German 
practices and policies employed in GSWA to quell the Herero and later Nama rebels, it is 
important to note the internal relations between centre and periphery, complicated by the 
overshadowing presence of the British neighbour. Indeed, the growing demands of the 
settlers, in which the rebellion served as a catalyst, may explain not only how German officials 
acted and legislated during the rebellion, but also how British policy vis-à-vis Southern Africa 
as a whole developed during those years. The presence of British and particularly Boer 
settlers in GSWA remained an ongoing issue which forced the hand of officials to make 
cross-border policies. Furthermore, the belief among Cape officials, particularly considering 
the economic dependence and entanglement manifested in the Anglo-German Company in 
Damaraland, was that GSWA was to be annexed and was ostensibly part of South Africa in 
all but formality and name.624 The pressures from the settlers and the decisions of the 
officials, whether in Berlin or Windhoek, were therefore shaped by the British shadow 
standing over GSWA. Where Whitehall had initially found the territory unimportant, for 
Cape Authorities, British supremacy in the region did indeed include South West Africa.625  
 
Britain’s entanglement in German colonial ambitions and policies, therefore, was influential, 
both directly and indirectly in a practical and theoretical way respectively. Practical as the 
Cape and British settlers in GSWA posed a rational deductible threat to the establishment of 
a Heimat. This was reinforced by the dependence on the Cape in terms of, among others, 
economy and communications, leaving GSWA, to an extent, isolated from Germany and 
more within the sphere of influence of the Cape and London. Indeed, after 1902, GSWA 
was, in a way, the new Transvaal in the region: the missing piece in the creation of a South 
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African hegemony. Theoretically, as the British Empire functioned as both inspiration and 
deterrence, Britain’s mastery over such vast and various colonies was a system to copy – 
especially in the settler colonies, where Germany hoped to create a white colony in GSWA. 
This, in turn, meant that the place of the indigenous peoples was crucial; in order to create a 
white settler colony as Australia or Canada, these peoples were to be exterminated, removed 
or completely subjugated. Indeed, the main difference between Britain’s white dominions of 
Australia and Canada and that of South Africa was not only the presence of the Boers but 
also the continued existence of a significant indigenous population. Therefore, the war in 
1904 was a way for Germany to impose further colonial ideals, taking drastic steps towards 
the establishment of a Heimat via the extermination or complete subjugation of the 
indigenous peoples.  
 
 
Total War in Africa: Outbreak of the Rebellion 
 
Before the outbreak of the Herero rebellion, Leutwein had taken his troops south to quell 
the Bondelswarts, who had risen on 25 October 1903, and the rebellion here was not over 
until 27 January 1904 – several days after the outbreak of the Herero rebellion. The 
Bondelswarts were a Nama clan residing in the area named Warmbad, close to the South 
African border. The German presence in Warmbad prior to the rebellion in 1903 was under 
the leadership of Lt. Jobst, who had served in China after the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901). 
According to Erichsen and Olusoga, Jobst violated the protection treaty between the 
Germans and the Bondelswart chief, Jan Christian, by summoning him to Warmbad over a 
dispute with a Herero woman regarding the ownership of a goat. When Christian refused, as 
Jobst did not have this authority, Jobst gathered the few men he had and shot Christian. In 
response, Jobst and his men were shot by the Bondelswarts, thus starting the war.626 
Leutwein had condemned the behaviour of Jobst, and in general, he was aiming to 
avoid war with the indigenous peoples, especially the Herero.627 However, swift reactions 
and demands for revenge soon forced Leutwein to go south on a 500 mile long journey 
through rugged and dry terrain to quell the Bondelswarts, leaving Windhoek and Hereroland 
exposed.628 When the Herero rose in rebellion, Leutwein quickly concluded a fragile peace 
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with the Bondelswarts and rushed north.629 While Leutwein was away, the young and rather 
belligerent Lt. Zürn was in command in the town of Okahandja. Zürn was known for his 
contempt of the Herero and after he had committed a series of abuses, rumours and anxiety 
started to spread that the Herero were out for revenge.630 However, many Herero in German 
employ continued to spread rumours that certain chiefs and captains had declared that they 
wished to oust the Germans from their lands.631 Such rumours were taken seriously by Zürn 
and the settlers in Okahandja, and soon two officials volunteered to go out and investigate 
whether here was any truth in them.632 In response to these continuous rumours, Zürn 
requested that a machine gun be sent from Windhoek in a move similar to that of the British 
in Southern Rhodesia, who found the mere presence of such a weapon to be of great use.633 
It was believed that it could deter any Herero attacks by its mere presence and thus gave the 
settlers a sense of security when the situation looked dire.  
Nevertheless, conflict seemed unavoidable, as indicated by Bezirksamtmann [District 
Officer] Gustav Duft, who informed Berlin: 
 
Peaceful negotiations useless, great slaughter of Germans by the Herero. 100 settlers believed murdered 
and all of their property and survivors taken. Okahandya reinforced by Zülow today. Waiting for sailor 
rescue corps from Windhoek which has been repulsed twice. Connections to Windhoek completely 
destroyed. Operations in Windhoek, Gobabis, Omarauru unknown. Great force and weapons needed for 





The rebellion had thus started and soon settlers were killed by the rebels – many in their 
sleep by their servants. The Zülow mentioned in Duft’s telegram was an officer dispatched 
to oversee the defences of Okahandja. Upon his arrival, he proclaimed to the Herero that 
due to the might of the German Reich, he advised them to surrender and promised that if 
they kept the peace, they would not ‘be so severely punished that if you continue murdering 
and continue fighting. And we Germans will win.’635 Despite his initial confidence, Zülow’s 
position in Okahandja was fragile: most troops were with Leutwein in the south and they 
were vastly outnumbered. Therefore, he attempted to frighten the Herero with Germany’s 
domestic strength that could be unleashed abroad. Zülow made this proclamation knowing 
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that reinforcements were already on their way, and four days after the rebellion had started, 
Friedrich von Lindequist, the German Consul to South Africa and later Governor of GSWA, 
reported that the war with the Bondelswarts was about to be concluded and that he had 
made communications with Berlin to send available ships and reinforcements to GSWA. The 
next day, Berlin confirmed that it would send 500 men to GSWA in order to quell the 
rebellion – a message ‘received with great joy.’636 
The outbreak of the war also led to new legislation pertaining to any Herero in the 
employ of various companies. It was forbidden for ‘natives to stay out of their 
accommodation between 8 pm until 6 am without written authorisation.’ Furthermore, no 
more than thirty Africans were to work together in groups and these should be under 
guard.637 The same decree stated that the police were also empowered ‘to make use of their 
firearms against the natives in cases of assault against themselves and others, resistance in 
open violence with weapons or dangerous tools, against them or others.’ Lastly, they were 
also allowed to shoot them should they attempt to escape.638 If they did not attempt to escape, 
but otherwise broke this decree, they would be punished with imprisonment and forced 
labour with corporal punishment for up to three years. In contrast, if settlers broke the same 
regulations, they were to be punished with a penalty fee of up to 600 Marks or imprisonment 
for six weeks.639 
With the outbreak of the conflict, and after having recovered from the initial shock 
of the rebellion, many Africans were lynched and killed regardless of whether they had 
participated in the rebellion. Many were hanged from trees or beaten to death.640 These 
incidents saw the war escalate and soon spread beyond the vicinity of Okahandja, and within 
days it reached as far as the coastal town of Swakopmund.641 In Windhoek, detailed 
precautions were also taken for inhabitants. All able-bodied men were called up for service, 
stores and hotels were taken by the military authorities to house civilians as well as troops 
and the outer perimeter of the town was to be abandoned.  Furthermore, the government 
would pay for the subsistence of women and children and there would be established public 
kitchens to feed civilians and soldiers alike, with the food being rationed by officials. This 
also included the indigenous people in Windhoek who had either not been killed by the 
settlers or who were loyal to the German administration. Particularly, the Berg-Damara 
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troops were also to receive free meals, albeit at the ‘rates of a native soldier.’642 Windhoek 
was, similar to Bulawayo in 1896, a town in a state of war. The anxiety and preparations made 
reveal that the sentiment of settlers and officials in both GSWA and Berlin already considered 
the Herero rebellion to be a major colonial war a few days after its outbreak. Indeed, it was 
already deemed necessary to use great military power to overcome the Herero. These fears, 
paired with exaggerated reports caused a tremendous outcry for revenge upon reaching 
Germany, providing an incentive to intervene swiftly.643 Cape views on the outbreak of the 
rebellion, however, were more concerned by the challenges with which the Schutztruppe would 
be faced.  
 
With regard to the natives, they have not the same pluck or fighting tactics as the Zulu or Matabele had. 
They will never come out and attack en masse, and there will be no opportunity of mowing them down 





The immediate response by the British to the outbreak was ambivalent: while the difficulties 
of a colonial war were recognised as a troublesome affair which could have consequences on 
their side of the border, they were nonetheless left puzzled by the tactics of the Herero. On 
Samuel Maherero’s orders, it was only German men who were killed by the rebels – British, 
Boers and women and children were spared.645 Therefore, the same article, which was kept 
by the Reichskolonialamt, questions the authenticity of the allegations of the rebels having 
molested settlers because it was only Germans that was targeted. Instead, the deaths of 
German male settlers were a consequence of the brutalities of their treatment of the 
Herero.646 From a British perspective, however, this displayed the fact that ‘the natives have 
been treated well and fairly by the missionaries and the English, and badly by the Germans.’647 
Yet, when the Herero rose in rebellion, it was not only the German authorities that were 
notified and expressed concerns. Magistrate Cleverly in Walvis Bay reported to London on 
the dire situation: 
 
There is said to be an understanding with all the Native races to make once and for all, a last and desperate 
struggle against the German supremacy. This is the more significant because the leaders are fully aware that 
the end is inevitable, and that the retribution will be of the most drastic nature. From the opinion expressed 




                                                 
 
642 BAB: R 1001/2112: Proclamation, Windhuk 16 January 1904. 
643 Olusoga and Erichsen, Kaiser’s Holocaust, 131. 
644 BAB: R 1001/2112: Excerpt of The Cape Argus, 28 January 1904. 
645 Erichsen, Angel of Death, 5. 
646 BAB: R 1001/2112: Excerpt of The Cape Argus, 28 January 1904. 
647 TNA: FO 64/1645: Report by Gleichen, enclosed in Lascelles to Lansdowne, 9 April 1904. 




Unwittingly, Cleverly predicted the atrocities that would soon consume GSWA. 
Furthermore, he believed that it was not only the Herero but indeed ‘the tribes’ that would 
be exterminated. German colonial ambitions then, according to Cleverly, would only succeed 
with the extermination of the entire local population. The British government, therefore, 
were in possession of a report that predicted the atrocities that were to be committed only 
eight days after the rebellion had broken out. 
The early stages of the conflict highlight the abusive practices taken by both settlers 
and officials but also indicate the fragility of German colonial rule. With the arrival of 
German troops, however, the Herero now faced, like the Ndebele, a long and defensive war. 
However, until June 1904, the Germans remained on the defensive, handing the Herero the 
initiative, but again similar to the Ndebele, the Herero failed to sustain an offensive and to 
cut off Windhoek from the coast. The Germans were therefore allowed to rally, gather 
supplies and wear off the initial rebellion without sustaining decisive losses.  
Upon his return to Windhoek via ship from Port Nolloth in British territory to 
Swakopmund on the GSWA coast, Leutwein began to outline the response that should be 
employed against the Herero. The Reichskolonialamt and Leutwein agreed that ‘after the 
outrages the Herero have committed, nothing short of unconditional surrender will have to 
be enforced.’ However, Leutwein disagreed with ‘those fanatics who want to see the Herero 
destroyed altogether.’649 Furthermore, Leutwein stressed that the public opinion in Germany, 
which at this time was clamouring for vengeance, was ‘blind to the actual conditions.’650  In 
a bid to bring the hostilities to a prompt conclusion, Leutwein therefore issued a 
proclamation to the Herero: 
 
Hereros! Since you have revolted against the German Emperor and shot his soldiers, you know that you 
can now expect a fight to the death. But you can prevent it by coming to me and hand over your guns and 
ammunition and face fair punishment.  
I am well aware that many of you carry no guilt and those can come to me in peace and I will spare their 
life. No mercy can be given to those who murdered white people and robbed them in their homes. These 
will be brought to justice and must face the debt of their guilt. But you others who have no such debt, be 
wise, and do not place your fate with those guilty. Leave them and save your lives!  





Needless to say, Leutwein’s proclamation had little effect. The Herero remained in open 
rebellion despite the situation gradually turning against their favour. In March 1904, the main 
body of German troops had been assembled and were ready for action. Going on the 
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offensive, however, Leutwein continued to run into trouble. For instance, on April 13th 
1904, a German force was encircled by the Herero at Oviumbo. During the night, the 
Germans escaped and avoided what could have been a decisive defeat. This saw Leutwein to 
once more take a defensive stance in the war and to wait for further reinforcements.652 
Consequently, Leutwein requested that the Reichskolonialamt sent a senior officer along with 
reinforcements. Not only was Leutwein himself disillusioned with the situation, the German 
government in Berlin too were unsatisfied by his actions and that he had resumed 
correspondence with Samuel Maherero to negotiate peace.653 The ensuing dismissal of 
Leutwein was received negatively by the British, as it was believed that this would ‘be a 
distinct misfortune and would probably result in a general rising of all natives in the 
country.’654 Indeed, Leutwein was generally favoured by the British, as it was believed that he 
saw British colonialism as an inspiration, especially concerning its Eingeborenenpolitik (native 
policy). This can be exemplified in Leutwein’s memoir, Elf Jahre Gouverneur (1907) where he 
claimed that the British had been better at ‘convincing the natives’ of their colonial cause and 
Britain could thus rule its colonies with ‘a nominal presence.’655  
Leutwein’s replacement was General Lothar von Trotha, who arrived in GSWA in 
July 1904. Upon his arrival, a martial law was proclaimed transferring military and 
administrative authority in GSWA from the governor to the commander of the 
Schutztruppe.656 GSWA thus became a military-run colony where the supreme authority was 
the commander in chief of the Schutztruppe and according to Bley, this was, in effect, Trotha’s 
‘personal military dictatorship.’657 Trotha had previous experience in colonial warfare in 
German East Africa where he waged a brutal total war to suppress the Wahehe rebellion in 
1894.658 His strategy was to strike the Herero with one decisive blow to either force 
negotiations, which was unlikely due to its unpopularity with both the public in Germany 
and the settlers, or, as Trotha wished, to completely destroy the Herero capability to fight. 
Indicatively, Trotha’s view on the war was that ‘against nonhumans [unmenschen] one cannot 
conduct war humanely.’659 
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The decisive battle came in August 1904 at the Waterberg plateau, where a large group of 
Herero had gathered. The German force – about 4,000 strong, with horses, oxen, 36 artillery 
pieces and 14 machine guns – began to surround the Herero, leaving the south-eastern flank, 
towards the Omaheke desert, exposed.660 According to Isabel Hull, the decision to leave the 
flank towards the Omaheke open was because of military incompetence on the side of the 
Germans.661 Olusoga and Erichsen, however, argue that this decision was part of Trotha’s 
intention to exterminate the Herero altogether, claiming that he knew that if they fled this 
way, they would die of thirst and exhaustion.662 Similarly, Zimmerer too argues that the 
genocide began at Waterberg, where ‘the Omaheke would finish the extermination’ begun 
by the Germans.663  However, as Henrik Lundtofte notes, the strategic logic of the Germans 
was that the Herero were least likely to flee in this direction.664 Hence, there remain a 
disagreement regarding the intention of the Germans at Waterberg and thus when the 
genocide commenced. At the time, the distinction between military and civilian targets 
became increasingly blurred. Trotha favoured total war and his experience at the brutal battle 
of Sedan during the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-1 may have shaped his perception of 
warfare.665 As Gesine Krüger, among others, has shown, total war was the norm for the 
colonial powers in Africa, as it not only focused on military targets but also on civilian 
targets.666 In fact, the previous case study of Southern Rhodesia in 1896, may serve well as 
an illustration of a colonial ‘total war’ as it was the Ndebele people as a whole who were 
targeted for complete subjugation, but not extermination. 
The key moment that differentiated Southern Rhodesia from GSWA – total war 
from genocide – came in the immediate aftermath of Waterberg where thousands Herero 
survivors found themselves in the Omaheke desert, which was terra incognita for Europeans. 
According to Lundtofte, when the Herero fled into the Omaheke, Trotha was handed the 
opportunity to commit genocide and seek the destruction of the Herero people. When 
Trotha then gave the order for the troops to pursue the Herero, the nature of the conflict 
changed from total war to genocide. Instead of seeking the subjugation of the Herero, Trotha 
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now sought their physical extermination.667 However, the pursuit was impractical as it 
exhausted the German troops and the order was soon retracted.668 Instead of pursuing them, 
Trotha attempted to uphold his strategy of extermination by ordering his men to prevent the 
Herero from returning to Hereroland. It was then that Trotha issued his infamous 
Vernichtungsbefehl [Extermination Order], which is often considered to mark the start of the 
genocide, as it is a clear statement of genocidal intention.669  
 
The Herero people must now leave the country. If the people does not do so I will force it to do so with 
cannon. Within the German frontiers every Herero, with or without arms will be shot. I will no longer 
receive any women or children but will either drive them back to their own peoples or have them fired at. 





Trotha also sent along instructions to this order, including that the soldiers were to shoot 
over the heads of women and children so they would run away. This, he claimed, would 
make sure ‘no male prisoners would be taken, but also that no atrocities would take place 
towards women and children.’671 Despite such instructions, women and children were also 
murdered in the genocide that ensued, and scaring them away meant that they were often 
left to die of thirst and starvation rather than being shot.  
The conduct of the German troops remained brutal in nature throughout the 
conflict. An account from a German officer, von Beesten, is indicative hereof. A group of 
Herero survivors had made contact and had been promised that they would not be harmed 
if they came in with their weapons. Soon after, a group of Herero and a few captains came 
in to meet Beesten at a farmhouse. However, prior to the negotiations, Beesten had prepared 
his troops but ordered them not to open fire until he gave the command. The negotiations 
quickly went sour: 
 
Already at my first condition of handing over the weapons I met resistance. We discussed the issue for 
about half an hour – the Herero chiefs refused to hand in their weapons unless the German soldiers put 
away their guns. I told Lt. von Hammerstein that the Herero are about to start a battle and that he should 





He then gave the order to open fire and the Herero, caught in a fenced closure, were mowed 
down. Excesses such as this were not uncommon and were well known to both German and 
British officials throughout the entire affair. Cleverly at Walvis Bay was plainly aware of the 
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brutalities and even before von Trotha’s appointment and the battle at Waterberg he reported 
on the ‘general feeling among the Germans’ which was characterised by ‘an unreasoning and 
vindictive bitterness which is almost as nearly allied to barbarism as the unbridled passions 
of the Herero themselves.’ Indeed, rumours of bayonetted Herero women were reported by 
Cleverly, who noted that the Germans were not representative of proper civilised European 
warfare, which he had otherwise suggested in his previous conversations with Witbooi.673  
 
There is a tendency in the historiography to focus on the Herero aspect of the conflict. This 
is perhaps best illustrated by the frequent terming of the genocide as the ‘Herero genocide’, 
disregarding the horrors suffered by other groups such as the Nama and the Basters. The 
Herero were the largest group and made up the most victims, but as Henning Melber has 
suggested, this may be an attempt to monopolise history in order to obtain legal rights to 
land, secure more development funding and perhaps even to secure a bigger proportion of 
the protracted German reparations.674 In fact, the Vernichtungsbefehl was soon extended to 
target the Nama too after they abandoned their allegiance to the Germans after Waterberg 
and took up arms. In his new proclamation to ‘the Hottentots’, Trotha promised that no 
harm would come to anyone except those who, by participating in the murder of whites, had 
‘forfeited the right to live.’ However, Trotha’s strongest emphasis was that the same fate 
suffered by the Herero would soon come to the Nama. ‘I ask you, where are the people of 
the Herero today? Where are their Chiefs? Some of them have died of hunger and thirst in 
the desert, some by German troops. This will be the fate of the Hottentots if they do not 
give themselves up.’675 
In the opening days of the Nama rebellion, approximately forty settlers were killed. 
Similar to the Herero, the Nama spared women and children, only killing German men who 
did not ‘bear the Witbooi mark’ (a sign of Nama friendship). Indeed, there were even cases 
of Nama warriors escorting women and children to German forts or settlements, risking 
their own lives in the process.676 The Nama fought a completely different war from the 
Herero and caused the Germans trouble for years. By applying guerrilla tactics much akin to 
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the Ndebele in the Matopos, the Nama utilised the rugged terrain in southern GSWA and 
thereby avoided facing the Germans in a large-scale battle like Waterberg. 677  
The reason for the Nama uprising is uncertain; according to Olusoga and Erichsen, 
the Nama, having witnessed the massacre at Waterberg, decided to rise because they were 
alarmed by the brutality of the Germans and feared that after the Herero, they were next.678 
According to Zimmerer, however, it was a response to Trotha’s Vernichtungsbefehl and the 
continuous pressure from settlers, who saw the situation as a chance to finally disarm the 
Nama and subjugate them completely.679 Drechsler points to continuous excesses by settlers 
and to public statements in newspapers such as the Deutsch-Südwestafrikanishe Zeitung (GSWA 
Newspaper), which many Nama were able to read, in which the ‘native question’ was openly 
discussed. Here the settlers called for the complete subjugation of the Nama, although they 
were at peace at the time, and despite the fact that Witbooi had even supported the Germans 
with over 100 men.680 Considering these various potential, yet relatively similar, causes, it 
seems plausible that the presence of a large German force, outspoken hostilities towards the 
Nama combined with their own experiences of German colonial warfare, that the Nama 
found a pre-emptive strike the best solution. 
The Nama rebellion proved further trouble for the Germans troops, who were 
already overstretched in their failing strategy of patrolling the borders of the Omaheke.681  It 
was not until the spring of 1905 that Trotha could move south to counter the Nama. This 
therefore put further pressure upon the German military and caused further disillusionment 
in Berlin, where the Vernichtungsbefehl was already unpopular. Several officials in Berlin and 
GSWA, most notably Leutwein, had lamented the Vernichtungsbefehl for various reasons 
deriving from its inhumane nature, but also because the Herero were considered a vital 
source of labour.682 When the Vernichtungsbefehl was retracted by the Kaiser in December 
1904, it was the dawn of a new stage in the conflict which saw the introduction of 
concentration camps.683 Instead of shooting the Herero men and driving the women and 
children back into the desert, the Herero were now to be kept as a source of forced labour 
to develop the colony. Although camps had already been established earlier, December 1904 
was perhaps the moment when they became the key feature and main legacy of German 
colonial rule in GSWA. 
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Concentration Camps and Genocide 
 
The conditions in the concentration camps were abhorrent, and as Casper Erichsen 
describes, the prisoners ‘were deprived of their humanity’ by, for instance, constant beatings 
and rape, as well as being forced to stay ‘huddled together like animals’ by barbed wire.684 
The mortality rate of the prisoners in these camps remains uncertain, but Joachim Zeller 
estimates that between October 1904 and March 1907, out of the total 17,000 prisoners 
(roughly 15,000 Herero and 2,000 Nama), 7,682 (45.2%) died.685  
Several camps were established throughout GSWA, but perhaps the two most 
notable were the Swakopmund camp and the Shark Island camp near Lüderitz. The strategy 
was to send the prisoners away from their respective homelands to strange and foreign 
climates where they had little opportunity to return and were more likely to fall ill. Therefore, 
the Herero were sent south and out to the coast to Shark Island and Swakopmund, while the 
Nama were, at first, sent to Windhoek in the central part of GSWA, before being sent to 
Shark Island later in the conflict.686 Erichsen labels Shark Island as ‘death island’ in his 
thorough study of the concentration camp located there.687 Conversely, however, Jonas 
Kreienbaum suggests that Shark Island, despite the horrors that occurred, was not intended 
for exterminatory purposes because of labour shortage and furthermore, measures were 
taken to attempt to improve the conditions.688 This exposes the contradictory intentions with 
these camps: they were used as labour pools at the same time as they were saw the 
implementation of exterminatory practices. In other words, the German administration 
sought to simultaneously exploit and exterminate. 
 The prisoners at Shark Island and the smaller camp on the mainland were subjected 
to forced labour, as in the other camps throughout GSWA. In Lüderitz, however, the need 
for labour was dire as not only one but two major construction projects were underway: one 
was the construction of the Lüderitzbucht Railway to Kubub and the other was the 
expansion of the harbour.689 Taking the latter as an example, this was a bid for the Germans 
to finally break the monopoly of Walvis Bay so that larger ships could be facilitated in 
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German territory rather than British. Suspiciously, the plans for the expansion of the harbour 
came conveniently at the exact same time as a large number of Nama prisoners arrived in 
October 1906.690 The construction of the harbour included dangerous work such as blowing 
up boulders for a wave breaker, which claimed many casualties. This prompted the technician 
overseeing the construction, Müller, to express his concern, not over the mistreatment of the 
indigenous peoples and their deaths, but also over the potential lack of manpower caused by 
the death toll: 
 
Contrary to the report of the Imperial Harbour Division of October 6, 1906 (…), in which it is expressly 
said that 1600 Nama prisoners will be set at the disposal of the Hafenamt (harbour administration), I now 
have only 30-40 men at my disposal. The desired outcome is therefore not achievable. The reason for 
decline [in productivity] is to be found in the fact that 7-8 Nama die daily. On the 7th of this month as 
many as 17 died in one night. If measures are not actively taken to acquire [new] labourers, I fear the work 
will not be completed.
691  
 
Such clear indication of slavery-like conditions did not suddenly occur as the conflict 
progressed. Indeed, even before Waterberg, there were already plans and considerations 
pertaining to the ‘native question’. The plan of deportation to a distant location where they 
would work as labourers was argued to have an ‘educative’ effect and upon return to GSWA 
and their tribes ‘the fear and subordinance of Germany would spread.’692 While there was a 
widespread sentiment that the Herero were a source of labour that needed to be utilised, 
there were also demands that they were to be punished for their crimes in taking up arms. 
For instance, the settlers in the Grootfontein district expressed ideals embedded in racist 
rhetoric in their view on how the colony should be developed:  
 
Only if the native feels that he works and is subjected to laws, will he be a useful member of the human 
race. In the beginning he will be reluctant to be under the compulsion of the law. The habit of work will 
finally let him realise the benefits of this compulsion. We whites believed these measures to be a necessity 
in order to bring the governments’ authority to the coloured people. This will support the economic 
development of the colony and bring justice and prevent the desire for uprisings.693 
 
Such views were supported by Paul Rohrbach, an expert on the socio-economic sustainability 
of GSWA, who had been a crucial figure for both settlers and the German government 
throughout the period. According to him, it would be healthy for the Herero and Nama to 
be in the service of the Germans as forced labourers, as it would teach them to create value 
and ‘earn a right to existence.’694 Furthermore, the German Consul to the Cape, Baron von 
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Nettelbladt, had directly stated that ‘forced labour appears to be the only satisfactory way of 
dealing with the natives.’695 Indeed, Hartmann probably saw the opportunity to finally create 
the aforementioned ‘mining population’ he so sought after.  
In addition to creating a source of manpower and satisfy demands for punishment, 
the aim of the concentration camp policy was also to reduce the indigenous population. 
There were two main reasons for this: first, by diminishing the numbers of Herero and 
Nama, there would be more land for German settlers to purchase and cultivate. This would, 
in turn, be a pivotal step towards establishing a settler colony, thus realising the Lebensraum 
ideology and creating a German Heimat in Africa. Secondly, if their numbers were 
significantly reduced, the Reichskolonialamt were more likely to be persuaded into deporting 
these peoples altogether, as it would be done at a lesser expense.696 Therefore, the intention 
of the Shark Island death camp was undoubtedly the extermination of its inmates, either by 
working them to death or by leaving them to die of starvation and disease.  
 
One further characteristic of these camps is also their connection to the scientific racialism 
at the time. From these camps, a large number of Herero and Nama skulls were exported to 
universities and institutes in Germany for craniometrical purposes. As camp officer Ralph 
Zürn stated, ‘taking and preserving skulls of the prisoners would be more readily possible in 
the camps than in the country where there is always the danger of offending the natives.’ 
Olusoga and Erichsen, in their account of the horrors in the Shark Island camp, describes 
how Herero and Nama women were forced to boil and scrape off the flesh of the severed 
heads of fellow prisoners.697 Anthropologists believed skulls to be an object in which racial 
inferiority (or superiority) could be observed. For instance, Hermann Schaafhausen, a 
prominent German anthropologist, associated the position of jaws to the ‘evolutionary stage’ 
of different human races, for ‘when the jaws push forward, the forehead remains behind. 
Where the urge to eat prevails, thinking is less developed. This is an indicator of low cultural 
development.’698 
Indeed, the reason for these camps was not merely practical to secure a source of 
forced labour and as a means to counter guerrilla warfare: there was also an aspect of revenge 
behind it. The gradual radicalisation of the conflict from colonial uprising to total war and 
then to genocide had been sustained by a prevailing dehumanisation of Africans which had 
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been promoted by scientific racialism.699 This may explain the radical policies and actions 
taken by German officials, and furthermore, gives inclination to drawing connections to the 
Holocaust. It presents a startling resemblance to the later horrors of the Holocaust and 
therefore connections through time cannot and should not be completely refuted. Yet it 
remains problematic if these are deterministically over-emphasised by, for instance, 
suggesting outright causality, because continuities and developments through time are often 
subtle. Indeed, the connection between anthropologists in Germany and the authorities in 
GSWA does not automatically mean that it was a gateway for introducing Nazi ideals into 
the German state and national identity. German anthropologists were not alone in perceiving 
skulls as an object through which to study race nor were they alone in collecting them.  
Anthropology, largely being an ‘armchair science’, was based in Europe, with 
relatively few field trips being conducted. The concentration camps therefore facilitated a 
cheap and efficient way of gathering objects for anthropological studies. But there can be 
little doubt that the mistreatment of the Herero and Nama at Shark Island and elsewhere 
were the culmination of colonial rule embedded in racial rhetoric and convictions. This was 
not only expressed by the concentration camps policy, but also by different administrative 
acts such as ordinances on the use and type of sjamboks, which indicates the close relations 
between the colonial administration and violent practices in GSWA.700  
 
A New Casement Report?  
 
In April 1905, Colonel Frederick Trench was sent by the British to GSWA as a Military 
Attaché in a move undoubtedly intended to keep a check on the movements and fighting 
strength of the Schutztruppe should it pose a threat to British territory and interests. Trench 
was persona grata in the German court and was acquainted with the Kaiser himself.701 Over 
the course of the campaign in GSWA Trench transmitted numerous reports to the authorities 
in Cape Town, who then forwarded them to Whitehall. These reports were substantial and 
very detailed and mostly concerned issues as unexciting as the setting up of fences and the 
digging of wells. However, regarding the concentration camps, these reports remain some of 
the most profound and compelling contemporary evidence of the horrors that unfolded. 
Upon visiting the camps, Trench reported that ‘the number of prisoners at the hands 
of the authorities at Lüderitzbucht, Swakopmund etc. does not increase. The Chief Staff 
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Officer tells me that of the 7000 Herero, Hottentots etc. 500 die every month on an average. 
“The sea air and the food they get do not agree with them!”’702 When Trench visited Lüderitz 
in March 1906, it was in many ways the culmination of the aforementioned racist perceptions 
that had come to fruition, which met him at Shark Island. The report not only notified the 
British and Cape authorities to the slave-like conditions discussed above, but also gave clear 
indications regarding the conditions within the camp itself, in which the horrendous state of 
the prisoners was vividly described: 
 
They look very feeble, and the camp out among a lot of rocks is very wretched and filthy. There seems to 
be absolutely no attempt at sanitation and, though it is cold enough for officers to wear their cloaks on 
their way to a mess evening, the prisoners seem to have no clothing save a blanket or so, and no shelter 
save what they can rig up for themselves with sacks etc. The island is much exposed to the cold S.S.W wind 
– which always seems to blow here – and dysentery and pneumonia seem prevalent as before. Dante might 
have written a notice for the gate.
703 
 
The reference to Dante’s tale of the inferno, in particular, has sparked attention by scholars 
and is used to illustrate the horrors that unfolded at Shark Island as well as exhibiting an 
unwitting foreshadowing of the ‘arbeit macht frei’ sign at the concentration camps of Nazi 
Germany. Trench also came across information about the Nama who had been deported to 
Togo, where ‘I understand that 90% of the Witbooi soldiers who fought for the Germans 
against the Herero are already dead.’704 Clearly the British were well aware of what happened 
at Shark Island and beyond. Their knowledge was not restricted purely to the excessive 
violence employed by the Schutztruppe in the actual warfare itself, but also included detailed 
knowledge about the treatment of entire indigenous peoples in GSWA, whether rebels or 
not.  
Trench’s reports on the treatment of the prisoners confirmed the accounts given by 
refugees when they crossed into British territory.705 However, virtually none of these were 
included in official correspondence and they would therefore only be accessible – if at all – 
in Southern Africa, whether in Namibia or South Africa.706 Trench was the man-on-the-spot 
for Britain and therefore these reports remain valuable sources that represent perhaps the 
most vivid evidence circulated in Whitehall on the genocide. Indeed, Trench visited many 
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places where he could personally visit the concentration or ‘prisoner camps’. What is notable 
here is the different treatment in the camps of Shark Island and Swakopmund. Of course, 
both were horrific, but in Swakopmund, where the majority of inmates were Herero, the 
conditions were, in comparison, less appalling: 
 
Both men and women are strong and healthy – and very different to the wretched people at Lüderitzbucht. 
They are said to get a lot of food from the people they work for and with – they could not do the work 
they do on their official ration. They get no pay whatever, although the Governor contemplates giving the 
best workers a couple of shillings, or so, a month, in future.
707 
 
The Herero prisoners at Swakopmund, although Trench claims them to be in a healthy 
condition, were nonetheless used as forced labourers in a state reminiscent to slavery. As for 
the Herero women, Trench noted that ‘the handsome are very well dressed while the plain 
ones go in sack-cloths and rags. Verbum Sap.’708 The reference to the handsome Herero 
women, therefore, suggests that they were used by the Germans as sexual slaves, or were 
victims of consistent rape.709 As Erichsen has shown, ‘the uncommon climate, general 
maltreatment and forced labour were all part of daily existence.’710 The camp, made up of 
iron sheets, was administrated by the military, and the majority of the Herero inmates were 
women and children. This was not because the men were kept separate, for women and 
children too were used as forced labourers: rather, it was because most of the men had 
already been killed.711  
The statements by Trench in his reports were written in a way that suggests a possible 
censure imposed by the Germans. It seems feasible that the military command would not 
allow him to transmit such clear evidence to his superiors, but at the same time, receiving 
such reports also posed potential problems in Whitehall. Trench’s reports showcase the 
detailed knowledge the British government had of the atrocities in GSWA while they were 
unfolding. Yet, as had been done with reports on military misconduct in Southern Rhodesia, 
it was imperative for Whitehall to keep these reports and other pieces of undisputable 
evidence away from public attention because otherwise they could stir public opinion and 
reinvigorate the humanitarian criticism that was unfolding through the CRM. In other words, 
Trench’s reports could potentially present the British government with a new Casement 
Report.  
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The South African Precursor 
 
With all these incidents and different measures of colonial violence perpetrated by the 
Germans, it remains to ascertain why this has been categorised as a genocide and how the 
concentration camp policy can be contextualised. One of the main reasons for the continuity 
thesis linking GSWA to the Holocaust about forty years later is the concentration camps 
used by the German authorities to hold prisoners. The concentration camp was not a 
German invention but was first used by the Spanish in Cuba and the Americans in the 
Philippines in 1898, before the more commonly known camps established by the British 
during the South African War. Nevertheless, the camps in GSWA have more frequently been 
associated with the camps in the Third Reich rather than the otherwise more geographically 
and chronologically appropriate linkage to the South African War in 1899-1902.712 Although 
the continuity thesis of ‘from Africa to Auschwitz’ remains symptomatic of a deterministic 
approach in which a contemporary context is generally ignored, there were clear differences 
between the concentration camps of GSWA and those of the South African War.713 
Therefore, it remains crucial to understand Britain’s own experiences with concentration 
camps in order to scrutinise their perception of the German use of this same practice in 
GSWA.  
The conditions of the concentration camps during the South African War were 
atrocious and saw a high death toll – especially among children. Camps were also established 
for African internees in South Africa which were perhaps more comparable to those in 
GSWA in terms of practices such as coerced labour and housing arrangements.714 However, 
in terms of scale, they were incomparable to those in GSWA. According to Peter Warwick, 
the death toll of the ‘black’ South African camps may have been around 14,000 and the death 
toll in the ‘white camps’ about 26,000.715 Furthermore, the mortality rate for Africans in these 
camps was, in fact, lower than that of the Boers (approximately 12% compared to 25%), 
which suggests that the camps in South Afric were not intentionally seeking the deprivation 
and death of the inmates. Indeed, while they cannot be vindicated, the concentration camps 
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during the South African War had high death tolls because of logistical shortages, general 
maladministration and outbreaks of measles.716 
Nevertheless, the camps established for the Herero and Nama prisoners were 
undoubtedly inspired by the camps set up by the British in South Africa.717 Yet, for the 
Germans, the camps in South Africa had been far worse because they held white prisoners.718 
However, the key difference between the camps in South Africa and those in GSWA was 
the intention behind them.  In South Africa, the Boer population was designated as ‘refugees’ 
and were under ‘protective custody.’719 The main aim was to curb the Boer guerrillas, whereas 
the Herero and Nama were ‘rebellious prisoners.’ As Kreienbaum notes, although the camps 
in GSWA were inspired by those of the South African War, the only clear ‘transferable 
aspect’ was the internment in guarded camps of women and children, since there was less of 
a guerrilla war in GSWA.720 However, this is only partially true, for while the Herero rarely 
employed guerrilla tactics, the Nama did. But unlike the Boers a few years beforehand, the 
Nama did not rely on a civil population to sustain their efforts: instead, they raided farms 
and conducted trade, mainly with African communities residing in British territory. Yet the 
Germans held Nama women and children regardless, indicating that unlike the camps in 
South Africa, these had more sinister and genocidal intentions. The British concentration 
camps had a rationale deduced from a military aspect of preventing Boer bittereinders to access 
supplies, but in GSWA, the prisoners posed no military threat. The Herero and Nama were 
kept far away from any conflict zones and the camps continued to operate long after the 
main fighting had ceased.  For instance, while the Herero resistance was virtually gone by 
1905-6, the prisoners were kept in these camps until 1908, when the camps were finally 
closed.  
This difference in terms of the purpose and intention of the concentration camp 
policy in South Africa and GSWA respectively also reveals why the former has not been 
defined as a genocide, whereas the latter has. Indeed, intention is generally considered a crucial 
defining factor that constitutes whether or not acts of mass violence can be categorised as 
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genocide.721 The definition of the term ‘genocide’ is a widely discussed subject, especially 
since the inventor of the term, Raphael Lemkin, himself found many inconsistencies and 
problems in applying it.722 Although the broader theme of genocide cannot be fully explored 
here, it is worth ascertaining how the atrocities in GSWA has been categorised as such. 
Considering the plain intentions exemplified by the Vernichtungsbefehl, there can be little doubt 
as to the sinister motives of the Germans. Nevertheless, there has been critique of the 
labelling of this affair as a genocide. The most well-known critics were Gunther Spraul and 
Brigitte Lau. Spraul pointed to the uncertainty of the mortality rate as a crucial aspect that 
has been neglected in characterising the violence in GSWA.723 Lau lamented the evidence of 
the Blue Book and questioned its credibility as a source to argue against the classification of 
genocide in GSWA.724 
 The 1948 UN Convention on genocide, which laid out an official and internationally 
acknowledged definition, listed various acts as genocidal, such as killing members of a 
‘targeted’ group, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and ‘deliberately’ infliction 
conditions of life that will bring about the physical destruction of the group.725 Indeed, as 
Bethencourt has observed, the events in GSWA in 1904-8 thus clearly fulfil these criteria, 
categorising it as a genocide.726 However, as Dirk Moses has noted, ‘genocide is to be 
explained as the outcome of complex processes rather than ascribable solely to the evil 
intentions of wicked men.’727 It is therefore not enough merely to uncover the intention of 
the Germans in GSWA, but also the methods which they applied and the relations between 
perpetrator and victim. Thus, the application of concentration camps and their continued 
use after the fighting was over, in areas far away from the fighting, serves to prove that what 
unfolded in GSWA 1904-8 can be categorised as a genocide. Not only were the intentions 
plain but practices of extermination were also in place.  
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According to Lemkin, colonial genocides occurred when the majority group could 
not be absorbed by the minority rulers.728 In other words, the Herero and Nama posed a 
hindrance to the hegemony of German colonialism, and to overcome this problem, the 
conflict was radicalised and became a genocide to completely subjugate the Herero and 
Nama.729  As shown above, the conflict in GSWA was gradually radicalised as the conflict 
escalated and the Herero and Nama were continuously dehumanised. Furthermore, it 
adheres to the general conception in the historiography that the Nama and especially the 
Herero posed a hindrance to German colonialism. Therefore, after their defeat, the Herero 
would then ‘perform work services and have their property removed’ as well as having their 
entire territory annexed.730 This would enable German settlers to legally obtain the old Herero 
territory, which was the most fertile for cattle herding, providing the Germans with full 
control of the economy and resources. 
However, applying the term ‘genocide’ to the affair in GSWA, while correct, also has 
consequences. Genocide was officially adopted as a term in 1948 in the wake of the horrors 
of the Holocaust, and therefore, applying the term to any given situation prior to the 
Holocaust is, to an extent, reductionist. More precisely, it reduces the genocide in GSWA to 
a precursor to the Holocaust. Certainly, similarities such as the concentration camps and the 
clear statements of exterminatory intent remain convincing parallels that invite the study of 
the genocide in GSWA as a historical precursor. But considering the context of colonial 
methods employed by the British and others, the concentration camps in South Africa, 
despite key dissimilarities, were indeed more comparable than those of the Holocaust.731 
Indeed, considering GSWA a precursor diminishes the colonial context and confines the 
Herero and Nama war and genocide within German history, since the main connection is 
that the perpetrator in both cases was the German state. 
 
The general perception and response to the concentration camps in GSWA by British 
officials can only have been significantly influenced by the recent polemic they had 
experienced with the concentration camps of the South African war a few years prior. At the 
time, it was subject to heavy criticism both internationally and domestically.732 Germany, 
being an ardent supporter of Boer independence, was one of the most vocal critics of this 
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practice. At home, the British government were dealing with various humanitarian groups 
and actors, perhaps most notably Emily Hobhouse, whom Alfred Milner referred to as ‘that 
bloody woman’ due to her meddling.733 This witnesses the place of such excessive colonial 
practices in the political arena – both domestically and internationally.  
Therefore, when Germany established camps in GSWA where the inmates were 
deliberately being killed, it should – in theory – have been subject to heavy criticism, both in 
Germany and internationally. It would even present an opportunity for the British to claim 
a sense of moral vengeance against Germany for its criticism of Kitchener’s concentration 
camps and for their outright support for the Boers, especially since they had clear evidence 
from Trench. Of course, one factor that ensured that this did not happen may have been the 
fact that this time it was Africans and not whites who were suffering in the camps. However, 
another reason may be found in the Congo crisis, which was blazing at the time. 
Humanitarian groups were demanding that the conduct and administration of the European 
colonial regimes be scrutinised and to follow humane principles and uphold the rights of the 
indigenous peoples. Thus, at the time, imperialism was under severe scrutiny, and if Britain 
in 1904-8 wished to exhibit Germany as a new King Leopold, an unfit and cruel colonial 
oppressor, the time was ideal. Yet, the British government decided not to take action and 
exhibit the colonial maladministration of Germany to the public. They chose to uphold a 
colonial omerta and kept their knowledge of these atrocities to themselves until it could more 
purposefully be used. This suggests that Britain had no interests in showcasing Germany as 
an unfit colonial power in 1904-8. Considering the previous entanglements of GSWA and 
British South Africa, it may be considered whether British involvement was a reason to 
suppress such information. Therefore, it is imperative to investigate the British stance and 
interests towards the conflict as it unfolded and to assess the extent and nature of British 
involvement in this violent affair. 
 
 
Between Collaboration and Anxiety: The ‘Friendly’ Neutrality of Britain 
 
Ulrike Lindner terms Britain’s stance towards the war in GSWA ‘friendly neutrality.’734  Such 
friendly stance may have been reinforced by a purely economic perspective in which the war 
in GSWA was also to the Cape’s benefit as the investments made by Germany to quell the 
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rebellion soon found their way into British hands through trade, contracts and supply 
materials, particularly for railroads.735 Ever since the South African War, the economy had 
struggled. Therefore, when exports to GSWA increased due to the war, the Cape 
Government was willing to ‘shut their eyes to the real destination of supplies’ bought by the 
Germans. In fact, by the end of 1905, exports to GSWA were of such proportions that the 
Cape market was almost exhausted of mules and horses, causing the authorities to be 
concerned as to the accessibility of these animals for the Cape forces in case of war.736 These 
supplies constituted outright support for Germany and revealed that the friendly neutrality 
stance was perhaps too friendly at times.737  
However, the stance remained rather ambiguous, for at the end of 1904 the Germans 
stored ammunition at Port Nolloth in British territory, fearing that if it were stored in GSWA, 
it would be a target of guerrilla raids. The British administration, upon learning such news 
decided to immediately close the border for trade, which immobilised the German war effort 
in southern GSWA. The border was later re-opened, but only for civilian goods.738 However, 
the Governor of the Cape, Walter Hely-Hutchinson, remained suspicious about the cross-
border trade between the two colonies. In a letter to High Commissioner to South Africa, 
Selborne, he informed him that ‘although there is not any conclusive proof, we have always 
felt sure that much of the supplies allowed to pass for the civil population have been used 
for the troops.’ Furthermore, he had decided not to pass this information on to the 
government ‘as I wish to avoid any step tending to embarrass the relations between the 
German Government and His Majesty’s Government.’739 This conforms to Dedering’s 
argument that one of the main issues at stake in the British border policy towards GSWA 
was the global political consequences, where it was not in the interest of British officials, 
particularly in London, to provoke Germany. Another key issue, according to Dedering, was 
the political and security interests of the Cape, where the British were afraid to exacerbate 
the existing dissatisfaction among their African subjects.740 Indicative hereof is the secret 
telegram responding to Hutchinson’s above letter, ‘His Majesty’s Government desire to give 
Germans every facility which can be given without exciting natives on the British side, but 
the latter consideration must be paramount.’741  
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British officials were therefore willing to help the German war effort, but only if it 
did not affect British foreign policies nor ‘excite’ the Africans in British territory. A few 
months after the correspondence between Hutchinson and Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton, on the extent of British support, a confidential military report 
may have caused their concerns to be worsened:  
 
The native chiefs complain bitterly of the way in which the British Government is assisting the Germans. 
This seems a short-sighted policy as it seems to show that we have forgotten the assistance these natives 





Despite such clear concerns, the Germans continued to import supplies from the Cape 
undercover, which had to be permitted by British authorities.743 British officials, therefore, 
were attempting to help the Germans as much as they could because by helping them, they 
could reduce unwanted German activity and the number of German troops in the region and 
thus send the message to Germany that they were dependent on ‘British goodwill in 
Southwestern Africa.’744 Therefore, at the same time as being interested and entangled to the 
situation in GSWA, Britain was also deterred by it: the border trade could benefit the Cape 
in recovering and be of diplomatic importance for relations with Germany, but it could also 
cause a rebellion in British territory, as it angered the Africans.  
In 1904 German Foreign Minister Baron von Richthofen enquired if it was possible 
to send supplies through British territory free of duty and in return offer duty-free trade for 
the British through GSWA. Initially, this offer was rejected, but a counteroffer where the 
Germans would connect Walvis Bay to the then under construction railways in GSWA, was 
accepted.745 Walvis Bay was key to Anglo-German relations relating to the war: it was the 
main harbour on the coast, and thus, a railway line, while being beneficial for the Germans, 
would also be welcomed by the British. This is proven, as the diplomatic negotiations on this 
matter soon developed to the question of German military access through Walvis Bay. Frank 
Lascelles, the British ambassador to Germany, believed that granting this access would prove 
to be counterproductive. He argued that ‘any action of the kind on our part might have a 
dangerous effect upon the tribes in British territory. Their attitude towards us might be 
considerably modified if they had reason to suppose that we were in any way co-operating 
with the German Government against the Herero’.746  
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Therefore, British support for the Germans was an ambiguous case: they could use 
the war as leverage to acquire railroad connections to Walvis Bay and there was also a 
significant interest not only in aiding their European comrades but also in ending the war 
quickly, as fears persisted that it would spread into British territory, as will be discussed 
below. Therefore, the British continued to help the Germans by, for instance, reporting on 
the movement of rebels.747 Moreover, they also allowed the Germans to have stores in British 
territory holding weapons and ammunition, where German soldiers could sneak across the 
border without the Herero or Nama noticing. This way, they were kept resupplied on the 
frontline and their stores were spared from being raided.748 
Another aspect of Anglo-German collaboration was that of volunteers from all over 
the British Empire who expressed their interest in joining the Schutztruppe. Indeed, this may 
have been out of an incitement of ‘white solidarity’ in the colonial world, as best illustrated 
by an article in The Times stating that ‘a natural bond links together white settlers, of whatever 
nationality, amid the teeming black population of the African continent.’749 Such sentiment 
may have been widespread, as the German consulate in Auckland, New Zealand reported on 
a group of veterans from the South African War who had made inquiries as to whether they 
could volunteer for service in GSWA.750 This is interesting from several perspectives: it not 
only shows the transnational, even global, networks of empires as interwoven and entangled 
entities, but also reveals the existence a colonial identity, not only regional but again globally. 
It was a case where British subjects, as far away as New Zealand, considered themselves 
suitable to join a German force in a colonial war. Thus, it gives indications to the racial 
solidarity between Europeans in subjugating non-Europeans throughout the globe. 
However, from the perspective of British and German officials, this issue was also one of 
suspicion and antagonism. Soon after the Herero rebellion had broken out, a British subject 
called N.R. Dawson appeared before the German Imperial Consulate in Cape Town and 
‘offered to go with 200 volunteers to GSWA to fight against the insurgents.’ Bearing in mind 
that Dawson’s offer came at a time when the Herero had the upper hand in the war, it is 
perhaps surprising that the offer was turned down because ‘the Imperial Government does 
not need the support of a volunteer corps.’ Upon hearing this rejection, however, Dawson 
was reported to have replied that ‘if he was not allowed to fight on the German side, he 
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would support the insurgents.’751 This, of course, led to German suspicions towards both the 
British and South African governments, but also toward British subjects in the region. 
Britain’s friendly neutrality, therefore, was not a straightforward case of Britain seeking to 
assist Germany behind the scenes. It was a policy of walking on eggshells, fearing any spill-
over effect from GSWA, whether it was in the shape of angering the Germans or the Africans 
within their own territory. Yet, Britain could not avoid being involved in terms of supplies 
and trade across the border, which forced the authorities to, in effect, choose a side.  
The collaboration between Britain and Germany were not as straightforward as 
argued by both Drechsler and Michael Fröhlich, who claimed that it was a white imperialist 
coalition embedded in ‘racial solidarity’ against African resistance.752 If there was such 
solidarity, it may have been in the shape of volunteers and not state actors in London or the 
Cape. Yet, as shown here, it cannot be simply labelled as an example of ‘racial solidarity’, 
since these volunteers may have joined and supported the African rebels when their offer 
was turned down. However, it is important to stress that this does not mean that Britain was 
completely reticent in assisting Germany in their colonial war; rather, they did so, but not by 
outright support in the shape of a policy directed from London. Instead, the collaboration 
with Germany during its colonial war was more ad hoc. Britain was willing to send supplies 
and trade, give information on movements etc., but this was limited and impromptu. 
Therefore, there was no direct policy decided by the British Government on how to act and 
collaborate with the Germans – or indeed the Africans. The rather chaotic, ambiguous and 
sometimes even contradictory issues that arose from the lack of a clear directive are perhaps 
best illustrated by the Marengo affair. 
 
The Marengo Affair 
 
Before the war, Jakob Marengo753 had worked in the O’kiep Cooper Mines in the northern 
part of the Cape Colony. With the rising of the Bondelswarts in 1903, however, he returned 
to GSWA and successfully led a band in the war against the Germans. In fact, his success 
was such that after the conclusion of peace with the Bondelswarts, the Germans still opted 
to brand him a brigand and an outlaw.754 Marengo, therefore, continued his struggle against 
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the Germans during the Herero war and thus preceded the later Nama rebellion. His guerrilla 
attacks upon the German troops were remarkably successful, and since he continuously 
crossed the border into British territory, the Germans were unable to capture him. According 
to Drechsler, Marengo’s aim was to replace German colonial rule in GSWA with British.755 
Nevertheless, even if Marengo held such intentions, it is only a sad irony that it was the 
British who eventually killed him.  
Despite Marengo having used the border as a way to evade German forces as early 
as 1904, it was not until the very last stage of the rebellion that the Germans succeeded in 
acquiring the co-operation of the British. When Marengo crossed into British territory to 
evade German troops and received help from indigenous peoples across the border, D.H 
von Jacobs at the German consulate in British South Africa asked the British to intervene 
and prevent Marengo from getting support by arresting his allies.756 The South African 
government responded that it was ‘prepared to do everything possible’ to prevent Marengo’s 
allies from assisting him from British territory and that it would ‘issue instructions to the 
Police Authorities to prevent co-operation between the natives of this Colony and the 
rebellious tribes in German South West Africa; and further, that any armed natives from 
German South West Africa, if found in this colony, are to be taken into custody and 
disarmed.’757 Eventually, however, Marengo’s cross-border resistance was subdued by the 
growing number of German troops, and after a skirmish at the beginning of May 1906, he 
gave himself up to the Cape authorities and was detained in Tokai Prison, far away from the 
border.758 
The Anglo-German border in Southern Africa stretched for thousands of miles, 
rendering the Cape Mounted Police unable to cover the entire area. Therefore, Marengo kept 
receiving support and moving across the border.  This is proven by a report from Trench on 
a German military memorandum lamenting the lack of British support. 
 
The hostile Hottentots are strongly supported by the members of their clan beyond the frontier and obtain 
from thence ammunition, clothing and supplies. They are able by reinforcements from the Cape Colony to 
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The Germans were well aware of Marengo’s movements across the border. In GSWA, 
Marengo operated from the Karrasberge in the south, where the rugged terrain not only 
suited his guerrilla tactics, but also allowed easy access across the border. Eventually, in order 
to prevent the ‘cattle thieves’ from crossing at liberty, troops were requested to be sent to 
the southern parts of GSWA.760 However, Marengo continued to evade capture and inflicted 
the Germans several losses.  
 
In the beginning of May we received news that Captain Beeck had pursued the Hottentot-leader Morenga 
for five miles before English territory and the skirmish continued despite objections was raised by the 
English police. The Cape Government and the press took the affair rather calm; British Army Officers 
assured me that they would have acted similarly. A few days later the news from the British border police 




German authorities were informed by British police about Marengo’s movements and even 
received their sympathies despite having illegally crossed the border. Nevertheless, from a 
German perspective, the alleged lack of British collaboration on the border continued to 
hinder them in securing victory. Indeed, von Trotha had explained that ‘a greater solidarity 
of action between the British and German authorities would be desirable’, and this, he 
claimed, was also in the interest of the British, ‘as all white men in South Africa should hold 
together against the natives.’762 
On the one hand, the British agreed to this by detaining Marengo upon his surrender, 
but on the other, they refused to extradite him despite continuous Germans requests.763 The 
war in GSWA ended – officially – in late March 1907 and as such, there was no apparent 
reason for the British to keep Marengo in prison. Upon his release in June 1907, the Germans 
immediately expressed their concerns that Marengo would return to GSWA in order to re-
instigate a rebellion in the south.764 Yet, ‘the Government of the Cape Colony had no power 
to prevent Marengo, by force, from returning to GSWA.’765 Despite Cape officials informing 
the Germans that they found it unlikely that Marengo would cross the border – which he 
would, in fact, do soon – the Germans were infuriated by such direct lack of willingness to 
co-operate.  
What followed reveals a chain of command within British colonial governance. 
Indeed, as the Cape authorities did not share the Germans’ concern, the Germans therefore 
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turned to the FO in London. The German ambassador in London, Count von Metternich, 
complained to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, no later than the day after the above 
communication: 
 
…as the Government of the Cape Colony feel bound to refuse Morenga’s extradition, the Imperial 
Government would feel much obliged if, considering the grave situation, His Majesty’s Government could 





Grey, the great humanist during the Congo crisis, wasted no time in communicating to Lord 
Elgin in the CO, and requested that the matter be ‘dealt with it at once’ by having the Cape 
Government remove Marengo from the border: ‘If they do not extradite him, they ought at 
any rate to see he does not stir up trouble.’767 Soon after, Elgin returned to Grey informing 
him that Hutchinson had reported that ‘immediate action’ was to be taken and that it was 
‘obligatory for the Cape Colony to render assistance.’768 This enabled Grey to finally let the 
Metternich and the German Government know that ‘the Cape Government consider it the 
duty to render assistance’ to Germany and that instructions had been given to bring in 
Marengo and send him away from the vicinity of the border and not to let him out of their 
sight.769 
Having complained first to the Cape authorities without any success, and then to 
Whitehall with limited success, the Germans now tried to sway Britain’s stance towards 
Marengo through another channel. While on holiday at Marienbad Spa in Bohemia, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II informed his uncle, King Edward VII, that he was worried that the conflict in 
GSWA would reignite should Marengo successfully cross the border. The Kaiser therefore 
pleaded that ‘it is very desirable this dangerous rebellion should finally be quelled. Will your 
Government compel Cape Government to assist us?’770 Immediately British policy towards 
Marengo changed and Grey responded: ‘Please inform His Majesty that in consequence of 
rumours respecting Marengo’s movements, orders for his arrest has been issued.’ 
Furthermore, Marengo was no longer to be granted asylum in British territory and would 
therefore be arrested or driven back into German territory.771 Clearly, when the King became 
involved, the previous stance in which they were unable to prevent Marengo from going 
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back, was changed to a direct policy of kill or capture. To put it frankly, Edward VII, perhaps 
unwittingly, gave Marengo his de facto death sentence.  
From the perspective of Whitehall, once King and Kaiser were involved there could 
be little incentive not to appease Germany over a matter as trivial as Marengo. Therefore, 
there was a change in policy towards Marengo in August 1907 when he crossed into GSWA. 
However, while this change may be seen in the context of local matters, the policy and 
eventual killing of Marengo should also be seen in a broader context. On 31 August 1907, 
Britain had signed the Anglo-Russian treaty, conventionally considered to be step towards 
the First World War, as it completed the encirclement of Germany through the British, 
French and Russian alliances. In such a fragile diplomatic climate, British actors may well 
have seen a convenient and cheap way to appease and reconcile with Germany by 
collaborating against Marengo. Indeed, Elgin made Hutchinson know that ‘It would create 
bad impression if anything which takes place on British territory is responsible for a renewed 
outbreak.’772 Nevertheless, Marengo had already crossed into GSWA and Grey therefore 
immediately had to apologise to Berlin, promising his full co-operation in the future.773 
Upon crossing the border, however, Marengo was met with a German force that 
defeated him at Ukumas on 8 September 1907.774 The Germans kept the British well 
informed as to the operation and vice versa. Marengo eventually fled back into British 
territory, where the arrest warrant for him was still in place. Major Elliot of the Cape 
Mounted Police was sent out to seize Marengo and his small band (approximately twenty 
men and women) at Gamsebkloof. Elliot’s approach to his orders of arresting Marengo was 
that ‘I shall request Marengo to accompany me to Upington, failing which, provided position 
is not too strong, shall open fire.’775 Marengo was therefore seen as a major threat to both 
British and German colonial rule, as illustrated by a British newspaper that called him ‘a 
South African Rob Roy.’776 Indeed, this stance of non-negotiation from the British may have 
arisen from the belief that ‘a retreat on our part would be disastrous and would increase 
Marengo’s prestige tenfold’ and as such, that he could be an instigator of a regional cross-
border uprising, particularly now when Britain had chosen its side.777 However, Elliot may 
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also have been tempted by the prize of 20,000 Marks which the Kaiser had put on Marengo’s 
head.778 
Marengo therefore had little choice; either continue to fight or surrender willingly 
and be handed over to the Schutztruppe, given Britain’s newfound friendship with Germany 
on the matter. In a report dated 21 September 1907, Hutchinson informed Elgin that Elliot 
had killed Marengo and that there was ‘no further fear of trouble.’779 The skirmish in which 
Marengo and his followers were killed was one of excessive violence: an estimated 5,000 
bullets were fired at the cave in which they were hiding and the onslaught was of such severity 
that Elliot, in admitting the brutality of the affair, may have coined the term ‘overkill’.780  
When juxtaposing the Blue Book’s description of this particular event with 
contemporary source material, the role and perceptions of the British in 1918 appear untrue. 
The Blue Book describes it as a lamentable exception, pitying ‘that even one British bullet 
should have aided in that horrible outpouring of human blood.’781 Another noteworthy 
perspective on this particular affair, from as late as 1916, was British historian and traveller 
Albert Calvert, who believed that Britain had merely assisted Germany in killing an outlaw. 
Instead, the killing of Marengo was for Calvert a moment of pride which ‘fanned the jealousy 
of German officials’ as Elliot received the Kaiser Medallie.782 Of course, Calvert wrote in the 
context of the First World War, which had at that time not yet been concluded. His views 
therefore, do not, unlike the Blue Book, echo a diplomatic intention, but rather a jingoistic 
smear. Indicatively, he did not deride German colonialism for its violent methods, but for its 
failure to employ these methods efficiently.783  
As Fröhlich has argued, the Marengo affair, seen from the metropole, was a case 
where intensive co-operation between the British and German governments succeeded.784 
But it also revealed a formal link between the German and British military in Southern Africa 
which not only indicates that information and awareness of methods of oppression were 
shared, but also that the success of Anglo-German colonial collaboration was openly 
celebrated. Indeed, Hutchinson spared little time to communicate to Governor Lindequist 
in expressing his pleasure of the Anglo-German collaboration in killing Marengo and asking 
that he should convey his acknowledgement to Captain von Hagen who had assisted Major 
                                                 
 
778 Walter Nuhn, Feind überall, Der Groβe Nama-Aufstand (Hottentottenaufstand) 1904-1908 in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 
(Namibia) – Der erste Partisanenkrieg in der Geschichte der deutschen Armee (Bonn, 2000), 248.  
779 TNA: FO 367/63: CO to FO, 21 September 1907, enclosed in Hutchinson to Elgin, 24 September 1907. 
780 Masson, ‘A Fragment of Colonial History’, 255. 
781 Administrator’s Office, ‘Report on the Natives’, 168. 
782 Albert Calvert, South West Africa during the German occupation 1894-1914 (London, 1916), 32. 
783 Calvert, South West Africa, 8. Also, Bomholt Nielsen, ‘Selective Memory’, 321-22. 
784 Fröhlich, Von Konfrontation zur Koexistenz, 262-63. 
179 
 
Elliot.785 In London too, rejoicing over Anglo-German collaboration was evident. Indeed, 
Frank Lascelles reported to Grey in the FO after Marengo had been killed that the Cape’s 
support in the Marengo affair had effectively ‘won Germany’s war’, as the rebellion ‘may 
now be considered completely quelled and the press have already proclaimed that now at any 
rate there is no possible reason to delay sending home the troops.’786 
The Marengo affair remained at the crux of changing diplomatic relations between 
Britain and Germany: it was first celebrated, only to be excused when it revealed the intimate 
relationship between colonial powers in the face of indigenous resistance. The Marengo affair 
therefore serves as a microcosm of the intersections of colonial rivalry and collaboration: it 
reveals how Anglo-German collaboration was underpinned by broader foreign policy 
interests, colonial stakes and general anxieties. Indeed, co-operation was here deemed to be 
in the interest of both Whitehall and the Cape, as it could appease Germany and see the 
conflict in GSWA move closer to peace, which would promote further stability in the region. 
Nevertheless, the Marengo affair also reveals how the Cape was far more reluctant and 
disinterested in collaboration with Germany, possibly because they feared a backlash or 
spread of African resistance, which officials in Whitehall considered unimportant compared 
to relations with Germany.  
On the whole, Britain’s involvement in the conflict in GSWA suggests a degree of 
collaboration with Germany, in contrast to the otherwise prevailing notion of rivalry between 
the colonial powers. Yet it also showcases how collaboration was not the only feature, for it 
co-existed alongside antagonistic tendencies and actions that can best be understood from 
the premise of increasing rivalry. Marengo posed problems both for the colonial authorities 
seeking further stability and for the diplomatic situation in Europe, but still outright 
assistance to Germany was not given until it became too costly not to do so. Marengo had 
remained in the Cape for years and his extradition was consistently refused: it was only with 
the interference of the Kaiser that Britain sought to assist. Of course, this event, while 
celebrated prior to 1914, served as a case of hypocrisy for the moralistic arguments of the 
Blue Book, wherein Germany was to be depicted as the main culprit, with Britain being a 
bystander, not aware of nor participating in the conflict. The Marengo affair, therefore, was 
a stark contrast that illustrates the reality and contrast of pre-and post-war perceptions of 
German colonial rule and violence. 
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German Suspicions and British Anxieties 
 
The Marengo affair illustrates the cross-border and trans-colonial aspect of colonial wars and 
their potential to impact other colonial powers. Indeed, the fear of a spill-over effect was 
perhaps the most prominent issue in the official mind when perceiving a war in a 
neighbouring colony. Therefore, in order to fully comprehend how British officials perceived 
German colonial rule and warfare, it is important to ascertain what they actually believed was 
at stake. In other words, what scenarios, fears and possibilities arose from the conflict in a 
neighbouring colony?  
From the British perspective, there were, in general, three geopolitical concerns 
which originated from the conflict in GSWA. The first issue was that of the rebellion 
spreading into British territory, particularly from the southern parts of GSWA where the 
Nama were waging cross-border resistance. The second issue was that of a potential invasion 
should Britain and Germany find themselves embroiled in a war. The last and perhaps the 
most crucial issue for British officials was the potential of a new Boer conflict emerging with 
assistance from Germany. 
The concern about the Nama rebellion spreading into British territory was perhaps 
one which was not unique to the war in GSWA. Indeed, it can be argued that whenever a 
‘native uprising’ occurred, the supposedly savage races were igniting a racial war. Again, 
Fröhlich and Drechsler’s contention of a ‘racial solidarity’ as a core factor in defining Anglo-
German collaboration is relevant. However, this is one-dimensional, as there were perhaps 
plenty of suggestions of ‘racial solidarity’ from the German aspect, but fewer from the British 
– at least in official circles. For instance, a German settler wrote in the Cape Times how the 
Germans were ‘proud to have fought shoulder to shoulder with Englishmen against Zulu, 
Basuto and Matabele.’787 However, as the Herero and Nama both had spared British and 
Boers, only targeting German men, it indicates that they were well aware of the ramifications 
it would otherwise have. In this sense, the notion of ‘racial solidarity’ was not reciprocal, as 
the Herero and Nama were aware of how to utilise the tensions and relations between the 
Europeans, by only targeting one group: German men. Instead, many British officials and 
commentators often claimed, that the indigenous peoples of GSWA had always wished to 
be under British rule.788 Many Herero and Nama leaders – including Marengo and Maherero, 
as we have seen –  often proclaimed that they were attempting to replace German ‘protection’ 
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with British. Hendrik Witbooi of the Nama, for instance, had written to the British regarding 
rumours that SWA was to be governed by Germany in the wake of the Berlin conference 
and pleaded for British takeover instead.789 For the Herero, many chiefs had petitioned 
British representatives in the Cape Colony for formal protection as early as the 1870s.790 
Unsurprisingly, this perception was carried on into the Blue Book in 1918 and created a 
crucial argument representing the wishes of the Africans, giving legitimacy to the South 
African invasion in 1915 and the creation of the mandate in 1920.791 
Among British officials, particularly the men-on-the-spot, outright assistance to the 
Germans against Africans of whom many had helped them before, was ill-perceived. This 
was not only due to a sense of loyalty towards these ‘friendly natives’, but was also because 
of the potential ramifications it would have, should Britain betray them.792 The British, 
therefore, were not willing to completely render open assistance to Germany, despite being 
sympathetic. Therefore, when the Germans continued to press for further collaboration, 
such as pursuing escapees over the border, it was refused, as Cape authorities believed they 
had been sufficiently helpful ‘in spite of the fact that the rebels fighting against the German 
troops belong to the same tribes and are member of the families of the Cape Colonial 
Hottentots and Damaras.’793 
British collaboration with Germany was therefore ambiguous and contradictory. 
They willingly supported them in fighting the Herero and Nama, but at the same time, were 
often reluctant to do so. Dedering argues that Germany consistently pressed the Cape 
authorities for logistical and police support, but despite collaboration in many other 
incidents, they did not always get it.794 Conversely, Lindner suggests that Britain explicitly 
supported the Germans as part of an Anglo-German ‘colonial project’ in the region.795 As 
shown with the Marengo affair, Britain and the Cape did indeed support Germany in its 
colonial war, albeit for different reasons and standpoints. Formal military links across the 
border, the exchange of information and supplies and the volunteers joining the Schutztruppe 
all remain clear cases of direct support and sympathy from a British perspective. But at the 
same time, the argument of non-collaboration as made by Dedering is substantiated by the 
anxiety of British officials that collaboration could cause the conflict to spread into the Cape 
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and Bechuanaland.796 Indeed, if they were caught helping the Germans in their genocidal 
affairs, they would antagonise not only the Nama rebels in GSWA but also their related clans 
residing within British territory.797 
British policy vis-à-vis GSWA was therefore contradictory in its premise: on the one 
hand, they feared the ramifications of supportive actions towards the German cause, and on 
the other, they were willing to lend vital support. Indeed, this reveals the irrationality of 
British officials at the time: there was no clear-cut policy as to how to act regarding GSWA, 
but instead a much more circumstantial and therefore anxious perception of what was 
unfolding across the border. A memorandum by Hutchinson is indicative:  
 
Putting it shortly, Ministers have been anxious to avoid: (i) irritating the natives in German South West 
Africa; (ii) alienating our own natives on this side of the border; (iii) unduly hampering the German 
authorities; (iv) unnecessary expense in guarding the frontier whilst the German Consul General has been 
doing all he can to use the Cape Colony as a base of operations against the natives – the very thing which 
Ministers consider ought not to be allowed. The result has been a considerable amount of friction between 




Although they had allowed the Germans to store weapons in British territory, the British 
were not willing to allow the Germans using British territory as a base of operations. This 
would be an apparent breach of sovereignty and would openly reveal to the Nama that Britain 
was just as much an enemy as the Germans. Indeed, there was a belief among British officials 
that it was vital to prevent Germans from crossing the border when pursuing rebels. The 
Acting Resident Commissioner in Mafeking, F.W. Panzera, was particularly alarmed by the 
possibility of provoking the Batawana tribe, who ‘have the greatest hatred for the Germans 
and were any of their men to cross the border it would probably mean that the natives here 
would retaliate at once and that would be a much more serious thing for the Germans than 
the little affair they have on in their own territory.’799 
Panzera’s concerns are indicative of the cross-border anxieties of British officials. 
The fears of a spill-over effect in which the entanglement of the African peoples themselves 
would eventually cause an uprising in British territory because of German vices, therefore 
affected overall perceptions of the situation in GSWA. Thus, the contradictory stance of 
being caught between willing support for Germany and anxiety that this would cause 
grievances among indigenous peoples in the Cape persisted as an underlying element upon 
which British border policy was made. Perhaps the best indication hereof was when an 
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official at the British embassy in Berlin reported on a German newspaper, the Lokale Anzeiger, 
which described a conversation between Consul Nettelbladt and Jameson (by then Prime 
Minister in the Cape). Here it was reported that Jameson had ‘declared the sympathies of the 
Cape Government were entirely with the Germans, and though, on account of the native 
policy of that Government, they could not declare their sympathies too openly, the Germans 
might count on their moral support and as far as possible their practical assistance.’800 
Britain, therefore, sought not to antagonise the Nama, the Herero or the Germans. 
While they were sympathetic to the German cause, they could not take open policies and 
actions. The fear of antagonising the Germans, however, was based upon the growing 
number of troops arriving in GSWA, paired with continuous German suspicions of Britain 
being Janus-faced: pretending to support Germany, but in reality supporting the Herero and 
Nama with arms and supplies. Furthermore, German authorities, especially in Berlin, were 
monitoring the British press and often expressed concerns that they felt the Cape 
newspapers, despite their relatively little attention to the affair, were creating a smear 
campaign against them.801 In fact, these concerns were so strong that Consul Humboldt at 
several instances took action and considered the authenticity of various articles. This was not 
merely a response to the supposed smear campaign, but rather served to scrutinise whether 
suggestions of smuggling of supplies across the border to the rebels were accurate.802 In fact, 
Trench reported on the sentiment among German officers and the German press, that there 
was a broad conviction that the ‘unneighbourly conduct of Great Britain’ had worsened the 
conflict.803 German suspicions were not only restricted to the media. From the very outset 
of the rebellion, there had been clear suspicions that Britain or British agents had played 
some part or other in instigating the rebellion and prompting the Herero and Nama to 
rebel.804 According to Commander Gudewill on the German ship SMS Habicht, there had 
from the beginning been ‘rumours in the land that the natives were incited, organised and 
supplied with weapons and ammunition by Englishmen and it is a fact that the purposeful 
rising of the Herero is directed and helped with large quantities of war material.’805  
Therefore, Anglo-German relations at the outbreak of the rebellion were to an extent 
also antagonistic and embedded in suspicions of one another’s intentions and actions, thus 
indicating that Britain’s involvement was not exclusively one of collaboration or ‘racial 
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solidarity.’ The Germans suspected British agents and support to the Herero and later the 
Nama, and the British, at least the officials, feared that the conflict would in one way or 
another include them, particularly due to the considerable military strength and operations 
of the Germans. Indeed, British officials were aware of, and alarmed by, the disproportionate 
number of approximately 15,000 troops against a few hundred Nama in the south – in fact, 
the number of soldiers soon exceeded the number of settlers in GSWA.806 The anxiety about 
a German invasion was, however, a rationally-deduced threat, as the British colonial 
administration in South Africa was still fragile and recovering from its wounds from the 
South African War.807 Furthermore, when a substantial number of Boers, many of whom 
were veterans of the recent war, crossed the border and volunteered to join the Schutztruppe, 
anxiety grew.808  
In 1905, Selborne voiced his concerns over the growing number of German forces 
in the region. Not only did he fear that the 15,000 Germans soldiers would soon be increased 
to 30,000: he also reported that among these, the Germans had ‘recruited between three and 
four thousand Boers, and are recruiting still.’ This, Selborne warned, would put Germany ‘in 
a position to squeeze us.’809 However, in spite of such warnings, Lyttelton replied calmly that:  
 
It would appear that the large number of German troops is due to a policy of crushing rebels by main force. 
For his part, Hutchinson [Walter Hely-Hutchinson], says that he personally believe the most ‘disquieting 




British officials, therefore, were overwhelmingly concerned by the presence of a large 
German force on their colonial doorstep and outright alarmed by the possibility of a Boer 
rebellion emerging from the situation in GSWA while doing little more than raising an 
eyebrow to the brutal warfare which was the reason for such a large German force in the 
first place. Not only does this correspondence between highly-placed officials in the 
metropole and colonies display a certain hierarchy of British interests and concerns, it also 
proves that they were well aware of and rather unconcerned by the brutalities inflicted upon 
the indigenous peoples of GSWA.811 
British newspapers and officials were therefore following the developments in 
GSWA carefully. In fact, von Lindequist while he was still Consul, often wired information 
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from Cape newspapers back to the Reichskolonialamt, not only to keep them updated on the 
ongoing affairs in GSWA, but also to let them know how their conduct was seen by others 
in an international light.812 This once again witnesses the entanglement of Anglo-German 
colonial rule in Southern Africa: both parties were deeply interested in, and even had stakes 
in, each other’s affairs. Indicatively, Lindequist even used the reports of British newspapers 
to inform Berlin on the movement of the rebels.813 Clearly, British officials were well aware 
of the atrocities that occurred, perhaps even more so than their colleagues in Berlin, which 
may be due to the larger setup of the British CO as well as the communications in the Cape 
being more substantial than in GSWA. However, in the face of such evidence, the Blue 
Book’s condemnation of German atrocities in GSWA are rendered devious, because at the 
time, British officials were far more interested in other concerns and were anxious about the 
mere speculation that Germany would invade or support a new Boer uprising.814 
The anxieties about a German invasion, particularly if Britain and Germany should 
find themselves embroiled in a war in Europe, became a topic of intense discussion internally 
between British officials in London, South Africa and Berlin. According to the Military 
Attaché to the British embassy in Berlin, Lord Edward Gleichen who had participated in 
several colonial wars, including the Southern African campaign in 1899, there was no real 
German threat in South Africa. Due to Germany’s insufficient naval presence in the region, 
encumbered by the ‘miserable’ harbours at Lüderitz and Swakopmund, which offered ‘no 
facilities for disembarkation’, Germany would be unable to send enough reinforcements.815 
On the alleged 15,000 troops about which Selborne had voiced his grave concerns, Gleichen 
equally believed that this was ‘barely sufficient to secure total victory in GSWA itself. They 
have too much trouble with the guerrilla war – no need to worry.’816 
Soon, the anxiety for a direct German invasion of the Cape was deemed improbable, 
due to the continuous failure of the Schutztruppe to secure victory.817 Indeed, Gleichen 
reported on this matter that:  
 
In face of the pitying and somewhat contemptuous comments which are so noticeable in the German press 
and in the remarks of one’s friends on the occasion of any ‘regrettable incident’ in our own numerous 
colonial enterprises, it is difficult to avoid feeling a certain amount of ‘Schadenfreude’ on learning the 
misfortunes of the superior people.
818
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Obviously aimed to mock the Germans, who during the South African War had vocally 
sympathised with the Boers and mocked the British, this reveals a certain rivalry in terms of 
prestige when it came to colonial warfare. Therefore, while the threat of a German invasion 
steadily faded as a possible scenario in the minds of British officials, the attention to the 
conduct of the Germans persisted, especially since reports claimed that ‘the feeling between 
the races [Germans and indigenous peoples] is so bitter that further atrocities, perhaps on 
both sides, seem probable.’819 Nevertheless, fears of Germany being a threat to British 
sovereignty in Southern Africa did not occur in a vacuum. An example of the ongoing Anglo-
German rivalry in the region is the aforementioned Kruger Telegram and such vocal support 
for Kruger spawned great resentment in Britain.  
 
Germany’s interest and role in the growing Anglo-Boer antagonism prior to 1899 has often 
been dismissed as being a product of British paranoia where Germany simply attempted to 
exploit the situation to its advantage and pressure Britain in European politics, but as 
Matthew Seligmann has observed, Germany’s colonial ambitions in Southern Africa at the 
time should not be obscured.820 Germany’s support for the Boers during the South African 
War, therefore, may well have been clear in the memory of British and South African officials 
in 1904.  
During the South African War, there were strong suspicions by British officials that 
GSWA was used as a source for supplies of weapons and ammunition for the Boers. As the 
British discovered that the Boers were armed with Mauser rifles821 – a German brand – they 
began to suspect that they were being smuggled over the GSWA border, just as the Germans 
in 1904 suspected the British of supplying the Herero and Nama. From the British viewpoint 
during the South African War, however, German ‘antipathy towards England, especially in 
this war’ sustained reasons to monitor GSWA because it was believed to be the only possible 
place where arms and ammunition could reach the Boer commandos in late 1901.822 
Furthermore, much similar to how Germany suspected the Herero and Nama of jumping 
borders in 1904-7, British officials during the South African War believed that ‘rebels cross 
and re-cross the boundary at their pleasure’ and in some cases ‘Germans have joined them.’823 
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While it was generally believed that the Boers were the Teutonic ‘blood-brothers’ of 
the Germans, it remains clear that Germany’s stance during the war was ambiguous. It was 
not willing to risk an international diplomatic crisis with Britain, as shown, for instance, by 
the Kaiser refusing to welcome President Kruger upon his visit to Germany in 1900.824 On 
a more local level, Germany became involved in the affairs of the war. In Walvis Bay, the 
small enclave on the GSWA coast, an unnamed German official warned the Magistrate that 
Boer commandos who had fled into German territory threatened to raid the settlement.825 
Soon diplomatic contacts to Germany was set in motion and the British were assured that 
‘German authorities would do everything in their power to prevent an incursion of Boers 
from German into English territory.’826 Nevertheless, reinforcements, including fifty 
volunteers and two machine guns, were sent to Walvis Bay, which was undertaking the 
construction of defensive structures.827 While the British remained anxious, news soon broke 
that the raid was not going to happen, as German authorities in Swakopmund had refused 
to sell weapons and ammunition to the Boers.828 The fear of Boer movements originating in 
GSWA was therefore prevalent before the outbreak of the Herero-Nama rebellion. British 
regional paranoia, therefore, seems to be continuous from the South African War and 
through the Herero-Nama rebellion.  
In light of such cross-border activities and subsequent British paranoia, it is evident 
that British officials considered the quelling of the Herero and Nama to be not only a pretext 
for a German invasion, but more probably a pretext to re-arm and mobilise Boer irregulars. 
While many Boer volunteers were officially recruited by the Germans as transport riders and 
scouts, British officials feared that many of these were bittereinders – veteran Boers fighting 
‘to the bitter end’ during the recent war – would make an incursion into the Northern Cape 
where British rule was resented.829 Indeed, such an incursion materialised with the 1906 
‘Ferreira Raid’, but before then, in 1905, British officials had already reason to believe that 
the Boers and Germans were plotting to undermine British sovereignty. In a secret military 
report, it was asserted that Boer leaders were ‘relying on certain German promises of 
assistance in case of rebellion.’ However, because the war with the Herero and Nama was 
dragging out to ‘proportions which the Germans never dreamt’, German authorities found 
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it necessary to seek a ‘temporary friendship’ with Britain if they were to emerge from the war 
as victors.830  
Fears of an actual German-supported Boer raid or invasion, however, did not emerge 
directly out of the context of the Herero-Nama war. Such anxieties were already existent 
during the South African War, where the British were aware that Boer ex-combatants had 
been allowed to acquire land in GSWA. Instead of taking direct diplomatic contact on this 
issue, however, ambassador Lascelles was instructed to ‘unofficially’ let the German 
government ‘have no doubt that every proper precaution will be taken to prevent Boer 
refugees using the application for land as a blind under the cover of which to prepare to 
attack us from German territory.’831 Thus, Lascelles was instructed to remind Germany to ‘at 
once take whatever steps necessary to prevent a breach of neutrality.’832  
Lascelles spent little time in fulfilling his task. Upon a private visit to him, von 
Richthofen, stated that ‘German Authorities would certainly take care to prevent any grants 
of land made to the Boers being used as a blind under cover of which to attack British 
possession from German territory.’833 Britain was therefore assured – diplomatically from 
Berlin – of the co-operation of the Germans, just as officials in London would during the 
Herero-Nama rebellion a few years later, as witnessed by the Marengo affair. These 
diplomatic missions should have satisfied British officials, but the suspicions in the latter 
stages of the South African War gave birth to a longer-standing fear of a militant Boer 
presence on Britain’s colonial doorstep. The situation was therefore ambiguous for British 
officials: on the one hand the Germans were feared to be plotting against them and on the 
other hand, they knew that Germany could not afford to alienate Britain.  
Despite the apparent German dependence upon British co-operation and friendship, 
British fears of a spill-over effect continued to persist. Upon interviewing Stephane Kock, 
brother to former Boer General Johannes Kock, who was a central figure in the South 
African War, British officials found ever more reason to trust their fears. Kock explicitly 
stated that the purpose of recruiting Boers in German service was ‘to take men to GSWA 
nominally to assist German transports, but really to be armed and ready to proceed to the 
Transvaal when the general rising took place.’ This rising, he claimed, was to have taken place 
in the summer of 1905, but was postponed because of the war in GSWA seeing no end, 
                                                 
 
830 TNA: FO 64/1646: Secret Report, Military Intelligence Department, enclosed in Hutchinson to Lyttelton, 
21 June 1905. 
831 TNA: FO 2/904: FO to CO, 31 April 1901. 
832 TNA: FO 2/904: FO to Lascelles, 21 May 1901. 
833 TNA: FO 2/904: Lascelles to Lansdowne, 29 May 1901. 
189 
 
leaving Boer volunteers restless and dissatisfied.834 It remains unknown, however, whether 
John Ferreira and his men, numbering about fifty, were attempting to realise Kock’s 
statements of a ‘general rising’ when they set out to raid British territory from GSWA in early 
November 1906. Before abandoning the Schutztruppe, they stole arms, ammunition, horses 
and even khaki uniforms from a lager. Upon reaching British territory, they attempted to 
recruit farmers to their side, either by force, or with false rumours that a war between Britain 
and Germany had broken out and a general rising in the Cape was already underway.835 
Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, now Prime Minister to the Cape, sought to make sure 
that this rather small incursion did not develop into a full-blown rebellion by having Jan 
Hofmeyr of the Afrikaner Bond publish a notice in their newspaper, Ons Land, that the 
Ferreira raid must be ‘immediately stopped.’ Furthermore, a police force was soon sent north. 
On 14 November 1906, a mere eight days after the incursion, the forces met in a rather 
chaotic skirmish where Ferreira and his men eventually surrendered.836 Although the raid was 
short-lived, unsuccessful and, as such, unimportant, Winston Churchill, then Under-
Secretary in the CO, still had to present the events to the House of Parliaments and describe 
the actions of the government, including communications to the German administration in 
GSWA to take precautions and uphold the ‘freelooters’ should they return.837 
Consequently, the German authorities, at least officially, co-operated and disarmed 
their Boer volunteers in GSWA.838 In the Cape, however, similarities were soon drawn to the 
Jameson Raid in 1895 and Boer nationalists demanded that Ferreira and his men be treated 
like Kruger had treated Jameson – thus sparing his life. Therefore, when a death sentence 
was initially passed, Hutchinson was quick to have the sentence commuted so that Ferreira 
and his men did not become martyrs.839 According to Dedering, there is no documentation 
to prove that the Germans had any involvement in the raid. However, he believes that there 
was an ‘atmosphere’ in which Boer volunteers believed they had the ‘silent approval’ of the 
Germans.840 Considering the above source about Johannes Kock, evidence is provided to 
sustain such conclusion, although its accuracy is somewhat questionable, as there is a chance 
that Kock merely sought to frighten his British interviewers. However, the Germans did use 
Boers in their operations: Manie Maritz, who had both fought in the South African War and 
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led the rising in 1914, for instance, was responsible for transporting supplies and recruiting 
Boers in British territory.841  
The key issue here is not whether the Germans actually supported and planned a 
Boer rising during the Herero-Nama war, but rather, the suspicions of British official actors 
in those years. These suspicions were strong: earlier support from Germany during the South 
African War, the unbalanced number of troops stationed in GSWA, the recruitment of Boers 
and, in the end, the Ferreira Raid, seem rational reasons for them to be anxious. However, 
as the war in GSWA dragged out, they feared this to be a longstanding smokescreen in order 
to cover imports of weapons and ammunition for a coming war with Britain where the supply 
lines between GSWA and Germany would be severed by British naval dominance.842 At the 
same time, and in contradiction, the war with the Herero and Nama assured British actors 
that Germany was not ready for a regional war, and thus, it could counterfactually be argued 
that a potential Third South African War was avoided due to the success of the Herero and 
Nama in dragging out the conflict, leaving Boer volunteers frustrated, as illustrated in the 
Kock source. Indeed, as late as 1907, Selborne complained to Elgin that Germany continued 
to seek and subvert British sovereignty and foster a Boer rising:  
 
It is obviously the opinion of the German Emperor that all possibility of a Boer rising has not ceased to 
exist, and in case of any friction between the United Kingdom and the German Empire he wishes to have 
at his hand an instrument for promoting a Boer rebellion. This he would endeavour to do by the actual 
support of his troops and by supplying the rebels with arms and ammunition from the great depots he will 




The fear of a Boer rising emerging from the chaos in GSWA was perhaps one of the reasons 
why the British government sought rapprochement with the Boers in 1907 where Botha was 
instructed to form a government in the Transvaal, as had initially been agreed in the Treaty 
of Vereeniging (1902).844 Furthermore, in 1907, a conference on South African colonial 
administration reiterated the importance of ‘an inter-colonial defence scheme for the better 
protection of the British South African Colonies.’ In 1907, Germany would be the only 
potential foe in Southern Africa for the British, either as a faction itself or through its links 
with Boer nationalists. Although this remains speculative, such concerns as those spawned 
from the presence of the Schutztruppe in GSWA and the number of Boer volunteers may 
therefore have played a role in the creation of the South African Union in 1910.845 
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British officials therefore sought to uphold their ambiguous friendly neutrality in 
order to make sure they antagonised neither Germans nor Boers, and in the process, ignored 
or overlooked the treatment of the Herero and Nama, who, in turn, would be antagonised 
and perhaps cause the rising to spread if the British were openly supporting the Germans. 
Therefore, they were in a delicate situation where the slightest action – or inaction – would 
cause the Herero-Nama rebellion to ignite a chain of events that could end in a general 
African uprising spanning the entirety of Southern Africa, a German invasion, a Boer rising, 
or perhaps all three scenarios at once. Consequently, Britain’s involvement in the treatment 
of the Herero and Nama – whether or not they were active in the rebellion against Germany 
– became intrinsic in their stance on the affair in GSWA. The flow of refugees, which 
increased immensely after the battle of Waterberg, only brought this matter straight to 
Britain’s colonial doorstep, forcing them to take direct action.846  
 
 
British Refugee and Border Policies 
 
British border policies during the war in GSWA were embedded in the same complexities as 
described above, seeking to antagonise neither Germans nor indigenous groups. The 
borderlands comprised contested boundaries between colonial domains in which indigenous 
actors could challenge and subvert hegemony.847 Therefore, when refugees from the 
atrocities in GSWA crossed the British border, they revealed fragilities in Anglo-German 
colonial hegemony, as it necessitated a political and administrative reaction by the British, 
thus forcing them to actively participate in the situation in GSWA. Indeed, as Dedering has 
claimed, ‘indigenous mobility inhibited the consolidation of colonial hegemony and 
subverted the self-confidence of colonial rulers.’848 At the same time, however, aiding the 
Germans to prevail could, as shown, antagonise their own colonial subjects, thus potentially 
causing the very same threat to colonial hegemony. 
Many of the refugees were the survivors of a lengthy escape through the Omaheke 
desert as a consequence of Trotha’s military strategy of first pursuing the Herero into the 
desert and then guarding the desert’s borders, preventing them from returning into GSWA. 
Although many Herero did cross back into GSWA, the other options were simply to stay 
and die of thirst and hunger in the desert or try and make it to the British Bechuanaland or 
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the Cape border. A British border policy pertaining to the war had already been imposed 
with the Bondelswarts rebellion in 1903, where the British administration allowed refugees 
to cross but refused to hand anyone over to the German authorities.849 In December 1903 a 
clear policy regarding refugees was made. The refugees were to be allowed crossing without 
hindrance but were to be taken into custody and disarmed. Any goods and stock deemed to 
have been stolen were to be returned to GSWA, but most importantly, the refugees were to 
be informed immediately that they would not be sent back against their will. The refugees, 
now being in British territory, would ‘receive the protection of the Government’, but anyone 
who ‘cannot make satisfactory arrangements for their own subsistence’ was expected to 
perform ‘reasonable services as the Government may require.’850 
The issue of refugee and border policy originated from the affair surrounding the 
South African War, as described above, which then diffused into the situation in 1904. 
Indeed, as the British had suspected the Germans of supporting Boers from GSWA territory, 
the Germans now suspected the British of allowing the Herero and Nama rebels to establish 
hideouts in British territory. Already in 1904, before the decisive battle at Waterberg, the 
German authorities had contacted the British to warn them of the rebels crossing the border 
from Hereroland. The initial steps taken by the British were to establish a border control 
where refugees were interned in camps and goods deemed stolen were returned to GSWA. 
From the German perspective, however, this policy was far too lenient and would therefore 
soon cause the Herero to ‘come into conflict with the Laws of England’ because of their 
‘reputation as rustlers.’ The Germans’ own border policy around the Omaheke and in the 
south was to set up bases from which they could operate, attempting to prevent the Herero 
from crossing.851 In southern GSWA, for instance, the town of Keetmanshoop was used as 
a base from which German troops would gather Herero prisoners, including women and 
children (as well as cattle), before these were eventually sent to concentration camps. In a 
response to German movements near the border, the British authorities insisted on 
maintaining total sovereignty over the territory and borderlands: with few exceptions they 
did not allow German troops to cross and pursue rebels; nor did they allow them to fire 
across the border, and most notably, they recognised the rights of the refugees as ‘political 
refugees’, rendering them under British protection.852 This did not occur in a vacuum, for 
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during the South African War, many Boer commandos had crossed into GSWA and were 
protected by the Germans as ‘political refugees.’853 Possibly, the British remembered this and 
therefore had little sympathy for the Germans when the tables turned. 
Yet, this incurred several issues: first, who should pay for these refugees and their 
subsistence? Second, how would the German authorities react to whatever action and policy 
the British took? And lastly, where should they accommodate these refugees? As the refugees 
crossed the borders into the Cape Colony and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the 
administration in each took their precautions and established refugee camps. Of course, this 
incurred expenses and therefore the FO, after a request from the Cape Government, asked 
the German Government to compensate the expenses of these refugees as they were, after 
all, German subjects. The Reichstag, however, refused any compensation for African 
refugees. As German Consul von Jacobs noted: 
 
The motives to render any possible assistance to European refugees from pure humanity as these people 
have been forced by treacherous and murderous natives to leave the country against their will. These 
reasons cannot be applied to the fugitive Hottentots and Damaras. After having committed murders and 
atrocious crimes against the white population in GSWA, English subjects included, these natives have fled 
into the Cape Colony for the purpose of escaping from well-deserved punishment. The distressed condition 
in which they may be at the present is only a consequence of their own criminal offences. The Imperial 
German Government is therefore not able to extend the principles of humanity to these natives in the same 




Consequently, the Cape Government were to pay for the refugees’ subsistence themselves, 
which prompted a lowering of expenditure and considerations on how to utilise these 
refugees. In a period from late 1904 to late October 1905, expenditure on the refugee camps 
was no more than £398, which was probably because assistance was ‘only granted to the 
aged, infirm and children, all able-bodied adults being put to work whenever practicable thus 
lessening the expenditure as far as possible.’855 Because of this insignificant expenditure, 
Secretary of State Grey considered it ‘undesirable’ to make representations to the German 
Government over such a small sum.856  
In the Cape, an estimated total of 1,275 refugees were interned in camps.857 While 
this figure and that of the expenditure were rather low, the British nonetheless used this issue 
as leverage in their diplomatic negotiations with Germany. For instance, the Germans were 
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refused permission to pass supplies through Violsdrift – a border crossing between Southern 
GSWA and the Cape – because it would be too expensive to establish police posts that would 
guard against raiding into the Cape Colony, and because the ‘cost of maintenance of refugees 
still remains unsettled.’858 In particular, the Cape Government found it a nuisance to pay for 
the refugees’ subsistence. Therefore, they continued to pressure Hutchinson to communicate 
to Whitehall for them to make further requests to the German government. At the end of 
1906, the Cape authorities even threatened ‘the possibility of the release of these people 
together with closing of drifts when supplies in the country are inadequate, that must force 
the German Government to accede to our just demands.’859 To such a hard-line stance 
towards the Germans, Whitehall responded that they ‘strongly deprecate at present juncture 
release of interned natives.’860 
This rupture between the stance of the Cape and Whitehall reveals that in London, 
the government was fearful of how colonial policy towards refugees would be received in 
Germany. In other words, their direct concern was the relations with Germany as a whole, 
whereas the Cape authorities were more concerned by the local situation in which they were 
not only paying for the subsistence of refugees but were also aggravated by the threat posed 
by Germany alongside the potential rebellion that could emerge in response to Whitehall’s 
more pro-German stance on refugees. The difference in interests between metropole and 
colony remains a central factor in how colonial policy vis-à-vis GSWA played out. Whitehall 
was caught between two opposing pressures on the matter of refugees: from Germany, 
which pressed for further co-operation, and from the Cape which pressed for support and 
demands to be requested by Britain from Germany. A third could perhaps be found in the 
facet of public opinion and a fourth in international law regarding refugees. All these aspects 
were, as will be shown, the backdrops against which a rather circumstantial British policy 
towards GSWA, refugees and border policy was effectuated.  
Indeed, it was legally established by British Law Officers that Germany was under 
no obligation to pay for the refugees and, moreover, since these were not belligerents, the 
Cape was in no way obligated to ‘intern’ them nor to return them to GSWA, because the 
rules of neutrality did not apply to non-belligerents.861 The Germans contested this and 
continuously claimed that the refugees were indeed belligerents, particularly when they had 
partaken in the rebellion as armed fighters, as was later the case with Marengo. By Christmas 
                                                 
 
858 TNA: FO 367/27: Hutchinson to Elgin, 4 October 1906. 
859 TNA: FO 367/27: Hutchinson to Elgin, 24 December 1906. 
860 TNA: FO 367/27: Elgin to Hutchinson, 28 December 1906. 
861 TNA: FO 367/63: Law Officers to CO, 26 February 1907. 
195 
 
1906, Elgin had already communicated to Hutchinson that the Germans had finally named 
their price on the maintenance issue and they would agree to pay the expenditure for the 
refugees if the British agreed to maintain strict surveillance of rebels in their territory for the 
duration of the conflict. Also, the Cape would do their utmost to prevent ‘any rebels who 
may remain in British territory after the termination of the rebellion from becoming a source 
of danger to the German Government.’ Moreover, there were to be no restrictions on the 
passage of supplies across the frontier and all goods carried between GSWA and the Cape 
were to be free of duty. Finally, the ferry at Rahman’s drift, which had a special arrangement 
on delivery of supplies, was to continue.862 This was a hefty price for a rather insignificant 
expenditure. 
The decision on the maintenance was, however, never truly solved. This was partially 
due to the lack of interest in this issue from Whitehall and because of continuous obstacles 
such as the election in Germany in January 1907, which has been termed the ‘Hottentot 
Election’ due to the influence of the situation in GSWA, which delayed negotiations for 
several months.863 Furthermore, as the war was, in the meantime, coming to an end, the Cape 
felt that it was running short of time: peace would mean that its expenses would not be 
reimbursed, as it would hold no leverage to negotiate with – Germany would be at peace 
with the interned and there would be less dependency upon Cape trade. Consequently, the 
Cape pressured Whitehall consistently but was met with a stonewall of disinterest on the 
matter, as this had to go through the CO and finally the FO, who both saw no reason to 
further antagonise Germany over something considered relatively unimportant.864 
The issue of refugees was marked ‘Case 609’ by the FO. When consulting these 
extensive source books, what is striking is the fact that there is much attention to issues not 
directly pertaining to the refugees themselves. The FO was, by far, mostly concerned by the 
effect that the issue would have on Anglo-German relations, whereas the CO, to an extent, 
sympathised with the Cape Government which was at the forefront of the direct 
consequences of the war in GSWA. It is likely, as discussed above, that British collaboration 
was determined by a diplomatic interest in appeasing Germany. However, it remains clear 
that there were certain issues where Germany was frustrated by the supposed lack of 
collaboration from the Cape and the British Government, especially concerning the refugee 
issue. 
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Belligerents or ‘political refugees’? 
 
The refugee camps set up by the British were barely guarded, prompting the Germans to 
suspect that the British allowed the Herero and Nama to re-cross the border. Indeed, there 
was little intention from the side of the British to maintain strict surveillance of both the 
border and camps, not only because this would incur further expenses but also because they 
did not consider border-crossings probable due to ‘geographical obstacles.’865 Nevertheless, 
after continuous pressure from the German Government, the FO had the camps moved 
further inland, still without resolving the maintenance issue, in order to satisfy the Germans 
and to allay any suspicions of the British allowing border crossings.866 Furthermore, the 
Germans asked the British to report on who was interned in their camps, particularly if there 
were any chiefs or notable persons – a request with which the British complied.867 Thus, 
Whitehall was willing to comply with certain diplomatic requests from Germany, indicating 
a collaborative understanding between the colonial powers not only in the colonies but also 
in Europe. In fact, Grey himself believed that the refugees were belligerents, and as such, 
Britain was actively obliged to support the Germans by law of neutrality.868 While the 
perception in London, therefore, was that the Cape was too unwilling to lend support to the 
Germans despite the anxieties that arose from the rebellion, the Cape Government and 
Governor Hutchinson claimed the opposite. In a telegram to Elgin, Hutchinson argued 
personally that he did not think ‘the German authorities have any real cause for complaint.’ 
This was because ‘they have really been afforded every facility by the Cape Government for 
the prosecution of the campaign, facilities so great as to prove a protest from the Military 
Intelligence Department at Pretoria.’869 
Perhaps the most important issue when it came to the classification of the refugees 
as either belligerents or ‘political refugees’ was that of extradition. The German Government 
communicated to the Cape – which then communicated to the CO and FO respectively – 
that they should revise their policy. The Germans took an interesting approach: instead of 
denying the stance of the refugees as non-belligerents, they appealed to the British that the 
refugees were ‘merely a big band of robbers and murderers’ and therefore that it would be 
in ‘the greatest interest of the whole white race in the Southern parts of Africa to deprive 
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these people of the possibility to escape the pursuit of German troops.’ Furthermore, the 
Germans reassured the British that if they handed the refugees back to the German 
authorities, they would be treated fairly. Indeed ‘The proclamations issued by General von 
Trotha and Herr von Lindequist guarantee to these natives the fairest treatment and that 
only those who have committed crime shall be punished.’870  
The issue of extradition is an ambiguous one because it not only caught the British 
in an internal deadlock between colony and metropole, each responding to their own 
interests and pressures from either Germany or indigenous populations respectively, but also 
due to international law. Perhaps the best illustration of how Anglo-German relations 
pertaining to the extradition issue evolved during the war in GSWA is once again Marengo. 
In March 1907, the Germans applied to have Marengo, who had been detained at Tokai in 
Cape Town, extradited. The Germans did not appeal to the juridical aspects, but emphasised 
the crimes Marengo had allegedly committed against British subjects, which would brand 
him a criminal and not a ‘political refugee.’871 In fact, the Germans even pointed out that 
Marengo’s actions were comparable to ‘those perpetrated by Ferreira and his men.’872 
Despite the German attempts, however, Hutchinson was ‘constitutionally bound to 
refuse’ and the Cape Government also refused to extradite Marengo at this point.873After his 
release, the Germans requested the Cape authorities to arrest him once more, but according 
to Hutchinson, they were ‘unable to issue a warrant for the arrest of Marengo, as I am advised 
that the evidence in support of the claim for extradition shows that the crimes complained 
of were of a political nature.’874 Once more, metropolitan concerns over how the Germans 
would react affected the opinions on the matter: ‘Lord Elgin shares Sir E. Grey’s 
apprehension that the refusal of a warrant for extradition without reference to a court may 
give rise to a protest on the part of the German Government.’875 London, therefore, was not 
willing to risk a deterioration in relations with Germany over the issue of Marengo, especially 
when there was no direct juridical decision made from the courts on the matter. 
Particularly, the FO was upset over the refusal of the Cape Government:  
 
Sir E. Grey’s opinion the practice of the Government of the Cape Colony in refusing requisitions for 
extradition by means of acts of the executive in lieu of submitting them to the decision of the ordinary 
judicial tribune is open to serious objections and is to be strongly deprecated. The administration of a 
branch of law so intimately relating to the liberty of the subject by the Executive Government without 
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recourse to the Courts seems undesirable on constitutional grounds – Inasmuch as it tends to expose the 
Colonial Government to adverse foreign criticism, and to misconceptions being placed upon its actions, 





Nevertheless, the FO, based upon the decision of the Extradition Treaty of 1872 between 
Britain and Germany, claimed that Marengo’s actions were political offenses, thus 
legitimising the actions of the Cape in refusing to extradite him, but informed the Cape 
authorities that the Secretary of State still had the final word in the decision. Grey believed 
that extradition cases should be decided by the Courts and not the government. The FO 
wanted to change this as it had ‘already proved a source of considerable embarrassment to 
the Imperial Government and may on some future occasion involve them in difficulties even 
greater than those which have attended Marengo’s case.’ Thus, it was suggested that an 
Extradition Court should be established in Cape Town.877 
As shown above, the Marengo case was an ambiguous one: while the British refused 
his extradition while he was imprisoned at Tokai, it was not until the Germans communicated 
to London that the British had agreed to monitor his movements and only with the personal 
intervention of the Kaiser that the British agreed to collaborate in the pursuit. This reveals 
the political rights of the Africans fleeing from GSWA: while the Cape Authorities were 
seeking to maintain sovereignty and denying any extradition, London was not. This may be 
because the Cape faced a rational fear of a potential rising being instigated, with outright 
collaboration with the Germans, whereas London was more aggrieved by potential 
diplomatic problems arising with Germany over what they considered a lesser matter. 
Particularly when the King became personally involved, no one in Whitehall seems to have 
been interested in opposing a policy of collaboration in the Marengo affair. 
Therefore, the protection granted to the refugees was subjected to a hierarchy, not 
only of ideals, but also of authority. It was used as a legalistic principle upon which Germany 
had no right to demand further collaboration by the Cape, but it was a principle which was 
in no way as strong as realpolitik and practical interests. Consequently, the British were only 
willing to protect the refugees as long it did not cause too many practical, diplomatic or 
political strains – which is only further substantiated by the despicable conditions in which 
they allowed the refugees to remain.   
 
 
                                                 
 




Refugees in British Territory: Camps and Labour 
 
The conditions in the refugee camps reveal many aspects of British official responses and 
perceptions of the conflict and genocide in GSWA. They not only give indications about 
Britain’s own treatment of the Herero and Nama, but also reveal how wider concerns in both 
metropole and colony affected policy-making. Indeed, as has already been shown, the 
minuscule expenditure upon refugees caused the British to take a rather contradictory policy: 
while they pressed the Germans to compensate, they were well aware that this was both 
unfeasible and unimportant. Yet they still used it as leverage in their dealings with the 
Germans in other affairs. Indicatively, when the British had assisted the Germans by killing 
Marengo, Elgin suggested that it was now the right time to make renewed representation to 
the German Government regarding repayment of the expenditures on the refugees.878 
However, the fact that the expenses on the maintenance of the refugees were so small and 
that this was more a diplomatic matter for the British government than a humanitarian one 
suggests a lack of interest in the welfare of the refugees. When the funding for the refugee 
camps was so small and was regarded as such an unimportant issue, particularly in London, 
it is worth looking into the actual conditions of these camps. The large quantities of sources 
from the CO and FO in London kept at the archives in Kew are very telling: while these 
sourcebooks contain literally thousands of letters, reports and telegrams, only a handful of 
these are concerned with the refugees themselves. This indicates the relative importance of 
the various matters where the conditions were considered less important than the 
compensation question.  
The conditions of the refugee camps in the Cape were atrocious. It is, however, 
important to note at this stage that these camps were not comparable to those in GSWA. 
The intention here, unlike in GSWA, was not to exterminate or subjugate the inmates but to 
intern them to prevent any problem with either Germans or African communities in British 
territory. Nevertheless, the conditions of those staying in these camps remained dire and 
were perhaps comparable to the labour camps in Witwatersrand, rather than the 
concentration camps in GSWA.879 Although these labour camps were also abhorrent places 
where ‘residents’ lived in terrible conditions, this was nonetheless what the British and Cape 
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authorities at the time believed to be sufficient, and although the South African labour camps 
occasionally came under scrutiny, it rarely became widespread.880 
In 1907, a new refugee camp was to be established at the French Roman Catholic 
Mission station at Matjeskloof near the town of Springbokfontein. A total of 590 refugees, 
of whom only about 20 were men, were sent from camps at Steinkopf and Port Nolloth and 
were reported to be ‘in a wretched condition and a very large proportion are dying from 
starvation, insufficient clothing and scurvy.’ A critical report on this camp further stated that 
in the previous week, twenty-two refugees had died, ‘mostly young women and children.’881 
The report continued:  
 
Government, beyond providing a small ration of bread, fat and sugar, have done absolutely nothing for 
these people. The Mission, whose resources are limited, have done everything they can to provide 
nourishment and clothes, and the Cape Copper Company have built a shed for use as a hospital, and 





The immediate critique, therefore, was aimed at the Cape Government for not looking after 
the refugees properly. Consequently, many died of starvation and disease. Doctor Cowan, 
who oversaw the medical affairs, had furthermore ‘represented the matter very strongly to 
the Magistrate, but can get nothing done. He says the people are dying simply from want of 
sufficient nourishment and clothes and unless more blankets and proper food are provided, 
this enormous death rate will continue.’ Furthermore, it was noted, that during the time when 
the refugees were at Steinkopf, a timespan of five or six months, over 100 died while the 
German mission supervised this station.883  
Considering the minuscule expenditure on refugees, these conditions are not 
surprising. Furthermore, when a band of Nama crossed the border with cattle, ‘with the 
intention of selling them and providing the women and children at the Steinkopf camp with 
money’, they were seized and sent to the Cape Copper Company’s mines and their cattle 
returned to GSWA, as they were deemed stolen. It was reported that this, as well as the 
treatment of the refugees, ‘has caused considerable feeling among the Hottentot and Basters 
of the district.’884 The concern that the rebellion in GSWA might spread, therefore, became 
intertwined with the Cape’s treatment of the refugees. Consequently, Hutchinson wasted 
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little time in investigating the matter, asking an officer in the vicinity, Colonel Crewe, to look 
into the report and find out if the number of deaths was correct and particularly if the ‘bad 
feeling caused amongst the natives in British territory’ was true.885 
Crewe sent his comments no later than a day after Hutchinson’s requests, which 
reveals the potential importance of this issue, not only in terms of a potential rising amongst 
the indigenous peoples but also its political ramifications should they be caught mistreating 
the refugees. Indeed, Crewe stated that ‘I have had some information regarding the condition 
of the refugees you refer to, and it is not altogether satisfactory’, and he therefore promised 
to make further inquiries.886 The local Resident Magistrate, W.T. Magennis, soon returned a 
detailed report on the refugee camps, in which he refuted any criticism. While he confirmed 
that the refugee camp had been moved from Steinkopf to Matjeskloof in order for the 
refugees to ‘come under proper care’, he was ‘surprised to see that it has been stated that a 
large number are dying from starvation. This statement is untrue; none have died of want of 
food since their arrival at Matjeskloof or prior thereto.’887 Furthermore, he stated that few of 
the refugees were skilled labourers, and therefore many could only work for low wages – 
mainly in the mining industry. Nevertheless, he admitted that ‘a good number have died, but 
there is nothing surprising in this’ because they died of scurvy. The group of Nama that was 
captured, he claimed, were working in the mines ‘as free men and have their families living 
with them.’ Ha also claimed that the false accusations in the initial report were the work of 
traders – especially Jewish traders – who wished to make money out of stolen goods and 
cattle brought over the border by Nama.888 
In addition to Magennis’ reply, the medical officer at the Matjeeskopf camp, J. 
Cowan, was drawn in to explain. He too downplayed the importance of the situation: ‘I said 
that I had represented the matter (death rate) strongly to the Government through you that 
if the diet scale now recommended or one like it was not passed then the death rate would 
be terrible. I did not say I could get nothing done by you.’ Moreover, he stated that ‘the 
refugees have not died of insufficient food so much as of improper food.’889 It is impossible 
to know what Magennis told Cowin to persuade him to support him or whether the initial 
report was indeed untrue. The last opinion on the matter came from a Mr W. Rorick, a Dutch 
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Reformed Minister who had visited the camp in question to ‘secure for myself and several 
of my congregation some of the children as servants.’ Having worked with rationing and 
similar cases in the 1890s, he gave his views on the administration and rationing in the camps: 
‘To me it is as plain as daylight that the refugees are overfed, and that our Magistrate deserves 
to be checked in his extravagance! There are, Sir, the minimum being taken, 200 able-bodied 
young people and children idling precious time and educated into a lazy mode of life.’890 He 
also alluded to the ‘racial stage’ of the Nama (‘Hottentots’) as the ‘lowest’ in Southern Africa, 
which, according to him, was why such treatment was ill-advised. Therefore, the refugees 
were to be employed as labourers in the mines of South Africa so that they would not, as 
was also stipulated with the Ndebele, fall idle and restless. 
 
Before discussing the issue of labour, it is first important to ascertain what impression the 
above evidence of the conditions in the refugee camps gave to the officials in Whitehall. 
Here, limited source material is available, so to get an actual idea of the setup of these camps 
and what conditions the refugees were in, it would be necessary to explore, in depth, the 
Cape and Bechuanaland archives in South Africa and Botswana respectively. However, this 
exact point indicates a crucial issue in understanding how Whitehall and the official mind 
acted and perceived the events. The limited interference of the metropole may have been 
due to lack of awareness. Whether intentional or not, the man-on-the-spot created an illusion 
through contradictory evidence which left Whitehall in the dark but may have satisfied the 
Cape authorities, who were likely aware of the actual conditions. Whether this illusion was 
intentional is unclear, but it created a conviction of satisfaction pertaining to ‘native policy’– 
both in terms of a rising not being on the cards and of the refugees themselves supposedly 
not starving, which may have prevented Whitehall from intervening. There was no 
humanitarian pressure aimed against these camps, both because it remained unknown to 
lobby groups and the press and because it was the Cape Government which was responsible, 
and except for Hutchinson, Cape politicians were less responsive to metropolitan pressures 
and attention that would arise out of a potential colonial crisis.  
While it is inviting to draw the conclusion that these camps were obscene and 
atrocious, thereby witnessing the British committing excesses in connection to GSWA too, 
it would be erroneous to draw such a conclusion due to the lack of source material available. 
Dedering, for instance, seems to place most trust on the more critical source on the camps. 
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Furthermore, he includes a source from Germany where it is claimed that 200 out of 600 
refugees had died of scurvy by October 1906.891 This may be correct but it is important to 
underline its uncertainty, particularly when consulting German source material, as the 
Germans’ knowledge of British refugee camps may only have been limited. Yet, what can be 
concluded from these sources is that Whitehall only paid the issue reluctant attention when 
it suddenly appeared before them; but as there was little humanitarian pressure to have them 
involved and since the information they received was limited as well as contradictory, they 
did not have the knowledge to act. Furthermore, there was no incentive to inquire further 
into the affair, except for personal humanitarian persuasions. 
Nevertheless, the conditions of the refugee camps certainly invite comparison to the 
concentration camps in GSWA. According to Zimmerer, the genocide committed in the 
camps in GSWA was not ‘industrial’ like the Holocaust, but was ‘murder by deliberate 
neglect.’892 Such definition, while correct, is problematic, as it implies that the refugee camps 
in British territory too could be categorised similarly to those of GSWA. The Cape 
administration and the British government definitely neglected the refugees, as shown both 
by the reports on their conditions and by the minuscule expenditure upon these refugees. It 
is therefore inviting to conclude that these refugee camps were merely an extension of the 
camps in GSWA. But one crucial difference remained evident; whereas the Germans had the 
intention to oppress and exterminate their prisoners, no such intention existed in the case of 
the refugee camps in British territory. As Dedering has shown, the security in the refugee 
camps in British territory was lax, with no barbed wire and few guards, and the internees 
could generally move around. Indeed, they were ‘more like rallying posts where refugees were 
supposed to eke out a living and stay away from the war.’893 This was much unlike the camps 
in GSWA, where barbed wire, natural boundaries and guard posts forced the Herero and 
Nama to remain in their desperate conditions against their will. Moreover, the fact that the 
bridge to Shark Island was guarded by a machine gun shows that the Germans saw it as 
imperative that the prisoners remained where they were.894 While the British too were guilty 
of neglect, there was no outright policy or desire to keep the prisoners in their terrible state. 
Nevertheless, the prevalent fears amongst British officials that the treatment of the 
refugees would cause resentment among their own subjects were countered by the 
premonition that the refugees would cause a stir among their own colonial subjects due to 
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lack of land, cattle and waterholes – a point which was made by the APS.895 Officials in South 
Africa agreed with this view:  
 
The location of these persons in any part of our Protectorate will necessitate an increase in our Police 
Force, if only to prevent their stock straying across the Reserve boundaries, and interferences with our 
natives’ waters, which would at once cause serious unrest and trouble amongst our own tribes.
896 
 
It was therefore considered problematic to simply allow the refugees to settle in British 
territory either permanently or for the duration of the war in GSWA. Furthermore, according 
to Mervyn Williams,897 the influx of refugees would ‘produce the greatest disturbance and 
uneasiness’ among other tribes who had already seen their territory ‘been brought within 
narrow limits by the successive concessions to Germany’ and ‘threatened with incalculable 
injury at the hands of worthless savages from beyond their borders, who, having never 
practiced the cultivation of soil, must, in order to support life, destroy their game and 
otherwise interfere greatly with the peaceful avocations of the inhabitants.’898  
This not only displays the resentment among Cape officials towards the German 
presence in the region, but also shows a hostile attitude towards the mobility of Africans 
across colonial borders. Indeed, there was a clear sentiment of hostility towards the refugees, 
because it was believed by many that they were, after all, the ones who had started the 
rebellion. Therefore, according to Williams, inviting in the refugees – or rather, criminals as 
he called them – would potentially cause a rebellion much like that in GSWA to occur in 
British territory.899 Panzera opposed Williams’ view and claimed that he was only afraid 
because it would ‘put off the time when the Protectorate will become a white man’s country.’ 
Instead Panzera advocated that although the complete disarmament of refugees was 
impossible, they could nonetheless prove to be a crucial source of manpower on farms and 
mines throughout British Southern Africa.900  
 
There is little doubt that the labour question was one of the most crucial in British policy in 
Southern Africa – both in the Cape Colony, the Transvaal and, as shown, in Southern 
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Rhodesia at the time. For instance, Hutchinson reminisced in 1911 that the African 
populations were an almost ‘inexhaustible’ source of labour, which was important as ‘white 
men were not willing to do Kaffirs’ work.’901 Therefore, the refugees coming into British 
territory were soon absorbed by the existing labour networks, sending streams of African – 
and later Chinese and Indian – labourers to the horrific conditions of the mining camps.902 
The influx of refugees soon found their way to the mines and farms still recovering from the 
recent war.903 Furthermore, the appalling conditions of the refugee camps may have furthered 
the Herero and Nama incitement to move further into British territory and seek employ.904  
Yet, the issue of the refugees coming into British territory was not only a matter of 
possible antagonism for the British indigenous subjects and a potential source of labour. It 
was also a matter of rights. For instance, when a large group of Damara who had crossed 
over wanted to remain in British territory – more precisely, the Batawana Reserve – they 
were instructed that ‘the British Government recognise no chieftainship of any Damara in 
the Protectorate, but simply regarded them headmen for convenience of administration.’ 
Therefore, it was recommended to the High Commissioner that they could remain if they 
‘submitted to the tribal control exercised by the Chief recognised by the government and 
that they obeyed the orders of the British Government and its officers.’905 In Bechuanaland, 
this saw the Tawana chief, Segkoma, permit the Herero refugees to settle in the Sehitwe and 
Nokaneng districts and soon they were gradually integrated into society, given work and were 
assisted in rebuilding and sustaining a livelihood.906 This may certainly have pleased British 
officials, but it also reveals that African communities were inclined to help protect the 
refugees from potentially being sent back to GSWA.  
From the British perspective, however, if a local chief would recognise the refugees 
as subjects, any potential motive for rebellion had been removed. Of course, the process was 
more complicated than that, and in the case of the Herero in the Tawana community, they 
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participated in an internal strife over succession where they supported Sekgoma.907 
Therefore, the influx of refugees into African communities in British territory also had social 
and cultural ramifications, as it could disrupt hierarchies and relations. Nevertheless, it was 
deemed better than sending this rather large group of between 500 and 600 able-bodied men 
back to GSWA, because that would ‘have a bad effect with the natives generally in the 
Protectorate’ and because this ‘would cause us to be identified with German methods of 
native rule.’908 Selborne agreed to this – Britain should not be connected to the German 
excesses, which proves that they were aware of the affairs in GSWA and even considered 
them excessive at the time. However, Selborne, seemingly determined to find some benefit 
from the influx of refugees, felt compelled to reply that ‘they understand, I presume, that 
they will have to pay hut-tax?’909 
 
The refugee issue was therefore key in understanding the policies and actions of the British 
vis-à-vis the war in GSWA. It forced them to take a direct and active stance and it meant 
that the war crossed borders in many forms such as in loot, anxieties and, of course, people. 
The British sought to maintain complete sovereignty over their borders but soon found 
themselves in an uncomfortable situation where they had to walk on eggshells to avoid 
provoking the refugees, the Germans and the indigenous peoples in British territory.  
According to Drechsler, after the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty in 1890 between 
Britain and Germany, the ‘dominant feature’ in their relationship in Africa was ‘co-operation 
in holding down Africans.’910 Likewise, Ulrike Lindner’s argument of a colonial project comes 
to mind. Yet, while Britain did co-operate, their overall stance when including their refugee 
and border policy, was ambiguous and often contradictory. It was far more directed by 
circumstantial and extant considerations, rather than by an idea of a shared ‘project’. It was 
chaotic, contradictory and inefficient; it was a sign of weakness from the British both in 
London and South Africa. Britain was a weak colonial state, which was anxious about the 
slightest possibilities of the conflict spreading across the border or having the slightest effect 
on the peace with both Boers and indigenous subjects, not to mention diplomatic relations 
with Germany. Therefore, it sought to enforce, or at least portray, complete sovereignty as 
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much as possible in the borderlands, thus attempting to show strength and a friendly stance 





Germany, being a ‘new coloniser’, was perhaps swayed by a more rigid strand of racial 
theories than was Britain, which had, for centuries, governed colonies and indigenous 
peoples and was keen to wash out the old sins of slavery. This rigid perception of race and 
the rejection of Darwinism as Affenlehre may have been influential in how colonial policies 
were formulated in GSWA, thereby sustaining a rationale behind the atrocious treatment of 
the Herero and Nama, who were dehumanised. While this suggests a certain German 
exceptionalism vis-à-vis the Sonderweg, it is worth highlighting the role of the British 
neighbour. Indeed, what occurred in GSWA was not a result of ideologies of Lebensraum and 
racism alone as it occurred within an entangled context in which Britain played a pivotal part, 
not only in inspiring the concentration and death camps but also through its actions and 
policies towards Germans and Africans alike. In other words, the war and genocide in GSWA 
was part of a broader trans-colonial context rather than a reductive extension of German 
national history to its former colonies.  
When the Blue Book portrayed Germany as an exceptionally cruel coloniser in 1918, 
it foreshadowed the Sonderweg perception of German colonialism. The position of Britain in 
the Blue Book was thus portrayed as that of a bystander, not directly participating and being 
unaware or, at best, knowing very little of the atrocities that unfolded across the border, at 
least not until the invasion in 1915.911 However, in 1904-8 Britain was, as has been shown, 
aware and even complicit in the affairs that unfolded in GSWA. The Blue Book is therefore 
representative of a selective memory where any indication of British awareness or co-
operation was subdued so that a British, or indeed South African, takeover would appear to 
be a benevolent intervention on part of the Herero and Nama.912  
But it was not only in terms of awareness and collaboration that Britain was entangled 
into the conflict. Besides trade and other interactions, GSWA was also a place where up to 
half of the white population was non-German. British and especially Boers made up the 
other half, thus questioning the demographic commitment of the colony to Germany. This 
and other entanglements such as the dependency on Cape imports meant that GSWA was 
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formally a German colony, but perhaps informally a British, or rather, a Cape dominated 
area. Therefore, the British and Cape entanglements into GSWA complicated German 
ambitions and were an outright threat to perceived German hegemony. Indeed, although 
Whitehall had allowed Germany to seize SWA, in the Cape it continued to be considered 
part of the future South African Federation (or Union as it came to be). Thus, this schism 
between metropole and colony pertaining to a neighbouring German colony influenced the 
ways in which the British Empire collaborated (or opted not to) and perceived German 
colonial rule and violence. Indeed, in a report from 1909, German colonial policies and the 
atrocities that had ensued were seen as problematic in how Britain acted in the region because 
it was deemed that German policy ‘drew the British along in their difficulties and they 
endeavour to impress the native mind that there is no difference between Germans and 
Englishmen.’913  Thus, the conflation of German and British colonial policies was also a 
source of concern in Whitehall, as it would ‘gradually eat away our authority amongst our 
own native subjects.’914 From the perspective of Whitehall, it was a matter of assisting – or 
not assisting – a fellow European coloniser and making sure it did not disrupt the relations 
with Germany nor South Africa. But for the Cape authorities, it was a question of not only 
sovereignty but also ideology. Whereas the power balance in Europe at the time was relatively 
even, this was not the case in Southern Africa, where the Cape was profoundly superior in 
terms of political, economic and military strength, to mention but a few. Hence the arrival 
of an increasing number of German soldiers in GSWA may have been feared to be an 
attempt by Germany to balance this difference. However, most importantly, the Cape, at this 
time solidifying itself after the South African war and gearing up towards the establishment 
of the Union of South Africa, sought to ratify its own sovereignty both towards its immediate 
border with GSWA and also towards the British imperial government in London.  
The fact that SWA was considered by many to be part of the forthcoming union in 
all but reality and that London had disappointed in allowing Germany to have it, may have 
caused further deviation within the British Empire. As Selborne informed his sister, Sophia 
Palmer, in a personal letter, the decision of the British government to allow Germany to 
acquire colonies was a ‘grave mistake.’  
 
The result has been to add very seriously to our Imperial political difficulties, e.g. the German footing in 
South Africa is the real cause of our troubles with the Transvaal… And what has been the result to the 
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natives? Instead of the splendidly just Imperial rule of England, e.g. Basutoland and Bechuanaland, there 




Thus, British perceptions of the Herero-Nama war and the subsequent genocide were 
subjected to an internal, often implicit, struggle between the various imperial and sub-
imperial actors. Just as Southern Rhodesia was to be secured by restraining the BSAC after 
1896, so too was GSWA part of the same imperial outlook. Indeed, the perception of 
Southern Africa in imperial terms was one where the German presence was important to 
address and the conflict and genocide in GSWA only disrupted the supposed stability of 
British South Africa and could potentially bring about various spill-over effects. 
The perceptions and actions of British officials pertaining to the war and genocide 
in GSWA were influenced by the degree of collaboration – or lack thereof – with Germany 
in colonial matters. During the Herero-Nama war, Anglo-German relations such as the 1905 
Morocco Crisis unfolded, changing foreign relations between Germany and Britain. 
Consequently, the rising antagonism would suggest that the British stance during the Herero-
Nama war was influenced as such: i.e. that it was shaped by antagonism rather than 
collaboration, as the Zanzibar-Heligoland treaty would envisage. This is partially true because 
the British, while being anxious about a potential German invasion or a German-backed 
Boer rising, were still willing to lend a hand to their German neighbours in a spirit of ‘friendly 
neutrality.’ Hence, it was not a clear case of Britain seeking to undermine Germany, but 
instead a case where British fears of a spill-over effect directed their actions and policies.  
The claim made by Lindner that Britain and Germany prior to the First World War 
were engaged in a ‘colonial project’ echoes earlier arguments by Fröhlich and Drechsler, who 
both emphasised the racial attributes to such collaboration, which Lindner notes was not 
restricted to Southern Africa, but was a common interest for all colonisers. For Germany 
and Britain, however, it was the ‘sharing of the white man’s burden.’916 As Christopher Clark 
observes, the tightening of the Anglo-French alliance at Algeciras in 1906, did indeed mean 
that Britain was less interested in maintaining good relations with Germany. Only in cases of 
‘crisis on the imperial periphery’ was this of interest, although it never amounted to a full 
alliance.917 Therefore, as Daniel Grimshaw has emphasised, Britain and Germany’s ‘imperial 
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projects were similar, creating secure economic benefits in their colonies’ and the rebellions 
in GSWA made the whole region unstable, thus causing a shared interest in ending it.918 
However, although the idea of a shared colonial project is useful, it is important to 
understand the complicated and often contradictory premises upon which British officials 
acted and perceived German colonial rule. Britain remained a ‘friendly neutral’ officially, but 
simultaneously supported the Germans in many incidents such as supplying arms and 
resources and assisting in military operations, particularly in southern GSWA.919 Yet, co-
operation was always subtle and ad hoc, for there was never a clear directive force, nor clearly 
stated instructions which British officials (or colonial officers) could follow. Furthermore, 
there is no archival evidence for any policy or directive aimed towards GSWA, whether 
indicating a shared project with Germany or seeking to undermine them by supporting the 
Herero and Nama. A ‘project’ is therefore perhaps too neat a term to describe this 
complicated web of stakes, interests and motivations, particularly since British officials are 
here shown to act haphazardly in accordance to the constantly changing situation. It is 
therefore important that the notion of rivalry is not simply replaced by one of co-operation, 
for colonial powers were collaborators and rivals at the same time. Certainly, the aspect of 
co-operation must and should be further promoted, but the anxieties, fears and outright 
refusals to assist colonial rivals were equally characteristic of both British and German 
colonialism. Instead, in the case of GSWA, the relations between Britain and Germany can 
perhaps best be characterised as a mutual understanding to preserve stability in the face of 
African rebellions which arose spontaneously, but not in a deliberate and explicit manner 
that would indicate a shared project. Furthermore, the perspective of British officials on the 
genocidal horrors in GSWA was not exogenously aimed but rather emanated from internal 
anxieties and interests. Thus, Britain did not collaborate to help Germany, but mostly did so 
on occasions when it was deemed necessary for selfish interests and to prevent any potential 
spill-over, which could, for instance, be in the shape of a new Boer rebellion or an African 
uprising emerging in British territory.  
Suggestions of colonial projects and racial solidarity are neat ways to bring order to 
the past to make it more comprehensible. The problem is that this marginalises the historical 
context and the chaos of the past. German colonial rule in GSWA was weak, and so was 
Britain in South Africa after the recent war. The former’s weakness was in due to its 
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incapability to attain hegemony and its limited numbers to adequately rule the vast and 
environmentally difficult colony of GSWA. The latter was weak in its internal political 
struggle between British and Boers and the imperial policy of South Africa moving towards 
a union. There was little indication of a ‘project’ when approached from the British 
perspective, but only an understanding pertaining to the stability of the fragile borderlands. 
Therefore, the weakness of the German administration had a direct impact on the actions 
and views of the British: it was a threat that could cross the borders where German colonial 
weakness could expose British colonial weakness.  
But these imperial and geopolitical stakes represent only one side of the coin. The 
other was the relative ignoring of German colonial violence and misrule. Despite being in 
possession of unmistakable evidence, the public outcry for action that persisted in the Congo 
crisis was here non-existent, leaving the perceptions of the detailed reports on the excesses 
to be mainly official. It remains striking that many of the same issues from post-war Southern 
Rhodesia re-emerged in GSWA, particularly the issue of forced labour and vengeance. The 
rebellion in Southern Rhodesia had more white casualties than that in GSWA, where neither 
women nor children were spared. In GSWA, only German men were killed, yet it was in 
GSWA, not Rhodesia, that the death camps were established. This beckons two conclusions: 
one is that German colonialism was, as much of the literature has suggested, exceptional and 
much more brutal than its contemporary counterparts. Another conclusion is that the rules 
of colonial wars had changed with the South African War. Before 1899 a peace settlement 
was the aim and the notion of total war was limited. Of course, civilian casualties were neither 
incomprehensible nor un-strategic, but they largely remained outside the direct strategy and, 
most importantly, the intent of the war. After the South African War, however, it was the 
destruction of a nation, if not through war, then through systematic extermination and 
subjugation by establishing camps and, for some, subjugating them to a slave-like working 
class. 
In conclusion, British officials’ perception of German colonial rule and violence was 
interwoven into a complicated web of shared interests, a general desire for stability and the 
changing, often contradictory relations with Germany both in Europe and in Southern 
Africa. The brutal conduct by Germany was well-known and at times lamented by officials, 
but still attained occasional support against rebels. Humanitarian concerns and reports of 
these details were then suppressed, as they could interfere with the more important 
realpolitik, foreign policy and imperial interests. Unlike the humanist lamentations as voiced 
in the Blue Book, the contemporary view was one of hard-line realism that sought to 
safeguard British South Africa’s stability and to avoid antagonising the Germans, Africans 
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and Boers in the process. Consequently, British perceptions of German colonial rule during 
the Herero-Nama war can perhaps best be characterised as ambiguous and even 
contradictory, as they both collaborated and refused to collaborate. They were interested in 
ending the conflict, supporting the Germans for diplomatic reasons, but were also aware that 
any conflation with German colonialism was problematic and did not necessarily adhere to 
colonial interests. It was a state of paranoia and a desire to reach stability on a regional scale 
which was chaotic, yet collaborative and well-aware of the atrocities that unfolded. The place 
of the Africans herein was paradoxical: on one hand their treatment was fundamental, albeit 
secondary to geopolitical interests, imperial legitimacy and maintaining a diplomatic 
equilibrium in Europe. On the other hand, any concern for the Africans was not immediately 
focused on the Africans themselves, but rather upon the excesses of colonial administration. 
In other words, it was not their welfare that was at heart at such concerns, but the 




























In the autumn of 2016, in the wake of the Bundestags’ recognition of the Armenian genocide 
committed by the Ottoman Empire in 1915, Turkish officials responded angrily by pointing 
to Germany’s own dark and unrecognised past. They not only pointed to the darkest chapter 
in German history, the Holocaust, but also to the supposedly forgotten genocide in Namibia. 
German politicians have since initiated negotiations with the Namibian state over an official 
recognition, although refusing to open the matter of reparations.920 Similar developments 
have not materialised pertaining to Southern Rhodesia, perhaps because of its unique process 
of decolonisation through the independence announced by Ian Smith in 1965, or since any 
addressing of the past seems unlikely due to the current political misgivings surrounding 
Zimbabwe under the recently deposed Robert Mugabe. Nevertheless, as late as January 2017, 
both the Herero and the Nama decided to sue the German state for its actions against their 
ancestors in 1904-8 at the US District Court in New York.921 It is not the intention here to 
discuss the details of current proceedings pertaining to either Britain’s or Germany’s colonial 
past, but they showcase the importance of understanding these events and reveal the scars 
left by colonial rule and violence. More importantly, Turkey’s response by pointing to 
German colonial excesses reveals that even to this day, colonial violence and misrule can be 
utilised as a tool of diplomacy just as the British did in 1918.  
The Blue Book of 1918 served as an effective means to justify Britain and her allies’ 
takeover of GSWA. Despite its clear subjectivity and clear agenda, it is nonetheless an 
important source to the study of how colonial violence was revisited after the First World 
War. The German White Book responded to it in the same manner and pointed to British 
colonial excesses too. The Blue Book and White Book invite comparison of the two cases 
above as incidents of colonial excesses wherein racism and oppression were the norm. 
Therefore, before moving on to conclude on how British officials understood each case of 
colonial misrule and violence in the context of the underpinning ideologies and their imperial 
ambitions, it is first important to characterise the nature of Anglo-German colonial rule by 
highlighting the structural similarities of these two cases. 
Naturally, there were several parallels between the two cases, but there also remain 
crucial dissimilarities. For instance, the murder of women and children in Southern Rhodesia 
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was not repeated to the same extent by the Herero and Nama in GSWA. However, the 
response of the colonial power was also different and indicates a relatively dissimilar 
understanding of how colonial risings were to be countered. Indeed, the response of the 
British in 1896 was fundamentally different from that of the Germans in 1904, as it was only 
the latter who pursued outright genocidal strategies. Nevertheless, the White Book’s referral 
to the 1896 rebellion as an example of British colonial excesses is vindicated by a variety of 
clear parallels that may furthermore explain how British officials understood, perceived and 
reacted to such situations. In terms of similarities, three main aspects can be identified: (i) 
the military operations and the violence inflicted upon the Africans; (ii) in both cases, the 
issue of ‘native labour’ was crucial for colonial policies and the general ambitions for each 
colony and; (iii) both cases also displayed the weakness of the colonial states in Southern 
Africa. 
Although the scale of violence in Southern Rhodesia and GSWA was, as mentioned, 
different, the similarities in the military operations and the violence inflicted remain 
instructive. It is worth noting that the two most fundamental publications on each case, by 
Ranger and Drechsler respectively, both categorise each rebellion as a united African 
response to European encroachment. In both cases, the Ndebele and Herero seized the 
chance to rebel when the colonial forces were engaged elsewhere. Both had the initiative, but 
failed to sustain their offensive and were forced into a long defensive war when imperial 
troops arrived. Only when the Africans used guerrilla tactics were the overwhelming 
superiority of Britain and Germany challenged, with measures of dynamiting caves and 
concentration camps being introduced in response. Of course, it is, worth noting here that 
in 1896, the concentration camps had not yet been introduced fully as a means of colonial 
warfare, whereas in GSWA, the British example of the South African War a few years 
beforehand may certainly, as has already been discussed, have been a grim inspiration for the 
Germans. As Lindner has argued, the usage of different means imposed by colonial powers 
in counter-insurgency efforts entered into what she calls a ‘colonial archive’ from which the 
colonial powers could transfer practices and draw upon the experiences and methods of 
others.922 These violent practices, which reveal the underlying racism of colonial rule and 
violence, were gradually radicalised by the success of African guerrilla resistance. Indeed, in 
the opening stages of the conflict, both British and German troops applied the strategy of 
‘mowing down’ African rebels. The ‘tools of empire’ not only created a power gap in material 
terms, but also created a psychology where the mere presence of a machine gun was believed 
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to be enough to scare off the rebels. Racialism, having created an image of European racial 
superiority, was thereby reinforced through this technological gap because it upheld that 
exact image.923 Therefore, when challenged by guerrilla warfare, the colonisers sought to 
maintain their self-portrayed superiority by employing violent methods of dynamiting caves 
and concentration camps.  
Regarding the aspect of ‘native labour’, John Wellington argues that one of the critical 
comparative elements between Southern Rhodesia and GSWA was the post-conflict state of 
each colony, which was characterised by the aspiration to maintain a racial gap or hierarchy.924 
The issue of ‘native labour’ was critical to maintain this gap to achieve the future economic 
development. Both British and German officials applied a similar rhetoric when it came to 
the use of forced labour drawn from the Africans. For instance, Milner argued in a similar 
way to his German counterparts Hartmann and Rohrbach that labour schemes would not 
only be economically beneficial but would also help to civilise the alleged savages. However, 
a central problem emerged where the labour-demanding projects –  for instance, the mining 
industry of Southern Rhodesia and the construction of the Lüderitz harbour – prompted a 
large influx of forced labour permitted under the guise of ‘public works’. The problem that 
arose from this was, as Milner had warned, that it could lead to ‘false accusations of slavery.’925 
This presented British officials with a problem since, the entire moral identity of the 
British Empire after 1833 was to rid the world of the slave trade and slavery. Furthermore, 
international treaties had clearly stated that it was the duty of the colonisers to oversee the 
welfare of the Africans and these ‘new slaveries’ would undoubtedly be in violation hereof, 
whether within the confines of the British Empire or as a well-documented practice in a 
neighbouring colony. In Southern Rhodesia, Whitehall intervened and made sure that any 
labour provisions were omitted on paper, and although such practices continued, this 
nonetheless indicates that humanitarian principles were indeed taken seriously. However, 
when forced labour was uncovered in GSWA, the British government did not have a direct 
responsibility nor a desire to intervene: at least, not until the outbreak of the First World 
War.  
The third comparative element between the cases is the underlying weakness of the 
colonial powers not just in Southern Rhodesia and GSWA but in the entire region. Aldwin 
Roes, in a study of the Congo Free State, identified four central factors that determined the 
strength and reach of a colonial power. First was the armed resistance against colonial rule. 
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Second was the geographical obstacles and the size of the colonial space. Third was the thinly 
spread administrative and military posts which stretched colonial authority. Fourth was the 
economic aspect where the colonial ventures often ended in disappointment due to 
overestimations of mineral wealth and a weak financial base.926 These four aspects neatly fit 
the situation in both Southern Rhodesia and GSWA and indicate that colonial rule in both 
was generally weak. The risings caused immense problems for the colonial administration 
and incurred several political and economic costs. The geography was also a key feature in 
each case study, as exemplified by the Ndebele resistance in the Matopos or the use of the 
border and rugged terrain, especially by Nama guerrilla fighters. Furthermore, in Southern 
Rhodesia, the newly conquered Matabeleland was thinly occupied and GSWA was sparsely 
populated with settlers. The financial situation of each was also problematic, as both had 
proven to be costly in maintenance, with limited prospects for the future.  
The weakness of the coloniser in both Southern Rhodesia and GSWA, therefore, 
presented the British imperial authorities in Whitehall with a problem as they became deeply 
involved in the conflicts of the surrounding area where the risings Southern Rhodesia and 
GSWA formed strong possibilities that could undermine British rule through various 
scenarios or spill-over effects. Therefore, to secure the hinterland of the prized, yet fragile 
South Africa, British intervention in one way or another sought to mitigate the weakness 
displayed by the BSAC and Germany. In regard to the former, it resulted in the deployment 
of imperial troops, and for the latter, it resulted in various incidents of collaboration with 
Germany, especially on the borderlands. According to Dedering, these borderlands 
formulated a critical space for resistance that caused different problems and concerns for 
officials, because these were the weakest areas, since they were ‘diffuse areas where 
hegemony is fragmented through the imperial rivalry between different colonial powers, 
through the ineffective control mechanisms of the colonial state, and through the precarious 
environmental conditions.’927  
Colonial rule in Anglo-German Southern Africa was therefore weak and the 
colonisers were constantly seeking to achieve domination and hegemony.928 This 
fundamental weakness prompted the colonial powers to use excessive force, especially when 
the weakness of the colonial state was displayed by, for instance, guerrilla resistance. In 
addition to the lack of hegemony in the colonies themselves, the entire region was also 
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affected by the Anglo-Boer relations, either in terms of the increasing aggressions leading up 
to the war or the ongoing attempt to stabilise the region afterwards. The context in which 
British officials understood colonial crises in the region, therefore, were entangled into the 
broader realpolitik situation where their presence was considered fragile and always 
challenged by Africans, Boers or Germans. Clearly, therefore, the overall strategic and 
imperial goal from the perspective of Whitehall before 1914 was the overall stability of the 
region. The weakness of colonial rule and the constant effort to obtain hegemony therefore 
prompted further collaboration between the British imperial government and the BSAC and 
Germany respectively. An important aspect in this thesis has been to understand the relations 
between the British government and the two secondary actors, and here a similar pattern has 
been revealed. Just as had been the case with their relations with Germany, the British 
government and the BSAC were simultaneously accomplices and rivals. They had shared 
goals and interests but were in constant competition, as the Company sought to further its 
autonomy and economic growth and the government saw Southern Rhodesia as part of their 
broader view of empire in Southern Africa, where company actions could affect or disrupt 
imperial policies and agendas, particularly concerning the Boer republics.  
The prevailing notion of rivalry as being characteristic of Anglo-German colonialism 
in Southern Africa is partly a product of the post-war descriptions in the White, and especially 
the Blue Book. Their antagonistic and disjointed narratives have confirmed the idea that 
Britain and Germany were engaged in a spirit of antagonism, obscuring connections and 
cases of co-operation. Indeed, the longstanding perception of the pre-war years has arguably 
been shaped by the spirit of the post-war years, but as John Mackenzie and others have 
shown, ‘imperial co-operation flourished before 1914, then it stopped.’929 The problem here 
is that we are left with two disconnected entities of absolutist nature: either colonial powers 
co-operated as friends or they were rivals. However, both are too definitive and do not 
consider the premises upon which colonial actors operated.  
British officials in both case studies are shown to have an ambiguous and often 
contradictory stance towards either the BSAC or Germany. They co-operated when it suited 
British interests and when it was the easiest solution. But concomitantly, they also knew that 
co-operation could, for instance, cause grievances amongst their colonial subjects or could 
undermine British imperial legitimacy. In 1918 both the moral and legal arguments presented 
in the Blue Book were based on the Africans’ own alleged desire to be under British rule. 
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Regarding Southern Rhodesia, the existence of a coercive labour scheme would not only 
bring to the fore a colonial scandal, but would also exhibit the British Empire as being in 
direct violation of its most crucial moral component of anti-slavery and humanitarianism. 
Therefore, the relations between Whitehall and the BSAC and Germany respectively, were 
characterised by an inherent ambiguity that encompassed several stakes, interests and 
convictions. Co-operation could then also pose a problem for Britain, as it indicated their 
awareness and participation in affairs that could be publicly lamented. Therefore, co-
operation was haphazard and not always given, either out of fear of its ramifications or 
because it would not suit British interests. Yet, in the face of ‘native risings’, the desire to 
achieve stability remained at the top of the agenda and thus prompted a shared interest 
among the colonial actors. 
Certainly, recent arguments that the British, or for that matter other empires, were 
‘trans-European projects’ remain compelling and allow us to transcend nationally deduced 
histories of colonialism.930 But it remains imperative to remember the ambiguous and often 
contradictory nature of the relations between the colonial actors. Indeed, the nature of both 
intra- and inter-colonial relations may perhaps best be described by the old Bedouin proverb, 
‘me against my brother, me and my brother against my cousin, me, my brother and my cousin 
against the stranger.’  
 
The place of the Africans, however, remained central, as they were not only a potential threat 
to the much-desired stability, but were also the victims of colonial maladministration which 
could, in turn, also destabilise the region, either by antagonising further upheaval or by 
spawning metropolitan critique and pressure. The treatment of Africans, therefore, was a key 
issue in these conflicts, as maladministration and exploitation could undermine both the 
moral and the legal premise of colonial rule.  
Although the officials in Whitehall and beyond often saw the Africans as being 
inferior, there remains little evidence of an outright linkage between scientific racialism as a 
metropolitan discourse and officials’ perceptions of colonialism. Where the theme of racism 
is central in this thesis is mainly in the implementation of practices such as establishing 
concentration camps, dynamiting caves and, as in both cases, introducing systems of forced 
labour. This is not to say that officials did not hold racist persuasions, but rather, that these 
did not carry through to their work in the same way as more political ideologies of 
humanitarianism. Racialism, while rarely expressed explicitly, was therefore a basic principal 
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conceptualisation upon which colonial rule and colonialism were effectuated. The subjects – 
the ‘lower’ races – were instrumental in the imperial project and crucial to the understanding 
thereof. Racialism thus allowed for violence and oppression, but it also invited complexities 
and juxtapositions such as the sensitive labour issues where racist ideas of labour being 
‘healthy’ for the Africans were at odds with the humanitarian anti-slavery ideology. Moreover, 
military practices were observed by, among others, media and foreign officials, and therefore 
officials, whether British or German, remained sensitive to how they were perceived by their 
counterparts and peers, particularly when the Congo crisis was unfolding.931 
The racism witnessed, both in the warfare employed and the labour polices, remains 
characteristic of Anglo-German colonialism before the outbreak of the First World War. But 
whereas the British government intervened in Southern Rhodesia to curb company rule, they 
remained passive upon uncovering similar and even worse incidents in GSWA and at times 
even helped the Germans. There is, therefore, a discrepancy between the two cases, where 
Britain in one case acted and in the other upheld a colonial omerta. However, in 1918, the 
nature of colonial rule was of course revisited in the Blue and White Books respectively, thus 
beckoning the question of what underpinning factors, interests and circumstances might 
have triggered this change from accepting the grim reality of colonial rule to denouncing it.   
The British government’s stance towards the BSAC offers a pre-war glimpse into 
how colonial scandals were interwoven into both humanitarian convictions and imperial 
policies and interests. It was not only revisited by the White Book but also shows that 
Germany in 1918 ostensibly took the same place that the BSAC had once held, being on 
trial. Indeed, where Rhodes and his associates had been held accountable for the Jameson 
Raid and maladministration, Germany was now proposed to be the main culprit behind a 
new colonial scandal. In other words, Britain sought purposefully to establish Germany as a 
new Rhodes, or rather, as a new Leopold. For British officials, the empire was embedded in 
a morality in which humanitarianism, originating from the anti-slavery movements, was a 
fundamental factor and justification behind expansion. Both company rule in Southern 
Rhodesia and the British response to the violence in GSWA highlighted the contradictory 
morality of empire: that violence and oppression went hand in hand with the alleged 
humanitarian ideals of civilisation and that emancipation was imposed through 
subjugation.932  
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Throughout the thesis, the humanitarian influence upon British officials has been 
evident, and it formulated strong and powerful practicalities such as the omission of the 
clause permitting the BSAC to obtain labour for public works. Although such humanitarian 
ideology of anti-slavery did indeed prevent colonial rule from possibly taking much worse 
forms, we cannot completely disconnect racism from humanitarianism, as they often went 
hand in hand, and both created an image of the colonised as inferior and in need of help. 
But the question that remained was in what ways to ‘help’: through actual humanitarian 
‘civilising’ or through racially deduced stereotypes allowing exploitation to exist under the 
predicate of ‘upliftment’. Indeed, humanitarian critique, especially from the outlook of 
British officials, was focused more on the excesses of colonial rule, rather than on the 
sufferings of the colonised. In other words, what was at stake was not primarily the lives and 
experiences of Africans, but the problems that would arise should colonial rule in Southern 
Africa be too violent and oppressive. Humanitarian critique and convictions, therefore, were 
mainly aimed at the colonial rulers rather than the colonised. The humanitarianism expressed 
by officials aimed to ensure that the moral foundations of empire were not disrupted so that 
it would remain a benign force in the minds of its public. In other words, the anti-slavery 
rhetoric was not to prevent new slaveries in Africa, but primarily to prevent colonisers from 
being perceived as such.  
The best example to illustrate the immense consequences of what would happen if 
accusations of slavery were indeed made on a solid empirical basis with the potential for 
public support, was, of course, the Congo crisis. The massive public protests and support 
for the CRM compelled the British government to amend its foreign policy accordingly. 
Colonial scandals could, in the minds of British officials, open a Pandora’s box that could 
lead to dismissals and public denunciations and even compel the government to change its 
foreign policy regardless of whether this was in its diplomatic interests. Therefore, upon 
uncovering similar incidents in GSWA, British officials subdued these reports, and 
fortunately for them, neither humanitarian groups nor the press caught on to the atrocities 
which could potentially mobilise public pressure to mount a diplomatic mission towards 
Germany. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, which occurred prior to the full escalation of 
the CRM, we can already see how the government was keen to ensure that any critique and 
ramifications could not be traced back to Whitehall. By making sure that the BSAC was not 
allowed to pursue ‘new slaveries’ on paper, the government could then and in future always 
point to the Order in Council and thus legalistically be exonerated. But in 1918, Britain and 
Germany both referred to these cases of colonial scandals as part of their diplomatic 
arguments made at Versailles. This, of course, leaves the question of how we may characterise 
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the discrepancy in British officials’ perception of colonial rule in 1918 compared to that pre-
1914.  
Before 1914, colonial violence and oppression was the norm in Anglo-German 
Southern Africa. If colonial rule was to remain stable and attain Britain’s support, the 
disclosure of reports on violence, exploitation and genocide – all serving as evidence of the 
racism that characterised colonialism in Anglo-German Southern Africa –  was harmful, and 
Britain therefore upheld a colonial omerta where the atrocities of colonial powers were 
withheld. Emanating from the ambiguous mutual understanding and collaboration between 
the colonisers, this omerta was upheld to secure the stable and efficient governance of colonial 
rule in the face of African resistance whether within or outside British formal territory. The 
logic and applicability of this omerta was multiple and formed a double-edged sword: First, it 
was upheld because of the anxieties and concerns of officials both domestically and 
internationally. It remains clear, that from the perspective of Whitehall, colonial antagonism 
was not in their interest, as they were focused on Europe and mainly feared the ramifications 
that colonial affairs would have for the more important European relations, especially with 
Germany.933 Domestically, public opinion, as had arisen during the Congo crisis, was 
unwanted, as it put the government in a delicate situation where it had to mediate between 
public desires on the one hand and realpolitik and foreign policy concerns on the other. 
Withholding information about scandals in the spirit of this omerta was therefore key for 
officials to prevent public outrages that could severely interfere with their realpolitik and 
imperial interests.  
Second, the omerta was not only a force that sparked anxiety among officials, but also 
one which could be harnessed to attain specific aims. This was the case to a lesser extent in 
1896-7 when the BSAC was denounced for its maladministration, which led the government 
to put a leash on the Company, and to a larger extent in 1918, when the Blue Book disclosed 
German colonial atrocities to gain diplomatic and public support for seizing the entire 
German colonial empire. It was not merely diplomatic and humanitarian support that could 
be obtained: as has already been shown by Andrew Porter, popular support could also be 
mobilised for specific purposes. When Chamberlain and Milner sought to obtain popular 
support for their belligerent stance towards the Boer republics prior to 1899, a strong body 
of pro-empire opinion in the metropole would ‘enable the Government to achieve its aims 
through a truly national show of determination…these were the assumptions which led 
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Chamberlain to try to use the force of public opinion as a counter in the diplomatic game.’934 
In other words, public opinion could be a mandate for diplomatic and imperialistic action, 
including war, and just as it could potentially compel the government to take steps against its 
wishes and interests, so too could it be mobilised by the government to achieve its goals.  
But if certain actors wished to mobilise public opinion for such purposes, the 
circumstances needed to be right. Before the First World War, realpolitik circumstances 
dictated that Britain should uphold its colonial omerta with Germany, as colonial scandals 
would only harm relations for no purpose and could pose a hindrance to seeking colonial 
stability, as often done through collaboration. For example, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, 
who had been a vocal supporter of the CRM, noted on a report from 1909 which described 
the genocide in GSWA in detail that it was ‘as bad as the Congo.’935 But another note on the 
same report simply stated that it was ‘not necessary to send this report to Berlin.’ 936 In 1909, 
British officials were therefore well aware of the genocide in GSWA but chose to keep it to 
themselves, not even transmitting it to Berlin. The logic behind this was that Britain should 
not interfere with France or Germany on the issue of colonial rule in the same vein as had 
been done with Belgium because they were, in the words of E. A. W. Clarke, Head of the 
African Department in the FO, ‘reasonably civilised’ and ‘boys too big to interfere with.’937 
The omerta meant that British post-war actions were in conflict with both perceptions 
and actions when the conflicts or scandals were unfolding. Indeed, as shown above the 
British government was well aware of the conditions and atrocities in both Southern 
Rhodesia and GSWA, and even participated in the counterinsurgency when they deemed it 
necessary to achieve stability. But breaking the omerta could also be a powerful manoeuvre to 
obtain public and diplomatic support. However, this manoeuvre necessitated that this 
intervention be legitimate. Martin’s report therefore served to illustrate the necessity of 
further imperial control in Southern Rhodesia and restraint of the BSAC. Similarly, the Blue 
Book, by purposefully exhibiting German maladministration while obscuring British 
awareness and participation, broke the omerta and paved the way for the takeover of 
Germany’s colonies under the guise of humanitarian intervention.  
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This thesis has revealed the complex interactions between the British government and sub-
imperial actors and fellow colonial powers, as being indicative of a mutual understanding 
where the subjugation of African resistance was crucial and saw rivalry and co-operation co-
existing. But it has also shown the underlying ideological framework and convictions of 
British officials in the face of colonial misrule and violence. Indeed, the circulation of reports 
on misrule and violence was managed by British officials to suit their needs. The result of 
the ambiguous, yet intimate relations between the government and the BSAC and Germany 
respectively was the omerta. Upholding it or breaking it shows that British officials effectively 
utilised the circumstances at the given time to suit their needs. It was broken to display the 
BSAC and Germany as unfit colonisers, paving the way for the extension of British 
governmental influence or even takeover by its dominion. Humanitarianism was the 
underlying factor in the omerta, as it formulated strong moral and legal validations of colonial 
rule and violence. This thesis has therefore shown, that diplomatic actions taken in the wake 
of a realpolitik shift intersected with humanitarian discourses that the official mind had 
hitherto sought to avoid, but could now harness for its own ends. Indeed, both Southern 
Rhodesia and GSWA, where overt incidents and practices of racism were widespread, could 
initially become an embarrassment or scandal that could potentially escalate into a new 
Congo crisis, the consequences of which would be difficult for British officials to anticipate. 
By upholding the colonial omerta, however, such scandals were prevented and managed. But 
when a suitable scapegoat could be exposed while exonerating British governmental 
involvement, such scandals posed a tempting and viable opportunity for Whitehall to further 
their diplomatic and imperialistic interests.  
Humanitarianism was therefore far more than a structural ideology proclaimed by 
various groups and individuals. It was not a passive force that only indirectly shaped the 
mind of imperial rule: rather, it was an active force which translated into strategies and tactics 
of colonial rule and imperialistic expansion at the expense of other colonial actors in the 
shape of humanitarian intervention. In other words, humanitarianism partook in attaining 
the strategic and realpolitik aims of the British Empire and mobilised public, political and 
diplomatic support, outmanoeuvring both the BSAC and Germany. The former escaped this 
manoeuvre, albeit restrained by the leash of legislation, which limited its powers and 
privileges. The latter, however, lost its colonies completely, and to this day, Germany’s 
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